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24 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Two definitions of Free Will |
Defined as a choice between at least two different options or the ability to do otherwise |
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Determinism |
There only being one course of possible events, which is entirely determined by the combination of past events and the laws of nature |
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‘Hard’ determinists |
The universe is determined and therefore free will is an impossibility, |
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Libertarians |
The universe is not determined and therefore we have free will. Kleptomaniac could not steal, humans can choose how to act despite past events, |
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‘Soft’ determinists |
The universe is determined but this is compatible with free will Freedom is the liberty of spontaneity: the freedom to act according to one’s nature, which is determined by external factors such as an agent’s environment or biology. So, for ‘soft’ determinists every act has been determined but an act can be free if the decision is taken under no external influences. |
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Incompatibilists |
Free will and determinism cannot be reconciled |
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Locke's analogy of a locked room |
A man is in a room. There is a door. He decides to stay in the room and therefore does not try to open the door. He has made a choice between 2 options so has free will. However, the door was locked and so the man could not have done otherwise. Therefore the man does not have free will. |
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Consequence Argument |
We cannot change anything in the past; if determinism is true then the future must be fixed in the same way; our acts are the result of the laws of nature and events in the past; not our decision what happened inthe past; our present and future cannot be decided by us. Concludes that if determinism is true, then no one has or ever had a choice about any aspect of the future, including what we normally take to be our free actions. |
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Libet Experiment |
Brain activity showed that the decision had often already been made before the participants were aware of having acted, there is something which causes people to make decisions they think are free; however, could just be an accuracy error on the timing of thedecision. |
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Honderich |
Everything is determined, both internally and externally; all our actions are caused by states of the brain. This means that even our will is not free as our brain determines it and so our freedom is restricted. |
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Spinoza |
We have no free will as our mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause and then there is an infinite regression of causes; |
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Skinner |
The causes of our actions lie in our physical environment. Our decisions are due to our upbringing especially psychological reinforces and punishment so no free will as could not do otherwise. |
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Ayer |
There are logically only two alternatives - our choices are either causally determined or accidental, with both denying moral responsibility. “If human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did” |
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Problem with Determinism |
Standard interpretation of Quantum Theory, the Copenhagen Interpretation, holds that the laws governing nature are indeterministic and probabilistic; Chaos theory and Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle also provide evidence that the laws of physics are not certain but merely probabilities. Must use Induction to prove that the laws of science will always be the same |
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Galen Strawson's 'pessimism' (hard incompatibilism) |
The notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. If one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must beresponsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossiblefor one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation S, one must have beenresponsible for the way one was at S−1. To be responsible for the way one was at S−1, one must have been responsible for the way one was at S−2, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ex nihilo. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. |
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Jean-Paul Sartre |
People actively determine their nature through their choices and actions. |
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Chisholm |
An agent must be able to both perform an act and be able to not perform the act to make a free choice; the act must be directly or indirectly in his power (example of going to Boston) There is a distinction between event causation and agent causation. When a person acts freely, he does something for which there is no event or state or combination of events or states that is a sufficient causal condition for his doing it or failing to do it. So Libertarian as no determinism. |
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Kane |
The existence of alternative possibilities is a necessary condition for free actions but not a sufficient cause of free will as it is possible that our actions are random. Ultimate responsibility is sufficient for free will. Ultimate responsibility means that agents are the ‘originators and sustainers of their own ends and purposes,’ so more than one way for an agent’s life to turn out and that way must be based upon the agents willing actions, not all actions but ‘self-forming actions’ of indecision. |
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Harry Frankfurt |
An agent can still have the possibility to make a free choice even if determined, ‘free’ action is not that they had the ability to do otherwise. If the agent did not know they could not do otherwise they still acted freely so are morally responsible. |
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Frankfurt's Example of addicts |
‘Hierarchical mesh’ of ‘wanton’ addicts, ‘unwilling’ addicts and ‘willing’ addicts. All have conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug they are addicted to and to not want to take it. Yet ‘wanton’ addicts have no second-order desire about desiring the drug, the ‘unwilling’ addicts have the second-order desire to not desire the drugs whilst the ‘willing’ addicts have the second-order desire to desire the drugs; Members ofthe first group are devoid of will and therefore are no longer persons, The second-group freely desire not to desire the drug but their will is overcome by addiction. The third group willingly desire the drug they are addicted to; Clearly the third-group are determined. However, they also freely will to take the drugsand therefore are responsible for their actions. |
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Hobbes |
An agent is free unless they are forced into actions against their will or they do not have the opportunity to do otherwise even if they decided to. Free Will is therefore the unimpeded ability of an agent to do what they want (within reason). |
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Problem with Hobbes |
A person who suffers from serious hallucinations may act unimpeded whilst they are hallucinating but do not have free will. |
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Hume |
Hume saw freedom as the ‘power of acting according to the determinations of the will: that is, if we choose to remain at rest we may; if we choose to move, we also may.’ We are free unless we are forced into actions against our will, like, as Hume said, a ‘prisoner in chains’ is unable to choose to unshackle himself. |
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Hume's psychological argument |
Hume developed a psychological argumentclaiming that there is a link between motive and the resulting action. We have the freedom to act according to the ideas and values that we have developed. Every act had to be caused; otherwise it was the result of chance, so freedom and determinism had to be compatible. So, we are not fully free and therefore do not have full moral responsibility but freedom and determinism are compatible. |
