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68 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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types of unilateralism
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pure – no consultations with allies
polite – tells other what it’s doing in advance but does it regardless of support welcoming – willing to go alone but willing to form “coalition of the willing” |
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hub and spoke bilateralism
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- don’t act unless allied states are willing to accept action and go along with you (but this is undertaken only on a state-by-state basis, not through a multilateral organization like NATO)
- happens most often in relations with Asia and the Pacific; usually doesn’t happen with Europe except for the UK |
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regional multilateralism
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- work through orgs like NATO – moving towards global multilateralism
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global multilateralism
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- very strict standard – don’t act unless the relevant institutions of global governance endorse your action
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trilateral commission
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Started by David Rockefeller in 1973 – worked to improve relations between the U.S., Europe, and Japan; it’s an illustration of how unusual it was to depart from the fairly high U.S. standard of multilateral economic policy (even though security policy was often multilateral during the Cold War).
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examples of conspicuous departure from multilateralism
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- under Clinton: backed away from Ottawa, Kyoto, Nuclear Test Ban treaties
- under Bush: abandonment of NK sunshine policy, ICC, ABM treaty, and then post-9/11: no NATO in Afghanistan invasion, Iraq invasion w/o multilateral support |
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the Obama admin and multilateralism
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Seems to be moving back to multilateralism. We’re in a honeymoon period with NK, reaching out to China, Nobel Peace Prize. But neoconservatives say that the global test is the wrong test; what impresses the Nobel Committee in Norway will not impress Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, etc.
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does public opinion shape foreign policy? what about the media?
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Public opinion seldom shapes USFP. The media sometimes shapes FP, but seldom by changing public opinion. More often it is the foreign policy elites shaping media content.
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who actually makes USFP?
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Roskin was right – elites. Three groups of citizens: 1) the foreign policy elite (1%) – attentive and active; 2) the attentive public (9%) – attentive but not active; 3) the mass public (90%) – not attentive and not active
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five links between public opinion and foreign policy
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1) do you have an opinion on FP?
2) did you vote? 3) did you cast your vote based on your FP opinions? 4) did you make an accurate assessment as to which candidate shared your FP opinions? 5) did that candidate deliver on their campaign promises? |
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Why does public opinion and actual policy persistently differ in a democracy?
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Because of the inattentiveness and inactivity of the mass public.
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So what's the role of media in shaping foreign policy?
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The Iraq War suggests that images aren’t that powerful and there isn’t actually much of a CNN effect. If FP elite has policy they want to pursue, they’ll pursue it. The CNN effect in Somalia was “effective” because camera crews went at urging of government officials and members of congress.
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Creative tension?
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Hamilton says yes; Paarlberg says no. Paarlberg says it’s a dysfunctional division of labor where the executive branch has too much military and security policy power and Congress has too much trade, environmental, and foreign aid policy power. Congress already has the upper hand in the Constitution.
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Powers given to Congress by the Constitution
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- declare war (now weakened)
- raise and equip armies/navies - reject treaties (also weakened) - reject appointees - regulate foreign commerce - power of purse (implicit) -->post WWII, the president has had increasing power in foreign policy by being allowed to enter into “executive agreements” that don’t require Congressional approval |
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National Security Act
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1947 - created the NSC, DOD, and CIA; one of the forces behind weakening Congressional power
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War Powers Act
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1973. Three stipulations: 1) consult Congress before sending troops; 2) notify Congress within 48 hours of sending troops; 3) terminate intervention of Congressional approval isn’t attained within 60 days (plus a 30-day withdrawal period)…..covert action not disciplined under the WPA.
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Is there a connection between party leaders and foreign policy?
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Yes! they make up elite opinion, which is what shapes USFP
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What did the framers want in terms of political parties?
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They didn’t want them (no “factions”); minimize their influence – hence the system of leadership selection, checks and balances, federalism that they built. But parties formed immediately anyway.
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What effect does party affiliation have in the executive branch?
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Quite a lot. There are 5,000 government positions filled at the choice of the president, usually based on loyalty to president and/at least president’s party. Exceptions in the Obama admin: Robert Gates, Gen James Jones, Lawrence Summers.
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Party affiliation inside Congress
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Majority gets control over: committee chairmanship, including the House Rules Committee; presumed majority vote to pass any major bill; Speaker of the House.
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When can parties influence foreign policy?
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Most influence when they disagree. The consensus during the early Cold War made majority rule of little consequence; but now, there is increasing party polarity, Congress is very divided, and elections have high stakes.
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What spurred increasing party divisions?
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1964 – Civil Rights Act
1965 – Voting Rights Act and escalation of Vietnam War under President Johnson |
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Was bipartisanship restored after 9/11?
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Briefly, but there was no lasting effect. It was an emotional rally behind the president, but the underlying structure of increased polarity was still the same.
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When is USFP successful?
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Under divided governments (ie Nixon in the midst of Vietnam and Bush St in ending the Cold War and in pushing Saddam out of Kuwait). Unsuccessful FP is usually hatched under unified governments (ie 2003 Iraq invasion).
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What doesn't matter in ethnic group capture of FP?
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Size of population (lots of Chinese Americans but no influential lobby representing them – meanwhile, Armenian-American population is tiny but has a very powerful lobbying group)
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What does matter for ethnic group capture?
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Economic success and motive to change the status quo. It also helps if you’re a refugee population. Ie CANF and AIPAC. CANF also has electoral power on their side.
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What are the two issues on which parties deliberate the least?
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Israel and Cuba
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Three models of foreign policy decision-making
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Paarlberg: unified choice, organizational output, high-level bargaining
Allison: rational choice, organizational process, bureaucratic politics |
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Model I FP
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Unified choice (rational choice). Action is chosen by a cost/benefit analysis by a unitary, rational decision-maker that is centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. Pick option with highest benefits and lowest cost. This is an inadequate approach and FP rarely follows this model.
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Model II FP
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Organizational output (organizational process). Each organization has a different standard operating procedure that they stand by when making decisions, producing an output that is unthinking and routinized. Governments perceive FP problems through these organizational sensors, so there is incomplete/incoherent information. Ie Vietnam – different orgs doing different things. Model II nightmare: can lead to mass chaos, too many voices speaking at once – it undermines the overall impact of the policy.
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Model III FP
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High-level bargaining (bureaucratic politics). Leaders of each organization have their own values and beliefs and disagree on approach. The government behavior is then the outcome of bargaining between the leaders of the bureaucracies. Model III nightmare: outcome may be everyone’s 2nd (or 3rd or last) choice, no one’s first choice.
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Which model is most plausible?
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Model II. Allison: careerists shape policy because they have job security and know way more about the rest of the world than upper level positions trying to manage up to millions of people (DOD has 2 million employees). Exs: country desk people know way more about their countries than does the secretary of state. At the level of implementation these are the people pulling levers and making adjustments – ie when the Navy followed their own SOP in implementing the Cuban blockade instead of following Kennedy’s and McNamara’s directions.
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National Security Council
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First formed in 1947, is has been used by different presidents in four main ways to protect from model II/III nightmares and move FP towards model one. Four models:
1) 1947 Truman: as a foreign policy cabinet 2) 1953-60 Eisenhower: FP “staff” to monitor decisions…but he effectively created another bureaucracy 3) 1961-80 Kennedy: among the White House, way to make FP sans SOS 4) 1980: under Reagan, very decentralized…under Bush, best FP ever – strong SOS. |
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What model was the Iraq '03 decision?
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Doesn’t really fit any of the models. What do you blame it on: Colin Powell’s personality defects? Condy Rice blocking Powell’s voice? Cheney’s interpretation of VP role as a 4th branch of government, giving himself unprecedented power?
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What services does the US intelligence agency perform?
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operational, analytic, and covert
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Operational intelligence
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Mostly performed by armed forces: defense intelligence agency monitors non-satellite sources, national reconnaissance office monitors satellite sources; NSA
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Analytic intelligence
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Designed to support FP decisions; it doesn’t differ too much from journalism/academia but they have access to more stuff. INR, CIA.
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Covert intelligence
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Gives policymakers a denial instrument to change behavior of foreign governments through covert action. NIC; covert CIA; president’s daily brief (PDB – most sensitive document coming out of the intelligence agency). Cons: it’s damaging to your image if it doesn’t work (Bay of Pigs fiasco); it’s also less necessary today (post-Cold War)
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Is diplomacy useful as an instrument of USFP?
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Democratic Wilsonians say yes; neoconservatives say no. Good place to test the power of diplomacy: Israel-Arab conflict. Seems like the more president involvement, the less progress. This was concealed by Camp David meeting under Carter and the Oslo Accords under Clinton, but in reality neither of these were the result of USFP initiatives or goals.
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What's the spectrum of means that can be used to influence another state's behavior?
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diplomacy -->threaten economic sanctions-->impose economic sanctions-->engage in demonstrative military action-->limited/full-scale war
*diplomacy can continue through this entire spectrum (as coercive diplomacy) |
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coercive diplomacy
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Combination of talking with threatening, punishing, demonstrating
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When isn't coercive diplomacy used?
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In signing treaties (ie to release a prisoner); holding elections – in these cases it’s just pure diplomacy.
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Failures of coercive diplomacy
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1) Somalia (1992-94) – U.S. retreated
2) DPRK (1994) – Carter retreated on negotiations 3) Iraq (1990-98) – war victory but coercive diplomacy failure 4) Kosovo (1999) – war victory, coercive diplomacy failure 5) Afghanistan (2001) – war victory, CD failure *it’s very tempting to escalate when things aren’t going your way! |
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successes of coercive diplomacy
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Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and China (1996) (but China was an ambiguous success)
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why does coercive diplomacy sometimes work and sometimes fail?
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Problem: you either have to retreat or follow through with your threats; the chances of getting what you want is small. It’s like a football forward pass – it could be complete, but it could also be incomplete or intercepted.
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examples of effective US foreign aid
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Marshall Plan(lots of $ - $50 billion/yr in today’s money); 1950s aid to postwar Korea. Volume of aid has been shrinking since the 1960s, now the total budget for foreign aid is 21 billion/yr
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Are economic sanctions useful?
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Not really. Ie Cold War sanctioning of China, Cuba, North Korea, Russia – it didn’t make them any more compliant.
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Haufbauer, Schott, and Elliot on economic sanctions
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Found 40/115 cases successful = 34% success; this is just as good as for any diplomacy tool and the study suggested that sanctions should be taken more seriously. But then Robert Pope discredited their study by taking it apart and recalculating the success rate at 5%.
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10 lessons of economic sanctions
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1) work towards small, long-term goals
2) good for crippling an economy, doesn’t work for changing political behavior 3) must be multilateral 4) there can be unintended consequences, ie Pakistan upping their investment in nuclear weapons after failed negotiations in the 80s 5) sanctions can hurt at home, too 6) sanctions on authoritarian states don’t always work because they are insensitive to social costs 7) you need a military presence on the border of the target state 8) if sanctions fail, you need to use military force to back it up 9) it’s easier to impose them than to lift them (ie Cuba) 10) fatigue factor – the more time sanctions are imposed, the less enthusiasm there is for them |
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what's the relationship between trade policy and foreign policy?
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Three possibilities: foreign policy could drive trade policy; trade policy could drive foreign policy; foreign policy and trade policy could operate independently in different spheres. Most often it’s #3.
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Who makes trade policy in the US?
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CONGRESS!!! There are other agencies (USTR, TPRG), but they’re all dominated by Congress because 1) Congress passes the legislation regulating them; 2) Congress has to approve their results; and 3) Congress plays an intimate role in shaping and monitoring negotiations.
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Areas where Congressional control in trade policy has been relaxed
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1) export of military weapons (Arms Export Control Act gave this power to the State Dept)
2) commercial products that could have potential dual use as weapons (power given to the Commerce Dept) 3) individual countries (Cuba, Libya, Iran) – Congress agreed that executive branch has power to impose economic sanctions |
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Import barriers
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They’re used more frequently in trade policy, but they can’t be used with large nations and usually aren’t used for FP reasons.
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Factors for success in environmental policy
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1) is there a clear and present environmental danger?
2) is there a small economic cost to the policy response? 3) is there support from U.S. private industry? 4) is there support from organized labor? 5) is there high probability of international reciprocity? -->if yes to all = success (Montreal vs Kyoto) |
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Ikenberry on multilateralism
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*rise of unipolarity is not an adequate explanation for increased unilateralism
*resistance to new multilateral agreements is because it’s a new type of multilateralism that is more legally binding *deep-rooted structural multilateral path hasn’t changed – this includes the high considerations of economic interests, power management, and political tradition |
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Kull et al
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*misperceptions, media, and the Iraq War
*President shapes public opinion when desire is strong enough – this can sometimes be done through the media *media can promote misperceptions – these are reinforced by self-selection of news sources *high levels of attention to news doesn’t reduce likelihood of misperceptions *media is sometimes a means of transmission for administration rather than a “critical filter” |
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Fisher
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*institutional failures of the Iraq War:
- president spreading misperceptions - Congressional rush to war - belittling inspections - disarray by Democrats - similarity of ’02 resolution to Tonkin Gulf Resolution - doctoring intelligence reports - damaged UN relevance *all failed in constitutional duties when war was authorized |
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Lee Hamilton
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*creative tension between Congress and the president makes for better policy, but neither has been pulling their full weight and too much power has been transferred to the president.
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Kupchan and Trubowitz
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*demise of liberal internationalism
*lots of bipartisanship during the early Cold War (50s) – product of geopolitical and domestic developments *problems: bipartisan collapse; party polarization (along regional lines); increased ideology; increased isolationism *prescription: selective engagement – in order to meet country’s geopolitical needs and “restore the political equilibrium necessary to sustain a coherent national strategy” |
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Lindsay
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*Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear
*Ethnic groups matter, but not as much as you’d think *ethnic lobbies confront the same constraints that all interest groups do *they enrich FP, but don’t necessarily shape it |
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Mearsheimer and Walt (and Dershowitz)
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*M&W assert that U.S. national interest should be the objective of USFP, but in Israel the policy is due especially to the Israel Lobby (AIPAC); the U.S. needs to adopt a Middle East policy that is more consistent with U.S. interests
*D: charges M&W with reviving “divided loyalty” and “non-American” slurs against Jews; made it impossible to participate in the discussion without taking sides in an artificial and blinding way |
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Allison
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*3 conceptual models of governmental behavior (unified choice, organizational output, high-level bargaining)
*picks Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) as a straw man for Model I |
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Richard Haass
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*War of Necessity, War of Choice
*Served as Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs under Bush Sr and has been president of the Council on Foreign Relations since July 2003. *Desert Storm = war of necessity *2003 invasion = bad choice |
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9/11 Commission (chapter 11)
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1) imagination
2) policy (too scattered, incoherent) 3) capabilities (outdated institutions) 4) management (transnationally ineffective – model 2 failure) |
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Ervin
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*a homeland attack would be just as easy now as it was on 9/11
*prescription: increased homeland security spending; better leadership in DHS; culture of openness and accountability |
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Martin Indyk
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*Innocent Abroad
*presidents often can’t resist attempting peace negotiations in the Middle East; Clinton and Bush both failed *to take this on, it has to be at the right moment with the right people |
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Andrews
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*environmental policy follows business and has provided “unprecedented levels of material comfort to many people and extraordinary affluence to a few”
*EJ principles: precautionary, polluter pays, intergenerational equality *bipartisan consensus gave way to ideological and partisan gridlock *environmental policy has in the past been in response to a crisis – it should be proactive |
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name all the authors of the second-half articles
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- Ikenberry (multilateralism)
- Kull et al (misperceptions, the media, the Iraq war) - Fisher (institutional failures of Iraq war) - Hamilton (Creative Tension) - Kupchan and Trubowitz (demise of liberal internationalism) - Lindsay (Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear – ethnic group capture) - Mearscheimer & Walt (Israel Lobby) - Dershowitz (reply to M&W) - Allison (3 Conceptual Models of Government Behavior and the CMC) - Richard Haass (War of Necessity, War of Choice) - 9/11 Commission Ch 11 (failures in gvt before 9/11) - Ervin (state of terrorism in the U.S. today) - Martin Indyk (Innocent Abraod) - Andrews (Learning from History – environmental policy) |
