Eu Ws7 Competition Law Abuse Of A Dominant Position

Front 1

Major banana producer importing into EU accused of abusing dominant position.

Back 1

United Brands (1978)

Front 2

Defining RPM:
- Bananas held to be a separate market
- Price unaffected by other fruit
- Combination of attributes made it unique
To what degree may other products be a substitute?

Back 2

United Brands (1978)

Front 3

RPM may be very small or tightly defined, for example spare parts for a particular make

Back 3

Hugin Kassaregister (1979)

Front 4

Defining RGM:
“The area of the common market where conditions of competition are homogeneous (the same for all)”

Back 4

United Brands (1978)

Front 5

A very strong position, held for a long time even if only 40-45% was held to be a dominant position. Dominance more likely if other competitors have small percentages.

Back 5

United Brands (1978)

Front 6

Tying/Bundling
- Requiring second product be bought with first, e.g. nails for nailguns

Back 6

Hilti AG v Commission (1994)

Front 7

A substantial part of the internal market can be geographically very small, such as a single sea port.

Back 7

Sea Containers (1994)

Front 8

Save in exceptional circumstances, very large market shares will be in themselves evidence of dominance

Back 8

Hoffman La Roche (1979)

Front 9

50% or greater market share raises a rebuttable presumption of dominance

Back 9

AKZO Chemie (1991)

Front 10

Nothing in principle prevents multiple companies with economic links from having joint dominance

Back 10

Italian Flat Glass (1992)

Front 11

“May affect trade”
ECJ will accept anything that brings an alteration in the structure of competition in the internal market

Back 11

Commercial Solvents (1974)

Front 12

Dominance:
- Position of economic strength which allows the undertaking to prevent effective competition in the relevant market
- It can do this because it can act independently of customers and competitors

Back 12

United Brands (1978)

Front 13

Test for demand substitutability:
Whether a small but lasting relative price increase would result in consumers switching to an alternative.

Back 13

Commission Notice on Definition of the Relevant Market (1997)
United Brands

Front 14

Test for supply substitutability:
Whether a competitor could switch to producing the same products without significant cost or risk

Back 14

Commission Notice on Definition of the Relevant Market (1997)
United Brands

Front 15

A dominant firm has a special responsibility not to allow Its conduct to impair undistorted competition

Back 15

Michelin v Commission (1983)

Front 16

Abuse:
Acts which, though not the normal way a firm would operate in the market, weaken or damage competition by virtue of ones position

Back 16

Hoffman La Roche (1979)

Front 17

Reducing prices in one sector to below cost to eliminate a competitor held to be predatory pricing

Back 17

AKZO Chemie (1991)

Front 18

Unjustified price differences are an abuse: importing to Rotterdam and then charging buyers in different MSs who take the stuff away is an abuse

Back 18

United Brands (1978)

Front 19

Refusing to supply an existing customer, who makes a normal order, as retaliation is an abuse

Back 19

United Brands (1978)

Front 20

Abusive discount policies
- When discounts are based on getting everything from D, not just standard volume discounts

Back 20

Hoffman La Roche (1979)

Front 21

For RGM, start by assuming the undertaking is the whole of the EU then work inwards

Back 21

Hilti AG

Front 22

Factors to consider as you tighten RGM

Back 22

United Brands

- Transport costs
- Product attributes (fragility, perishability)
- Shipment patterns (significant moves suggest market)
- Location of other plants

Front 23

Abusively refusing to supply to eliminate a competitor

Back 23

Hugin Kassaregister (1979)

Front 24

C can claim in the national courts of the relevant MS because TFEU 102 has horizontal and vertical direct effect

Back 24

BRT v SABAM