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35 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Judgment
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an evaluation or estimate of something
when we reason about what to believe |
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Decision
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an intention to pursue a particular course of action
when we reason about what to do |
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Classic Decision Theory
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analyzes risky decision-making using ideas of probability and logic
Formal and context-independent |
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According to Classic Decision Theory, risky decisions can be broken down into 2 things
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Utility: how much you value and outcome
Probability: How likely it is to occur |
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Expected Value equation
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value x probability
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Expected Value Rule
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Choose the option that maximizes expected value
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Requirements of expected value rule
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Preferences must be coherent (stable and consistent)
* Must satisfy certain axioms: ordering of alternatives dominance cancellation transitivity continuity invariance |
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Ordering of alternatives
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any two alternatives can be compared so that one is preferred over the other, or a person is indifferent to them
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Dominance
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perfectly rational decision makers should never choose a dominated strategy, even if the strategy is only weakly dominated
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Cancellation
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a choice between two alternatives should depend only on those outcomes that differ,, not on outcomes that are the same for both alternatives
common factors should cancel out |
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Transitivity
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if a>b and b>c, then a>c
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Continuity
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a decision maker should always prefer a gamble between the best and worst outcome to a sure intermediate outcome if the odds of the best outcome are good enough
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Invariance
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a decision maker should not be affected by the way alternatives are presented
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St. Petersberg Paradox
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Nicolas Bernoulli
nobody would pay very much to play a game with infinite expected value: continuous coin toss |
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Diminishing Marginal Utility
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utility decreases as consumption increases
Daniel Bernnoulli |
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Major flaw of Bernoulli's model of utility
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Reference independent:
it assumes (implicitly) that the EU of a choice is evaluated against total state of wealth "the carriers of utility are states of wealth" human perceptual system is reference dependent |
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Prospect Theory
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Kahneman and Tversky
replaced "utility" with "value" Reference dependent: predicts that shifts from a reference point will lead to different choices changes in states, rather than absolute wealth, are the carriers of utility |
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Value Function
(Prospect Theory) |
Concave for gains: implies risk aversion
Convex for losses: implies risk seeking |
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Loss Aversion
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losses "loom larger" than gains
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Decision weighting function
(Prospect Theory) |
psychological impact of that probability on a decision
overweighted for low probabilities, underweighted for high probabilities Certainty effect: people care about eliminating risk more than they care about reducing it |
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Expected Utility Theory
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John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
proposed as a normative theory, not a descriptive theory: shows how people WOULD behave if they followed certain requirements of rational decision making |
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Intransitivity
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a decision maker with intransitive preferences can be used as a "money pump"
Amos Tversky proved the existence of intransitivities with a gambling experiment where students chose between high probability and high outcome |
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Preference reversals
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When people are asked to choose between two bets, they pay particular attention to the probability of winning, but when they are asked to set a price for how valuable the bet is, they look at how large the potential payoffs are
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Preference reversals
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When people are asked to choose between two bets, they pay particular attention to the probability of winning, but when they are asked to set a price for how valuable the bet is, they look at how large the potential payoffs are
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Satisficing
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Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon
rather than optimize, people "satisfice" when making decisions to satisfice is to choose a path that satisfies your most important needs, even though the choice may not be ideal or optimal |
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Endowment Effect
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a result of loss aversion
the value of a good increases when it becomes part of a person's endowment people require much more money for something than they would pay to own the same item |
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Certainty Effect
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a reduction of the probability of an outcome by a constanct factor has more impact when the outcome was initially certain than when it was merely probable
Russian Roulette: people pay more to remove the only bullet than one of five |
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Pseudocertainty
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Vaccine experiment: people are attracted to certainty
A dry cleaner may offer to clean one shirt free with each order of three, instead of calling it 25% off because free is more appealing than a discounted service |
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Regret Theory
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counterfactual reasoning is the comparison of hypothetical outcomes; forms the basis of regret theory
risk aversion, but adds regret has been offered as an alternative to prospect theory, but anticipation of regret may not conflict w/ prospect theory |
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Multi-attribute choice
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concerns how, rather than how well, people make decisions
people use compensatory strategies to compare alternatives: either linear model or additive difference model (only differences are weighted) or ideal point model (how far from ideal?) |
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Noncompensatory strategies
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used with complex choices of many alternatives
conjunctive rule disjunctive rule lexicographic strategy elimination-by-aspects |
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Conjuctive rule
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Noncompensatory stragegy: eliminate any alternatives that fall outside certain predefined boundaries
example of satisficing |
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Disjunctive rule
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Noncompensatory strategy: each alternative is evaluated in terms of its best attribute, regardless of how poor other aspects of the alternative may be
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Lexicographic strategy
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Noncompensatory strategy:
list the most important dimensions and choose the one(s) that scored the highest until there's only one left |
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Elimination-by-Aspects (EBA)
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Noncompensatory strategy:
probabilitistic variation of the lexicographic strategy each dimension of comparison is selected with a probability proportional to its importance |