Epistemology

Front 1

Ayer: S knows p iff:

Back 1

S knows p iff:

1. What one is said to know be true

2. One be sureof it

3. One should have the right to be sure

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Infallibilism

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knowledge requires being certain

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Tripartite theory of knowledge

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S knows that p iff:

(i) It is truethat p

(ii) S believesthat p

(iii) S is justifiedin believing that p

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Elgin's thesis

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important parts of good scientific theoriesare not true

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The Ability Intuition

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knowledge is getting it right through one’sability

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The Anti-Luck Intuition

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knowledge is getting it right in a non-luck way

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Classical account of knowledge

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(i) The proposition is true

(ii) One believesthe proposition

(iii) One’s belief is justified

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Russell: Gettier case

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The stopped clock

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Chisholm: Gettier case

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sheep

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Radical scepticism

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knowledge is impossible

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Sceptical hypothesis

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where everything is at is usually is, but we are beingradically deceived

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Fallibilist intuition

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in knowing something I only need to be able to ruleout all relevant possibilities of error, not all possibilities

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Mill:Argument from analogy

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1. There are patterns in my behaviour that revealthat I am having certain mental states2. This same behaviours is exhibited by others ∆ These others experiencethe same mental states that I do, and so are minded

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Closure Principle

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If you know one proposition, and you know it entails asecond proposition, then you know that second proposition too

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The Sensitivity Principle

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when one knows, one has true belief such that,if what you believed hadn’t been true, you wouldn’t have believed it

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modal statements

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how the world could have been (but isn’t)

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Contextualism

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Scepticism raises the epistemic standard

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Overkill Problem

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already deny sceptical hypotheses

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Problem of Epistemic Descent

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maybe the higher standard is privileged

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Mooreanism

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when our common sense convictions come intocontact with theory, common sense always wins

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Neo-Mooreanism

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we do need reasons for common sense convictions

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Safety Principle

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when one knows, one has a true belief couldn'thave easily been false

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Epistemic Externalism

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One can have knowledge even though one’s beliefdoesn’t satisfy an internal epistemic condition

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External Epistemic Condition

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Any condition which is not an internal epistemiccondition

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Epistemic Internalism

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One has knowledge only if one’s belief satisfiesan internal EC

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Strong objectivism

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there is always a possibility that what youbelieve about the world could be false

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Weak objectivism

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what we believe about the world right now couldbe false

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Anti-realism

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truth is just our best opinion, and thereforecannot be different from it – the truth is what we discover at the end ofinquiry

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Goldman

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Reliabilism

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causal theory of knowledge

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S knowsthat p iff the fact that p is causally connected in an ‘appropriate’ way withS’s believing that p

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Reliability

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the tendency of a process to produce beliefsthat are true rather than false

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Reliabilism

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S’s belief is warranted (entitled) iff S’sbelief is generated by a reliable process type

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Accessibilism

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(required by internalism) often assumed thatwhenever a person has a justified belief, he knows what the justification is

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Graham

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Pluralist reliabilism

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Warrant

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epistemic right to form, hold or rely on a belief

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Reasons

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warranted beliefs and other cognitivepropositional attitudes

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Entitlement

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warrants that are not reasons - externalist

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Externalist warrant

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epistemic entitlement arises when abelief-forming process that has reliably forming true beliefs as a function,operates normally – truth-promoting

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Justification (Graham)

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the various beliefs one offers or would offerwhen asked why one’s belief is likely to be true – internalist

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Epistemic norms

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the operation of the cognitive processes in normal circumstances – promote true beliefs

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Normal conditions

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those where the item, because of a certaineffect that becomes its function, was selected for

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Normal functioning

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the way the item operated in those conditionswhen it produced that effect that explains why the item was replicated andpersists

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Epistemic entitlement

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normal functioning, from conforming to this classof epistemic norms

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NED2

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Duplicate of human brain in a vat – no causal connection

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NED3

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Fully disembodied mind/spirit

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NED1

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Phillip kidnapped and brain hooked to supercomputer

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Epistemic peer

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a person equally good at forming beliefs, andequally rational, intelligent

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Evidential parity

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the agents share all evidence

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Full disclosure

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the agents have shared all evidence with oneanother

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Cognitive parity

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the agents are equally intelligent and rational

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No exception clause

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no general reason to think that either of us isespecially likely to be particularly good, or bad, at reacting to evidence onthis particular topic

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Conciliatory

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when the other seems just as intelligent, wellinformed etc. – should change my degree of confidence significantly toward myfriend

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Steadfast

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views on which one may maintain one’sconfidence in the face of others who believe otherwise

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Christensen

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Equal Weight View

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Elga

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“live and let live” attitude: could be more thanone completely reasonable epistemic response

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Rational Uniqueness

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there is a unique maximally epistemicallyrational response to any given evidential situation

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Independence

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in evaluating the epistemic credentials ofanother person’s belief about P, to determine how to modify one’s own beliefabout P, one should do so in a way that is independent to the reasoning behindone’s own initial belief that P

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Lackey

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Justificationism

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Justificationism

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the epistemic power of disagreement isexplainable in terms of the degree of justified confidence with which thebelief in question is held

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Uniformity

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disagreement with epistemic peers functions thesame epistemically in all circumstances

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Non-conformism

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there can be reasonable disagreement amongepistemic peers – one can continue to rationally believe x

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Egocentric view

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I am justified in giving my belief extra weightin the face of peer disagreement because the belief is mine

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Reasoning view

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I am justified in giving my belief extra weightin the face of peer disagreement because the belief is the product of correctreasoning

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Conformism

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there cannot be reasonable disagreement amongepistemic peers – one cannot stick to one’s own belief – doxastic revision mustbe made

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Idealised disagreement

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(1) A and B are aware that they hold differentdoxastic attitudes; (2) Prior to this A and B believe themselves to beepistemic peers; (3) A and B are epistemic peers

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Ordinary disagreement

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(1) A and B are aware that they hold differentdoxastic attitudes; (2) Prior t this A and B believe themselves to be roughly epistemicpeers

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Symmetry breaker

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something that indicates that the epistemicposition of one of the parties to the disagreement in question is superior tothe other’s

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personal information

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information about the normal functioning of mymind

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Descriptive pluralism

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many different communities, cultures, socialnetworks etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems)

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Nihilistic relativism

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there is no objective right or wrong E-system

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Epistemic objectivism

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there is objective rightness in matters ofepistemic norms, standards, or principles

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Objectivity-based relativism

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presupposes the truth of epistemic objectivism,but preserves some of the pluralism associated with relativism

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Non-entailment thesis

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But second-order O-justifiedness does not entailfirst-order O-justifiedness

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Epistemic non-absolutism

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there are no absolute facts about what aparticular item of information justifies

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Epistemic relationalism

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epistemic judgements of the form “E justifies B”expresses the claim: “According to the epistemic system C, that I accept,information E justified belief B

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Epistemic pluralism

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There are many fundamentally different E-systems,but no facts by virtue of one of these systems is more correct than any of theothers

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E-system

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a system of rules or norms directed at doxasticattitudes or choices

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Externalist – reliabilist

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if an E-system is more reliable at forming true beliefs,then it is better than the other

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Internalist

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if a norm is intuitively compelling, aftersuitable reflection, it might make it a uniquely correct E-system

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Objectivism

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there is a uniquely correct E-system

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Weak epistemic objectivism

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E-systems can be ordered by the binary relationof being at least as correct as

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synchronicperspective

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if two agents are evidential equals with respectto P at time t, can they reasonably differ in their attitudes at t toward P?

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Diachronic

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how an agent should change her opinion about Pover time

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Testimony

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the intentional transmission of information

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Reductionism

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justification for a testimony-based belief willalways ultimately rest on non-testimonial evidence

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Credulism

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we don’t always need to have further grounds infavour of a testimony-based belief in order to justifiably hold it

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Epistemic externalists

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one can be justified in believing a certainproposition even though one lacked grounds in support of that belief, just solong as some further relevant facts about the belief are true