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14 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Strategic Interdependence
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a person's outcome can depend on what others do
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Dominant Strategy
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simplest situation, decision is based by the best response to w/e the other might play
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Iterated Dominance
(Common knowledge of rationality) |
P1 knows that P2 is rational, and where P2 knows that P1 is rational for eliminating decisions
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nash equilibrium
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if each player's strategy is a best response to the other player's strategies
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social preferences
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degree and nature of how people care about the well-being of others
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distributional preferences
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preferences that can be represents purely in terms of amount of money (or other material resource) people get
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face-saving concern
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dont want to look bad in front of others
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intentions-based preferences
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include reciprocity, procedural justice, and other facets of socail preferences that imply people care about how allocations came about
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p in dictator game
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most subject seem to have a positive p, willing to sacrifice to increase the other's payoff when ahead
p is around .4 |
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"o" in dictator game
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only about 10-20% have negative "o"strong enough to hurt the other player
about 30% willing to sacrifice to help a player ahead of them |
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reciprocity
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people like to treat others as others have treated or are treating them
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rejection of low offers in ultimatum game
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1. responders dislike coming out behind
2. responders dislike being treated unfairly |
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Rabin's Model of Fairness
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Two players whose utility has two components
1. exogenously given material payoffs 2. psychological payoffs based on impressions of fairness and unfairness |
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Fairness Equilibrium
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A situation where each player maximizes her utility, and beliefs about the other player are correct
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