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218 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Katz
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4th Amend.
rights are personal and do not belong to an area. Even if no trespass there can be violation |
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Reasonable expectation test
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Person must have a subjective expectation of privacy. Must be something that society will find reasonable and legitimate.
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Abandnment of property
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Gives up your right to privacy
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Legitimate interests for expectation test
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Being free from physical disruption and inconvenience
Keeping personal or embarrassing information private Control and use of his or her property |
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Oliver v. US
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No expectation of privacy in open fields
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Dunn v. US
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curtilage is protected by 4th amend.
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Curtilage factors
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(1)Proximity of the area to the home
(2)Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home (3)The nature of the uses to which the area is put (4)The steps taken to protect the area from observation by people passing by |
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Access by members of the public
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No expectation of privacy if the general public has access
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US v. White
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No expectation of privacy for public conversations
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Smith v. Maryland
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No expectation of information voluntarily given to 3rd party. Ex. phone numbers recorded on pen register.
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California v. Greenwood
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Trash rips okay
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Calfornia v. Ciraolo
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Aerial surveilance okay
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Florida v. Riley (Oconnor concurrence)
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Reasonableness of expectation is whether the public ordinarily had access to the info. not whether it was legally possible
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Bond v. US
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Bus passenger expects his bag to be touched but not exploratorily searched.
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US v. Place
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Canine sniffs no problem, they only reveal illegal activity--not a search. Must have PC to stop
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Canine sniff alerts
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Can lead to PC but still must get warrant or an exception
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Illinois v. Caballes
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use of trained K9 during Traffic stop okay--no privacy interests. Stop must not go past time of ordinary stop
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Kyllo v. US
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Use of thermal imaging device to get information from the inside of house is a search into a constitutionally protected area
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US v. Knotts
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Beeper tracking device okay on vehicle because the information is the same as following
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US v. Karo
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Beeper movements tracked while out of public view no good.
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Texas v. Brown
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the use of artificial means to illuminate the dark does not constitute a search
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Burdeau v. McDowell
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search by private citizen not violation of 4th unless citizen thought they were agent of police or police should reasonably have known their actions would lead to such belief
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Walter v. US
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Private citizen search can provide PC for warrant but does not abrogate warrant requirements
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US v. Jacobsen
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Courts look to see extent government exceeded the private search, therefore, reopening is permitted
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US v. Paige
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if a private party's intrution into the home is forseeable, then the occupant no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy
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NJ v. TLO
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school children have expectation of privacy, any intrusion by school officials must be reasonable
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Oconnor v. Ortega
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public employees have an expectation of privacy but intrusions justified if officials have reasonable suspicion
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Spinelli v. US
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Two part test for PC on informants
1. must have underlying circumstances for the magistrate to verify 2. gov must support the credibility of informant |
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Illinois v. Gates
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Totality of circumstances test
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Totality of circumstances test
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Magistrate to make practical common-sense decision whether all of the circumstances in warrant requirest whether there is a fair probability of getting evidence sought
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Probable cause to search
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whether there is fair probability that the evidence sought will be found
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Probable cause to arrest
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there is a fair probability that the person committed the crime.
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Maryland v. Pringle
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if there is PC that felony has occurred and there are multiple people in the vehicle, PC over all of them
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Warden v. Hayden
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Distinction between items of evidentiary value and the instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband of a crime no longer valid
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Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
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Requirement on warrant app.
reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. Factors: 1.type of crime, 2. nature of item, 3. Opportunity for concealment, 4. normal inferences about hiding spaces |
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Andresen v. Maryland
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Requirement on warrant app.
must describe the items to be searched for with reasonable particularity to prevent a general rummaging by police |
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Knock and announce
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PO must knock, announce, and allow a reasonable amount of time under the circumstances for a person to answer before entering under warrant
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Wilson v. Arkansas
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Knock and announce not constitutional requirement but merely a component of the 4th reasonableness inquiry
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Knock and announce exception
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the door is already open--no breaking.
PO tricks person out |
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Richards v. Wisconsin
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no knock and announce if officers reasonably believe a danger to persons or inhibit effective invest.
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Hudson v. Michigan
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violation of knock and announce does not require exclusion of any evidence found
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Shadwick v. Tampa
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Magistrate must be neutral, detached and capable of probable cause determination
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Atwater v. Lago Vista
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PO can arrest for minor offenses if wants to and state allows custodial arrest for that crime`
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US v. Watson
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PO may arrest for crimes committed in his presence or for felony commited outside of presence but reasonable belief person committed.
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Graham v. Connor
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excessive force to be judged by the 4th reasonableness standard
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Excessive force factors
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(1)Severity of the crime at issue
(2)Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others (3)Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight |
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Scott v. Harris
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When a PO tries to stop a vehicle chase, not liable for the injuries to suspect. Must involve danger to others
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Payton v. New York
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an arrest warrant is required to enter home of suspect to arrest.
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Steagold v. US
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Search warrant necessary to enter the home of third party to look for someone on arrest warrant
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Minnesota v. Olson
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Arrest warrant required to enter the home of third party when suspect staying overnight
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Minnesota v. Carter
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One merely on the premises of a third party has no expectation of privacy. PO may enter and arrest
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Terry v. Ohio
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PO may reasonably search the outer clothing area of suspect for weapons if he believes the person possibly armed and dangerous
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Adams v. Williams
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Reasonable suspicion for terry stop can be supplied by another person. Not just based upon PO observations
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Penn. v. Mimms
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PO can order driver out during TS--automatic, no reasonable suspicion
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Maryland v. Wilson
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PO can order passengers out durign TS--automatic, no reasonable suspicion
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Brendlin v. Cal.
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PO must have reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle--hunch not good enough
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Michigan v. Summers
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PO can require all persons on premises to remain while executing search warrant
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Reasons PO can make people stay during search warrant
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(1) Prevent flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found
(2) Minimize the risk of harm to the officers (3) Facilitate the orderly completion of the search |
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Muehler v. Mena
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Along with authorization to make occupants remain, PO can use reasonable force to make that happen.
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US v. Mendenhall
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a person seized if a reasonable person would believe they were not free to leave.
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Florida v. Royer
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PO can approach a person and ask to talk. A person does not have to talk, cannot be made to remain without reasonable suspicion. They can walk away
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Morgan v. Searle
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A person must express his desire not to be bothered and to continue to express
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INS v. Delgado
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Police do not have to tell people that they have the right to walk away. If they ask questions and the people respond, then ok
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Florida v. Bostick
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PO allowed to approach people in Bus station as long as reasonable person believed they were free to go.
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US v. Drayton
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Officers do not have to tell people they have the right to refuse consent to a search
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Cal v. Hodari
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Pursuit does not constitute seizure until person submits
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Alabama v. White
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Reasonable suspicion less demanding than PC--less reliable information, less quantity, and content
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Flordida v. J.L.
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Anonymous info must be reliable for reasonable suspicion, not just giving identity of person
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US v. Arvizu
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totality of circumstances approach in determining whether PO had objective reason for arrest
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Objective reason
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draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them
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US v. Sokolow
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PO must be able to articulate what factors gave them reasonable suspicion even if in the form of profile
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Illinois v. Wardlow
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Sudden and unprovoked flight enough to give Reasonable suspicion for a stop
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Minnesota v. Dickerson
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Terry stop used for weapons..cannot use for evidence
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Michigan v. Long
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Can search in Terry stop anywhere the person can grasp reach or lunge.
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Maryland v. Buie
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A protective sweep of premises okay as long as justify the reason
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Hiibel
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PO can ask for ID during Terry stop
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Ohio v. Robinette
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Totality of the circumstances approach when deciding whether the continuing conversation was consensual after Terry stop
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Knapp v. Texas
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Forced transportation and questioning constitutes arrest and needs PC
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US v. Sharpe
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Time limit on TS, “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant”
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Arizona v. Hicks
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even a limited inspection for evidence not allowed during terry stop
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Chimel v. Cal.
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Search incident to arrest. Okay to search person and anywhere he could grasp, reach or lunge
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Davis v. Robbs
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Grab area is determined at the time of arrest, not where the person is at time of search
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US v. Robinson
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Not only full search of person incident to arrest okay but reasonable
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Atwater
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If PO has PC to arrest, even for minor crime, then he can and does not violate 4th
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NY v. Belton
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Search incident to arrest. Can search auto passenger compartment and any containers
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Thornton v. US
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If arrestee was recently in a vehicle, PO can search incident to arrest.
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Knowles v. Iowa
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Search incident to citation no good. Does not meet the officer dangerousness or evidence destruction possibility
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Whren v. US
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Actual subejective motivations of the individual PO doesnt matter to PC analysis accordign to 4th
If discrimination fall under equal protection |
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Plain view doctrine
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if a po in a protected area legitimately and see an article in open view, then he may seize. No search took place
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Coolidge
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If the PO find an article outside the scope of their legitimate entry, then illegal search
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Horton v. Cal.
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Discovery of article in plain view does not have to be inadvertant. Meaning--PO can be looking for contraband but not searching
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Plain touch search
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If giving terry pat, and feel an object consistent with contraband, then can seize
Cannot go beyond scope of pat down, no pushing and prodding Minnesota v. Dickerson |
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Carroll v. US
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Police may search a vehicle w/o warrant as long as PC of evidence of criminal activity
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Chambers v. Maroney
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Siezure of vehicle to obtain a warrant okay, but so is searching w/o a warrant since you are seizing the whole thing anyways.
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Coolidge
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but a warrant is required if PO had a chance to obtain
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Cal. v. Carney
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autos have a lesser expectation of privacy because it is mobile but even when it isn't the exception still applies
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US v. Chadwick
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search of container--seizure of footlocker allowed because of mobility but cannot search without warrant
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Personal luggage
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privacy greater than automobile
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Cal v. Acevedo
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PO may search auto and containers in it if PC
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Wyoming v. Houghton
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Where PC exists to search vehicle, PO do not have to have individual PC for each sparate container. Passengers also have a lower expectation of privacy to containers
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Warden v. Hayden
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Hot pursuit doctrine--suspect knowing that he is being pursued runs so he may destroy evidence, escape, or threaten public safety
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Welsh v. Wisconsin
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SUspect must know he is being pursued.
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Police and public safety
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PO may enter a house without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury
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Brigham young v. Stuart
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action reasonable under 4th when objectively viewed, doesnt matter what the PO subjectively wanted
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Risk of destruction of evidence
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if evidence will be destroyed in the time it takes to get a warrant, the warrant requirement is excused
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Dorman v. US
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Exigency factors:
(1) Gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is being charged (2) Whether the suspect “is reasonably believed to be armed” (3) A clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime (4) Strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered (5) A likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended (6) The peaceful circumstances of the entry |
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Mincey v. Arizona
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A warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation, and there is no “scene of the homicide” exception to the warrant requirement
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Welsh v. Wisconsin
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An important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made
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Illinios v. Macarthur
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It is permissible to seize a premise for a reasonable period of time while diligent efforts are being made to obtain a warrant
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Administrative searches
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If the government search or seizure is designed to effectuate “special needs” beyond criminal law enforcement, then the Court engages in a balancing of interests under the reasonableness clause to determine what safeguards must apply
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Camara v. Municipal court
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Warrant is required for admin. safety inspection. Need not be based on PC that problem with house but based upon reasonable admin. scheme
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New York v. Burger
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Warrantless inspection of closely regulated business
Factors: 1) There must be a “substantial” government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made (2) Warrantless inspection must be “necessary to further the regulatory scheme” (3) The statute’s inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant (a) It must advise the owner that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope •“sufficiently comprehensive and defined” (b) It must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers •“carefully limited in time, place, and scope” |
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NJ v. TLO
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School can seach students and lockers under reasonable suspicion
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Skinner
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No suspicion necessary if huge governmnt interest and privacy interests are minimal
Ex. Drug testing |
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Von Raab
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Suspicionless drug searches okay for gov. workers who carry weapons
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Earls
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Drug testing okay for kids in sports because school has to mainain discipline, health, and safety. Children already have a diminished expectation of privacy
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Chandler v. Miller
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suspicionless drug tests no good for politicians. no evidence of a drug problem, the officials do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification aids no interdiction effort
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Ferguson
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Cannot test pregnant women for drug use in a LE capacity when not offering them treatment
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US v. Davis
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Airport screening search is reasonable if: (U.S. v. Davis)
(1) It is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) It is confined in good faith to that purpose; (3) Passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly |
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Delaware v. Prouse
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absent reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot stop a vehicle and detain to check license and registration
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US. v. Martinez-Fuerte
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Suspicionless stops okay at checkpoint to look for illegal aliens, fixed checkpoints minimally intrusive
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Sitz
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Intrusiveness of sobriety check point okay if for a legitimate state purpose and limited.
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Edmond
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Primary purpose of drug checkpoint was for criminal intertiction. No public safety motive. No good.
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Lidster
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Okay to stop vehicles in a limited manner to ask info about a crime. That drugs were found is secondary
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South Dakota v. Opperman
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Inventory searches okay if following a standard police procedure
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Inventory searches
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Three legitimate state interests supported inventory searches
(1) Protection of the police department from false property claims (2) Protection of the property interests of the owner (3) Protection of the police and public from dangerous items |
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Illinois v. Lafayette
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Inventory searches at the station to include personal property
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Colorado v. Bertine
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Police have discretion to allow a person to make arrangements to pick up vehicle or can impound..as long as policy says
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Florida v. Wells
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Police officers discretion must be exercised pursuant to standardized departmental regulation; however, the Fourth Amendment does allow some discretion to be exercised in the opening of containers in an inventory search in light of the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container itself
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US v. Ramsey
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Searches made at the border without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
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Border searches
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Routine” border searches of the personal belongings and effects of entrants may be conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and such searches are deemed reasonable because of the important state interest involved in regulating the border, and the limited intrusiveness of a routine border search
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Montoya de Hernandez
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“Non-routine” or highly intrusive border searches require reasonable suspicion
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Flores-Montano
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A “non-routine” or highly intrusive search of a vehicle requires more than the removal of the gas tank, but conduct that results in serious damage to, or destruction of, the property
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Martinez-Fuerte
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Inland checkpoints (both permanent and temporary) require no suspicion to stop and propound limited questions; additionally, no articulable suspicion is required to refer a motorist to a secondary inspection area for further questions. However, if the secondary inspection was unduly offensive or intrusive, then individualized suspicion would be required
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Brignoni-Ponce
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Roving border patrols require reasonable suspicion
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Almeida-Sanchez
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Searches related to the border but not at the border or equivalent require PC
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
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whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances
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Bumper
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burden of proving that consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given is on the government, and “this burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”
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Frazier v. Cupp
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A joint user of a bag can voluntarily consent to a search of the entire bag because the joint users have “assumed the risk” that the other would consent
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US v. Matlock
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It is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched
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Illinois v. Rodriguez
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Even if someone does not have actual authority to consent to a search, because they do not have joint access or control of the premises, the entry can still be valid if the officers had reasonable belief that the person had authority to consent
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consent to search residence by family member
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can consent to search their area and common area but not where others have exclusive control
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Georgia v Randolph
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A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident
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FLorida v. Jimeno
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The scope of consent is determined by a standard of objective reasonableness. It is up to the citizen rather than the officer to clarify any ambiguity concerning the scope of consent
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Withdrawing consent
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Revocation of consent must be clear and explicit
Consent cannot be revoked retroactively after the officers has found incriminating evidence |
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Lopez v. US
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The recording device was used to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation that was fully entitled to be disclosed The risk of doing illegal activity is that it will be accurately reported in court
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Lewis v. US
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A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the purposes contemplated by the occupant
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Gouled v. US
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the undercover agent's search must still be within the scope of the invitation into the home
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Hoffa v. US
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Relying on misplaced confidence that someone will not reveal our statements is the “kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak”
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Wiretaping Title III (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 – 2520)
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Coverage – “the aural acquisition or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device”
“Necessity” Requirement – normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous Time limits – “not for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, not in any event longer than 30 days” Roving Wiretaps – “interception of communications that are not tied to a particular location – must show that a stationary wiretap will not be a sufficient means for intercepting the targeted communications” |
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C.A. § 1801)
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Does not require probable cause, but that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power”
Includes “Lone Wolf” – not directly affiliated but engages in international terrorism |
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Weeks v. US
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Evidence obtained in violation of 4th must be excluded
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Map v. Ohio
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exclusionary rule applies to state courts as well
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Exclusionary rule
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generally does not apply outside the context of a criminal trial
The Exclusionary Rule is to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs Exclusionary Rule does apply to forfeiture proceedings Government would receive award for violation |
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Attacking the warrant
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There is a presumption of validity to the warrant affidavit. To get hearing must have allegations of deliberate falsehood or consious disregard for the truth. must be accompanied by offer of proof
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Challenging warrantless search
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gov has burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement was justified.
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Simmons v. US
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When a defendant testifies at a suppression hearing, gov cannot use his testimony against him. except: prior inconsistent statement-impeachement. Gov can use witness testimony
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Standing
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a person must have their personal 4th amend rights violated, cannot be someone elses, and the claimed rights must be reasonable
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Rakas
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whether search and seizure violated the Fourth amendment rights of a criminal defendant requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. Overturns the “legitimately on the premises” test of Jones v. U.S
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Wong Sun
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Fruit of the poisonous tree.
substantial causal connection between illegal search & siezure and the evidence presented at trial. If the evidence is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, it will be allowed |
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Brown v. US
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Confession exploited by illegal arrest: (1) Whether the Miranda warnings were provided
(2) The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession (3) The presence of intervening circumstances (4) The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct •The burden of showing admissibility rests on the prosecution |
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Ceccolini
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If a defendant decides to testify, the causal link between testimony and illegality
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Independent source doctrine
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evidence will not be excluded if it is obtained independently and without reliance on any illegal police activity
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Murray v. US
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Even if the police had obtained knowledge as a result of an illegal search, if they do not rely on that information in obtaining a search warrant, then the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant is still admissible
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Nix v. Williams
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Inevitable discovery--the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence would have been discovered through independent legal means
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Walder v. US
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Evidence that had been illegally seized can be used for impeachment when the defendant “opens the door” to the evidence on direct examination
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US v. Havens
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There is no difference of constitutional magnitude between impeachment of direct testimony and impeachment of testimony elicited on cross-examination, so long as the questions put to the defendant on cross examination “are plainly within the scope” of the direct
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James v. Illinois
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The impeachment exception is not extended to allow impeachment of defense witnesses (as opposed to the defendant) with illegally obtained evidence
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US v. Leon
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Good Faith exception-- The Exclusionary Rule cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity, especially when the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues is objectively reasonable. Does not apply if the error is the officer’s and not the magistrate’s
Does not apply when the individual who issued the warrant is not neutral and detached |
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Due process test for confessions
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Involuntary tests are inadmissible--Brown v. Mississippi
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Due process for confessions factors:
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Totality of Cir.--(1) Characteristics of the suspect (youth, educational background, mental condition)
(2) Characteristics of the police behavior (duration, trickery, handcuffing, isolation, physical deprivation or mistreatment) (3) Characteristics of the context of the situation (denied the aid of family, friends, or counsel, and rewards and inducements for confession) |
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Fulminante
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A finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient
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Colorado v. Connelly
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The Due Process focus is primarily on police misconduct rather than the suspect’s state of mind, and coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
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Miranda v. Arizona
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1. Custody
2. Interrogation |
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Dickerson v. US
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Congress cannot legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution and Miranda is a constitutional right
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Harris v. New York
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Statements received as a result of a Miranda-defective interrogation can be admitted for purposes of impeaching a witness’s credibility
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Doyle v. Ohio
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Post-Miranda silence can not be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial
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Jenkins v. Anderson
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Pre-miranda silence can be used
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Fletcher v. Weir
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Post-arrest, pre-miranda silence can be used
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Michigan v. Tucker
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A Miranda-defective statement that leads to witnesses will not result in the exclusion of the witnesses testimony as ‘the fruits of a poisonous tree’
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Oregon v. Elstad
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A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet coercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings
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Missouri v. Seibert – Concurrence by Kennedy
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If a two-step interrogation strategy that involves interrogation until a confession is received and then providing Miranda warnings and getting another confession, then the post-warning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the post-warning statement is made
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U.S. v. Patane – Concurrence by Kennedy
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Admission of non-testimonial physical fruits does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused’s coerced incriminating statements against himself, and therefore should not be excluded
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New York v. Quarles
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“Overriding considerations of public safety” can justify an officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings, and that an unwarned confession and physical evidence obtained under such circumstances is admissible despite Miranda
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Custody
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when the person is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
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Stansbury v. California
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An officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody
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Yarborough v. Alvarado
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A suspect’s youth is irrelevant in determining whether he is in custody
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Oregon v. Mathiason
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An individual questioned at a police station is not necessarily in custody
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Berkemer v. McCarty
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Terry stops are not custodial for Miranda purposes; however, if the stop escalates to an arrest, Miranda will apply
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Rhode Island v. Innis
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“Interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect
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Edwards v. Arizona
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Confronting a suspect with incriminating evidence constitutes an interrogation
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Pennsylvania v. Muniz
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“Booking exception” – officers can ask questions attendant to custody without Miranda warnings, and if the suspect’s answer is incriminating, it is admissible at trial. Officers’ instructions must be “limited and focus inquires” that were “necessarily attendant to the legitimate police procedure
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U.S. v. Perkins
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An undercover agent does not have to give Miranda warnings because there is no danger of coercion
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Moran v. Burbine
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Miranda does not require the police to inform the suspect of an attorney’s efforts to reach him
It is the suspect who has the right to counsel under Miranda; and that right does not come into effect until the suspect invokes the right Counsel has no independent rights to assert |
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Colorado v. Spring
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A suspect’s awareness of all of the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege
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Oregon v. Elstad
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A person can make an intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege even after a Miranda defective confession has been obtained, and the police do have to provide an additional warning that the previous confession is inadmissible
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Michigan v. Mosley
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The suspect’s right to cut-off questioning must be “scrupulously honored;” however, questioning can be resumed after the officers gave the suspect a reasonable “cooling off” period
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Davis v. U.S
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Police questioning a suspect can continue the interrogation unless the suspect has made a clear and unambiguous invocation of the Miranda right to counsel; further, police are not obligated to clarify the suspect’s intent
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Edwards v. Arizona
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A suspect cannot waive the right to counsel after he has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, unless he initiates the conversation
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Oregon v. Bradshaw
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Two-step Analysis to suspect “initiated” communication:
(1) Defendant “initiates” further communication when he evinces a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation Inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally “initiate” a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards (2) Totality of the circumstances test of a knowing and voluntary waiver Even if the suspect initiates communication, “where re-interrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation” |
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Arizona v. Roberson
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An invocation of the right to counsel under Edwards was not offense-specific, and prevents police-initiated interrogation on any crime
Sixth Amendment right is “offense-specific”; therefore police can initiate questioning on crimes other than the crime with which the defendant was charged Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel protects against police-initiated interrogation with respect to any crime |
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Minnick v. Mississippi
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Police-initiated interrogation after an invocation of and consultation with counsel may occur only if counsel is actually present during the interrogation
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Massiah v. U.S.
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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by the use in evidence of his own incriminating statements which government agents deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his retained counsel
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Brewer v. Williams
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It is incumbent upon the State to prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment” for a waiver of the right to counsel. Must be more than receiving warnings and electing to speak
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Fellers v. U.S.
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The Sixth Amendment requires that the incriminating statements be “deliberately elicited”
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U.S. v. Henry
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By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce the accused to make incriminating statements without assistance of counsel, the government violated the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Informant must be working for the government at the time the information was obtained – otherwise there is no state action implicated
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson
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To prove a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must show that the police took some action, beyond mere listening, that was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating remarks
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Maine v. Moulton
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Police may investigate crimes separate from the crimes charged and may use statements made by a suspect in a later trial for those crimes, but incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, not withstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining the evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel
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Patterson v. Illinois
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The Miranda warnings are sufficient to adequately inform a suspect of their Sixth Amendment rights so that they can make a knowing and intelligent waiver
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Michigan v. Jackson
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When an accused unequivocally invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the standards of Edwards govern the waiver of the Sixth Amendment rights
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Texas v. Cobb
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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only to charged offenses. Determined through the Blockburger Test (Double Jeopardy)
Whether each offense requires proof of fact which the other does not |
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U.S. v. Wade
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Counsel’s presence is a requisite for post-indictment lineups
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Gilbert v. California
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failure to have counsel present will result in exclusion of the out-of-court identification
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Kirby v. Illinois
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A person’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him
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U.S. v. Ash
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A defendant has no right to counsel at a photographic identification, whether conducted before or after indictment or formal charge
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Stovall v. Denno
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A claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it
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Neil v. Biggers
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Even if the confrontation procedure was suggestive, the identification can still be reliable if the witness had an independent source for the identification. The defendant must prove both that the confrontation procedure was suggestive, and unnecessarily suggestive
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Manson v. Brathwaite
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Factors for the admissibility of identification testimony:
(1) The opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime (2) The witness’s degree of attention (3) The accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the criminal (4) The level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation (5) The time between the crime and the confrontation •1, 2, and 4 are all self-reports and are highly susceptible to misassessments |
