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36 Cards in this Set
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Terry v. Ohio
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An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
- Both the detention (stop) andthe frisk (pat down) must be based on reasonable suspicion -Totality of circumstancesArticulable facts |
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Minnesota v. Dickerson |
lawfull pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or massmakes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of thesuspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search forweapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would bejustified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-viewcontext.” |
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Dunaway v. Newyork |
Killing of a Pizza Parlor owner.A detective questioned the informant and did notlearn enough to get an arrest warrant, but nonetheless that Petitioner bebrought in. The Petitioner was taken into custody and told he was not underarrest, but he would have been restrained physically if he tried to leave. Hewas driven to a police station, put in an interrogation room and thenmirandized-State cannot pitch an arrest here because there was no probablecause and would therefore make the confession useless. So they try to link thiscase to the Terry stop which is based on reasonable suspicion. Court says no this is an arrest like situation that requiresprobable cause.
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US v. Mendenhall |
Airport Stop. Storing Drugs in Whoha
HOLDING:-The court held that the defendant was not seized when she was approached by the federal agents when they asked to see her ticket and identification, even though defendant was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. ANALYSIS:-A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances that surround the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he/she was not free to leave. -The totality of the evidence is adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant had voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily. |
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United States v. Drayton |
Respondents Drayton and Brown were traveling ona passenger bus that was stopped for a routine search by three police officers.Two positioned themselves up front; one proceeded down the aisle, engaging thepassengers in conversation. According to his testimony, passengers were notrequired to cooperate.
Held“if a reasonable person would feel free toterminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.” A determinationof when this is true “necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstancessurrounding the encounter.” NO WARNING |
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California v. Hodari |
Facts. The Petitionerand other youths fled after seeing a patrolling police car. The police gavechase and ordered the Petitioner to stop. The Petitioner continued to flee,throwing a rock later identified as crack cocaine. The Petitioner wassubsequently caught.
Issue. Has a seizure occurred when a person, who is told to stop bypolice, runs from the police? Held. No. A seizure ofa person has not occurred until that person has been physically seized, orseized through the submission to authority. Discussion. An arrest has not occurred when a person runs from the police. |
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Brenlin v. California |
Carstopped for expired registration but it wasn't technically illegal cause they had temp tags. Passenger in car with a warrant out. a Fourth Amendment seizurerequires some sort of physical force with lawful authority, or submission to anassertion of authority. Hodari had not been touched when he discarded thecocaine, and had not submitted to authority because he was still attempting toescape.A person is "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when physical force or a show of authority terminates or restrains his freedom of movement. If the police's intent to restrain an individual is unclear, or if an individual's submission to a show of authority takes the form of passive acquiescence, a seizure does not occur unless a reasonable person would not feel free to leave in light of all the circumstances. If, however, the person has no desire to leave for reasons unrelated to the traffic stop, there is no seizure.
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Alabama v. White |
An anonymous caller toldMontgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attachécase in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car andWhite’s future movementsThe Court held that thetotality of the circumstances provided a sufficiently reasonable suspicion thatWhite possessed illegal drugs. Even though police had no way to confirm thecredibility of the caller, police verified many allegations made by the callerabout White’s car and movements. Because the police had a reasonable suspicion,the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment
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Illinois v. Wardlow |
Defendant WilliamWardlow was stopped and frisked after looking towards police officers and thenrunning in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Nervous, evasivebehavior and location in a high crime area are relevant factors in determiningthe reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment.
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Maryland v. Buie |
Police officers entered the Respondent’s home toarrest him. After the Respondent emerged from his basement, a police officerentered the basement to ensure no one else was in the there. While the officerwas in the basement, he found evidence linking the Respondent to the robberythat had led to the Respondent’s arrest. The Respondent was subsequently foundguilty of robbery. Only areasonable belief (reasonable suspicion) that a serious danger exists isrequired before police perform a protective sweep after arresting a person inhis home.
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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz |
The Michigan State Police established a sobrietycheckpoint pilot program. It only went on for one day. “Under the guidelines,checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehiclespassing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers brieflyexamined for signs of intoxication.The checkpointprogram is consistent with the Fourth Amendment because “the balance of theState’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this systemcan reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusionupon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the stateprogram. |
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City of Indianapolis v.Edmond |
The City ofIndianapolis instituted a series of traffic checkpoints. At each checkpointlocation, the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, an officerapproached the vehicle, advised the driver to produce a license andregistration, and watched for signs of impairment and conducts an open-viewexamination of the vehicle. They could only do so with consent. A narcoticsofficer walked around the car with a dog. The whole stop was to be only two orthree minutes.“a vehicle stop at a highway checkpointeffectuates a seizure within the meaning of Fourth Amendment.” The court alsonoted that it had “never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purposewas to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” In response toIndianapolis’ assertion that the checkpoints “had the same ultimate purpose ofarresting those suspected of committing crimes,” the Court held that “therewould be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocksfor almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line atroadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control,the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming aroutine part of the American life.”
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Rakas v. Illinois |
Police officersstopped a car matching the description of the getaway car in a robbery.Petitioners were passengers; neither owned the car. A shot gun and ammunitionwere found in the car. Petitioners’ motion to suppress was denied for lack ofstanding.Rights assured bythe Fourth Amendment are personal rights [which] . . . may be enforced byexclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection wasinfringed by the search and seizure,” not vicariously.
"legitimately on the property" requirement of Jones v. United States, for challenging the legality of a police search, was too broad. The majority opinion by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist held that a defendant needs to show a "legitimate" expectation of privacy in the place searched in order to be eligible to challenge the search. For example, an overnight guest in a friend's apartment has such "standing".In the case at issue, the Court ruled that vehicular passengers in a car they did not own had no such legitimate expectation. |
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Minnesota v. Carter |
Wayne ThomasCarter, Melvin Johns and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officerobserved them through a window bagging cocaine. Carter and Johns moved tosuppress the evidence, under the theory that they had Fourth Amendmentprotection against unreasonable search and seizure; however, the court heldthis does not apply to individuals who merely visit another’s home.
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Murray v. U.S |
Based on this, agents forced entry into the warehouse without a warrant. Observing bales of marijuana, the agents left, and kept watching the warehouse until they had a warrant Issue. “Whether, . . . assuming evidence obtained pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion of such evidence that been observed in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed.” No. The court applied the “independent source” rule formulated in Segura, permitting evidence found “independently”, despite an improper search. In the present case, “knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if the later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry, there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.” Discussion. “The independent source doctrine . . . rest[s] upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied.” |
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Wong Sun v. US |
Brief FactSummary. The constitutionality of various statements made by suspected drugdealers was at issue.
Synopsis of Ruleof Law.“[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and anunauthorized arrest as the officers’ action in the present case is no less the‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of theunwarranted intrusion.” |
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United States v. Leon |
The police conducted the search, but the search warrant was later found to be invalid because the police lacked the probable cause for a warrant to be issued in the first place
BriefFact Summary. A search warrant was issued to search theRespondent, Leon’s (the “respondent”) residence wherein a large quantity ofillegal drugs was found. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issuedwas found to be insufficient on its face. The evidence was suppressed at trial. Synopsisof Rule of Law. Reasonable reliance upon an otherwise invalidsearch warrant does not render evidence obtained during the search inadmissible the majority opinion. No, only when a warrant isgrounded upon an affidavit knowingly or recklessly false has the Supreme Courtof the United States (“Supreme Court”) suppressed the evidence obtained as aresult. This case presents the good faith exceptionprovided to law enforcement officials in reliance upon search warrants issuedby neutral and detached judges that later are revealed to be lacking inprobable cause. The officer must reasonably rely upon the search warrant whileobtaining the evidence. The judge must be neutral and detached. The affiantmust not have provided false information. |
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Hudson v. Michigan |
Booker T. Hudson was convicted of drug andfirearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in hishome. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the FourthAmendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers towait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before theyenter the home. No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled thatevidence need not be excluded when police violate the"knock-and-announce" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmedthe validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionaryrule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendmentviolation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not beinvoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because theinterests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to dowith the seizure of the evidence." Justice Scalia wrote that theknock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, andimpositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search forwhich they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs ofthe exclusionary rule as applied to |
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Herring v. US |
The Coffee County, AlabamaSheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searchingHerring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket anda gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated bythe fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. Thewarrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, wassupposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone hadaccidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed amotion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence,however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama deniedHerring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison. No. In a 5-4 decision withChief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by JusticeAntonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas andJustice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's FourthAmendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawfulsearches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematicerror or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidenceobtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to theexclusionary rule. |
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Davis v. US |
Policearrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a falsename to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrestedhim, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false informationto a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in hisjacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtorder in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted inobjectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subjectto the exclusionary rule," extra= When Davis was arrested, the law in the Eleventh Circuit and mostjurisdictions was that when an officer has made a lawful arrest of the occupantof a car, he may conduct a search incident to arrest of the passengercompartment of the car, regardless of whether the occupant is within arm’sreach of the vehicle. In Arizona v. Gant, decided later, the Supreme Courtadopted a new, two-part rule under which an automobile search incident toarrest is constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of thevehicle during the search; or (2) if the police have reason to believe the vehiclecontains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. The exclusionary ruleis a judicially created remedy, not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, whichhas the sole purpose of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations. Moreover, the deterrence benefits must outweigh the heavy costs of excludingreliable evidence bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Here,because the officer’s search complied with then-binding Circuit law, he was notblameworthy in any way. |
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Escobedo v. Illinois |
Danny Escobedo was arrested and takento a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused hisrepeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo's lawyer sought unsuccessfully toconsult with his client. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Notallowing someone to speak with an attorney, and not advising them of theirright to remain silent after they have been arrested and before they have beeninterrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment protects the right toeffective assistance of counsel. Here, because the police investigation focusedon the accused as a suspect rather than a less specific investigation, refusingto allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this Sixth Amendmentright. |
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Miranda v. Arizona |
On March 13, 1963, ErnestoMiranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where hewas questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape.After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession fromMiranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite theobjection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officersadmitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorneypresent during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, theSupreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rightswere not violated because he did not specifically request counsel. the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incriminationis available in all settings. Therefore, prosecution may not use statementsarising from a custodial interrogation of a suspect unless certain proceduralsafeguards were in place. Such safeguards include proof that the suspect wasaware of his right to be silent, that any statement he makes may be usedagainst him, that he has the right to have an attorney present, that he has theright to have an attorney appointed to him, that he may waive these rights ifhe does so voluntarily, and that if at any points he requests an attorney therewill be no further questioning until the attorney arrives. The Court held that,in each of the cases, the interrogation techniques used did not technicallyfall into the category of coercive, but they failed to ensure that thedefendant’s decision to speak with the police was entirely the product of hisown free will. |
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New York v. Quarles |
Awoman identified a man as her rapist to a police officer in a supermarket. Theofficer frisked the respondent and found an empty shoulder holster, and thusasked the respondent where the gun was. The respondent said “the gun is overthere,” and the officer retrieved it and then gave the respondent their Mirandawarnings. The trial court suppressed the respondent’s statement in quotes aboveand the gun, and the state appellate courts affirmed. The state of New York wasthen granted certiorari. Issue. Is there an exception tothe requirement that a suspect be read their Miranda rights before theiranswers can be admitted into evidence when the officer’s aims in questioningare to insure that no danger to the public results from concealment of aweapon? Underthese circumstances, there are strong public safety concerns justifying thecourt creating an exception to the requirement that officers provide Mirandawarnings before asking questions. The officer’s trying to retrieve a weapon heknew was somewhere nearby so that no accomplice or customer would pick it upand start shooting protected the public, and this type of action should not bediscouraged.Althoughadmittedly this caveat may cloud the Miranda rule, police officers have theability to distinguish when this exception should apply.Hismotivation in asking where the gun was is not at issue in this case. |
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Oregon v. Elstad |
Afterobtaining the witness’ tip, two officers went to the Respondent’s home with awarrant for his arrest. The Respondent’s mother answered the door and led theofficers to her son’s bedroom. The officers asked the Respondent to get dressedand accompany them to the living room. After one of the officers took theRespondent’s mother into another room, the other officer, without giving theRespondent his Miranda warnings, got him to say he was present during therobbery.TheRespondent was put into a police car and transported to the police stationwhere one of the officers finally advised him of his Miranda rights. TheRespondent said he understood his rights and agreed to speak to the officers.Thereafter, he recounted to the officers how he participated in the burglary.The statement was then put in writing. The writing included a statement thatanother individual gave the Respondent a small bag of grass. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that ". . .the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when "custody" legally begins. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that the holding "in no way retreat[ed] from the bright-line rule of Miranda." Discussion.This is an interesting case, showing that although Miranda warnings arenecessary, they are not the be all and end all if an individual continues tospeak and is not coerced to do so. |
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Dickerson v. US |
Thepetitioner, Charles Thomas Dickerson (the “petitioner”), made a statementregarding a bank robbery to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”)without receiving his Miranda rights. A federal law was in place that allowedthe admission of statements if they were voluntarily made. .Congress cannot overrule the Miranda v. Arizona decision because it was adecision based on the United States Constitution (“Constitution”) rather thansimply court-made law. |
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Missouri v. Seibert |
Respondent was convicted of second-degreemurder, after a fire was set to her mobile home, killing another individual wholived there. Several days after the fire, she was interrogated by a policeofficer, who initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get her tofirst confess. Once Seibert confessed, the officer took a break, read her theMiranda rights and resumed questioning after she made a waiver. He prompted herto restate the confession she made earlier, and she was convicted based on thatsecond question. Seibert appealed based on the fact that the use of anun-Mirandized confession to get a later confession made that later confessioninadmissible. Held.The second Post-Miranda confession is not admissible when a prior confessionhas been given unless the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficientto give the defendant the reasonable belief that she can decide not to speakwith police. Discussion. A confessionobtained after an un-Mirandized confession was given is not always inadmissiblebut, when it is intentionally obtained by a determination not to give Mirandawarnings, it is. |
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Berkemer v. McCarty |
OnMarch 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observedRichard McCarty’s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. Hefollowed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle.Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that hewould charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer freeto leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.Williamsthen asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty respondedthat he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a shorttime before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however,a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty’s system. Williamsresumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence ofalcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williamsresponded, Held:Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion written byJustice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that arrestees in custody and undersuspicion for a misdemeanor traffic offense must be informed of theirconstitutional rights or subsequent statements are inadmissible. JusticeMarshall rejected Berkemer’s argument that the Court should carve out anexception to the Miranda rule for lesser offenses. He noted that the police areoften unaware when they arrest a person whether that person has committed afelony or a misdemeanor, and that seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalateinto more serious investigations. He reasoned that carving out an exception tothe Miranda rule for misdemeanor traffic offenses would undermine Miranda’ssimplicity and effectiveness given the rule’s widespread, customary use bypolice.Justice Marshall then distinguished betweenthe statements McCarty made at the scene of the arrest and at the jail. He heldthat McCarty was in custody as of the moment he was formally placed underarrest for driving under the influence, and that statements made after thispoint were inadmissible. He also held, however, that McCarty was not put incustody for purposes of the Miranda rule before this point. Justice Marshallreasoned that a routine traffic stop was more akin to a non-custodial ‘Terrystop’, and generally ended with a motorist’s release. He noted that McCarty wasnot told he could not leave prior to his arrest, and was only asked a fewquestions and told to perform a balancing test. Consequently, Justice Marshallheld that the Ohio State Highway Patrol was not obligated to give Mirandawarnings to persons detained pursuant to routine traffic stops. |
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Rhode Island v. Innis |
Facts.The respondent was arrested for a robbery of a cab driver that led to themurder of the driver. The driver was shot in the head with a shotgun, but theweapon was not found with the respondent at the time of the arrest. Therespondent was placed in the back seat of the patrol car, and he rode back withthree officers. The officers, one sitting in the back seat with the respondent,remarked what a tragedy it would be if a child were to stumble upon the weaponbefore they found it. The discussion moved the respondent enough to disclosethe location of the weapon in order to avoid an accident. Theconversation was not an interrogation, and therefore the respondent’s rightsunder the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)were not violated. Interrogations should not be so broadly defined to includesuch a wide range of conduct by officers post-arrest, but rather should onlyinclude conduct that police should know would illicit a response. |
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North Carolina v. Butler |
An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler hisrights under Miranda v Arizona after arresting him on a federalwarrant. At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice ofRights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood hisrights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicatedthat he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney.Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced asevidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial courtdenied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his rightto an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that heunderstood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armedrobbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolinareversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements madeunder interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice Potter Stewartwrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that Miranda did not require adopting an inflexibleper se rule. Also, 10 of 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that expresswaiver is not necessary. It is up to the lower court to determine whetherButler impliedly waived his rights. |
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Berghuis v. Thompkins |
Van Chester Thompkins was considered a suspect in a fatal shooting on January 10, 2000 in Southfield, Michigan. After advising Thompkins of his Miranda rights, police officers interrogated him. Thompkins did not state at any time that he wanted to rely on his right to remain silent, nor that he did not want to talk to the police, nor that he wanted an attorney. The court record suggested that he had been almost completely silent during the three-hour interrogation and the few sporadic comments he made had no bearing on the case[4] (police described it as "nearly a monologue"[5]), but near the end, detectives changed their approach and "tried a spiritual tac[k]" [6] and an "appeal to his conscience and religious beliefs".[7] Thompkins was asked in sequence—did he believe in God, did he pray to God, and did he pray to God to forgive him for shooting the victim. He answered "yes" to each of these. In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the questioning. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police." |
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Edwards v. Arizona |
Edwards was arrested at his home on charges of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder. Following his arrest, at the police station, he was informed of his Miranda rights. Edwards stated he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After being told that another suspect was arrested in connection with the same crime, Edwards denied involvement and then sought to "make a deal." Edwards then proceeded to call a county attorney and shortly afterwards he said to his interrogator "I want an attorney before making a deal." Immediately, the questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail. The following morning, two detectives came to see him stating that they wanted to talk to him. At first Edwards resisted, but he was told he had to talk to the detectives. The officers informed him of his Miranda rights, and obtained a confession from him. At trial, Edwards sought to suppress his confession. The lower court and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the motion. is a decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that once a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel police must cease custodial interrogation. Re-interrogation is only permissible once defendant's counsel has been made available to him, or he himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Statements obtained in violation of this rule are a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendmentrights. |
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Massiah v. US |
. PetitionerMassiah, a merchant seaman, along with a conspirator Colson, were indicted fornarcotics offenses. Both pled not guilty and were released on bail. Colson,without petitioner’s knowledge, decided to cooperate with the government. Hepermitted agents to place a radio transmitter under the seat of his car, bywhich agents could hear conversations in the car. Colson and the petitioner metin the car, and were overheard by an agent. The petitioner made several incriminationstatements during the conversation. Held. Yes. The SupremeCourt used the previous Spano rule. The Court did not “question that in thiscase . . . it was entirely proper to continue an investigation” of thepetitioner. It simply held that “the defendant’s own incriminating statements,obtained by federal agents under [these] circumstances . . ., could notconstitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at histrial.” |
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Brewer v. Williams |
Facts. The defendant hadrecently escaped from a mental hospital and was staying at a Des Moines YMCAwhere the girl was last seen. The defendant was seen leaving the YMCA with alarge bundle with two small legs protruding from it. A warrant for his arrestwas issued, and his attorney in Des Moines advised the defendant to turnhimself in to the nearby Davenport authorities. The defendant had counsel inDavenport as well. Both attorneys advised the defendant not to speak to theofficers without their presence, and he indicated on several occasions toofficers that he wished to talk only with the assistance of counsel. During theride back to Des Moines, with only an officer and the defendant in the car, theofficer decided to leverage his knowledge of the defendant’s religious natureby mentioning that he hoped they found the body before snowfall so they couldgive her a decent Christian burial. The defendant then gave the officer thelocation of the body. Held. The evidence should besuppressed because the defendant was denied counsel during an interrogationenvironment. Once judicial proceedings begin, such as the arraignment,assistance of counsel is required. In this case, the defendant not only did notwaive his right to counsel, he affirmatively maintained it through severalexchanges between the officers Discussion. The definition of interrogation here is very broad compared to acase decided a few years later, Rhode Island v. Innis. The important factors inthis case were the timing of the interrogation (after a judicial proceeding),the definition of interrogation, and whether the right to counsel was knowinglyand voluntarily waived. |
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Patterson v. Illinois |
Patterson (defendant) was one of three gang members who were indicted for the murder of a rival gang member. Before being transferred to the county jail, Patterson asked one of the police officers who else had been indicted for the murder. Upon hearing that one of his fellow gang members had not been charged, Patterson voiced his surprise, stating that the man omitted had planned everything and that there was a witness who could prove it. At this point, the officer stopped Patterson and handed him a Miranda waiver form to inform him of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Patterson signed the form and then told the officer about killing the rival gang member, making incriminating statements about himself. Later, Patterson was interviewed by the Assistant State’s Attorney. The attorney went over the Miranda form Patterson had signed earlier and Patterson said he understood his rights. Patterson then made more incriminating statements. Before trial, Patterson moved to have his statements suppressed. The trial court denied Patterson’s motion and the jury convicted him. The state supreme court then rejected Patterson’s theory that he knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel but not his Sixth Amendment right. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. DISCUSSION The Court disagreed, finding that an accused who was admonished with Miranda warnings had been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on that basis would be considered a knowing and intelligent one. The Court stated that it seemed self-evident that one who was told that he had such rights to counsel was in a curious posture to later complain that his waiver of those rights was unknowing. |
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Montejo v. Louisiana |
At a preliminary hearing, Montejo was charged with first-degree murder. Montejo was also appointed court-ordered counsel, which he neither expressly requested nor denied. Later that day, while in prison, police read Montejo his Miranda rights, and he agreed to go along on a trip to locate the murder weapon. While in the police car, Montejo wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's widow. Only upon return did Montejo first finally meet his court-appointed attorney. At trial, the letter of apology was admitted over Montejo's objection. The jury convicted Montejo of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death. In a decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court expressly overturned Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), asserting that requiring an initial “invocation” of the right to counsel in order to trigger the Jackson presumption, might work in States that require an indigent defendant formally to request counsel before an appointment is made, but not in more than half the States, which appoint counsel without request from the defendant. The Fifth Amendment's right to counsel attaches upon invocation (i.e., when an attorney is requested). The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel attaches when adversarial proceedings begin (i.e., at the arraignment). The presumption in Jackson attempted to analogize the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination through Edwards v. Arizona to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, essentially not allowing police interrogation after the right attached. Under Montejo, in the case where the Defendant has not asserted his Fifth Amendment's right to counsel but rather relies on his Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, police may reinitiate interrogation after his Miranda rights have been read. However, if a Defendant has asserted his Fifth Amendment's right to counsel and adversarial proceedings have begun, police may not reinitiate questioning without counsel present and waiver under Edwards, or unless the Defendant initiates the conversation and police get a waiver. Instead, the Court stated that the protections afforded under Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick were sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from police badgering that might elicit culpable evidence. |
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McNeil v. Wisconsin |
When arrestedfor armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right tocounsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defenderrepresent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated setof crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rightsagain, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answersincriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. Heunsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. Ajury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended thathaving the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which werelater violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him. No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts oflaw, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confrontingpolice. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the SixthAmendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendmentwhen speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Courtreasoned that "[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police withoutcounsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter underprosecution." McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him ata pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices hewished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police. |
