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209 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Katz v. US Search/ electronic surveillance |
Phone booth Reasonable expectation of privacy objective/ subjective |
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Oliver v. US Open Field |
No privacy in an open field |
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US v. Dunn Open Fields |
Test for curtilage Proximity Enclosed Nature of use Steps taken to protect |
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California v. Ciraolo Aerial searches |
Flying 1000' above ground is ok Anyone could see, no privacy, no warrant needed |
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Florida v. Riley Aerial Searches |
flying 400' above ground is okay could see with the naked eye so there is no expectation of privacy, no warrant needed |
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Kyllo v. US Thermal imaging of homes |
requires a warrant more than naked eye getting info that would not be obtained w/o physical intrustion |
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California v. Greenwood Searches of trash |
does not require a warrant know people go through trash no expectation of privacy |
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US v. Knotts Observation & monitoring public behavior |
no expectation of privacy for visual observation of vehicles |
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US v. Karo Observation & monitoring public behavior |
beeper inside container w/owner's consent, but receiving party did not know about is ok |
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Smith v. Maryland Observation & monitoring public behavior |
pen register (list of phone #'s) has no expectation of privacy |
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US v. White Observation & monitoring public behavior |
Listening in on conversation on radio no expectation of privacy b/c anyone could listen in |
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California Bankers association v. Shultz Observation & monitoring public behavior |
bank knows all and yo have no expectation of privacy |
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US v. Place Use of dogs to sniff |
Luggage w/drugs- drugs have no expectation of privacy 90 minute detention= arrest |
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Illinois v. Caballas Us of dogs to sniff |
if there is a legitimate reason for stop no expectation of privacy during dog sniff |
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US v. Watson warrant needed for arrests? |
a warrant isn't required if there is probable cause |
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US v. Mendenhall Is the person seized? |
seizure= by means of physical force or other show of authority, freedom of movement is restrained (would a reasonable person feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the interaction |
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Florida v. Bastick Is the person seized? |
test= would a reasonable person feel free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encouter |
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US v. Drayton Is the person seized? |
Boarded bus, searched bags-not seized mannerisms indicate seizure |
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California v. Hodari D. Is the person seized? |
arrest occurs when physical force has been applied or when person submits to authority |
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US v. Jones Search |
the warrantless use of GPS on car to monitor movements violates the 4th amendment |
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Florida v. Jardines Search |
If the officer has a right to be where he is at, there are no 4th amendment issues |
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Maryland v. King Search |
swabbing is a search, but not unreasonable no 4th amendment issue |
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Atwater v. City of Iago Vista what crimes can a person be seized for? |
can arrest for anything as long as you have probable cause statute that allows any arrest |
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Illinois v. Gates Probable cause |
test for warrant: fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be found test for anonymous tip: veracity, basis of knowledge is relevant, but not dis-positive totality of circumstances |
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Maryland v. Pringle Probable Cause |
probable cause steps there is evidence of a crime evidence that defendant committed the crime |
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Whren v. US Objective or subjective |
pretextual stops= legal probable cause or legitimate reason for stop? |
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warrant requirement |
based on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation specify time for execution issued by a neutral or detatched magistrate |
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire Warrant requirement |
attorney general is not a neutral magistrate |
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Shadwick v. City of tampa warrant requirement |
Court clerk can be magistrate |
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Lo-Ji. Sales, Inc. v. New York Warrant requirement |
violated warrant requirement when the Judge became the leader of the search party |
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Andresen v. Maryland Form requirement |
5th amendment doesn't apply to documents properly seized |
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Groh v. Ramirez form requirement |
warrant must be specific enough |
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Zurcher v. Stanford Daily Executing requirements |
valid warrant, can search anything Privacy protection act protects newsrooms from searches |
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Michigan v. Summers executing requirements |
anyone present during search can be detained |
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Muehler v. Mena Executing requirements |
asking questions doesn't violate the 4th amendment |
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Wilson v. Arkansas knock and announce |
you have to knock and announce before entering |
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Richards v. Wisconsin knock and announce |
facts developed during search made no knock ok |
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Maryland v. Garrison unforeseen circumstances |
objectively reasonable mistake is ok validity of warrant based on info officer knows about |
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Los Angeles County, Cal. v. Rettele unforeseen circumstances |
suspects had moved no 4th amendment issue b/c did not know about |
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Olmstead v. US electronic surveillance |
wiretapping- not a search wires tapped outside property no trespass |
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US v. US Dist. Ct. for East Dist. of Michigan electronic surveillance |
needed warrant; inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept
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New York v. Belton stop & frisk |
arrested while driving can search car b/c they have probable cause |
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Michigan v. Long stop & frisk |
Can search area where driver might have weapon |
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Terry v. Ohio stop & frisk |
does the officer have a right to stop? Does the officer get to frisk? - reasonable suspicion that they are armed and dangerous |
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Sibrun v. New York stop & frisk |
frisk has to be to look for weapons, not drugs |
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Dunaway v. US distinction between stops and arrests |
detention for custodial interrogation= arrest |
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Florida v. Royer distinction between stops and arrests |
investigation detention criteria - temporary - last no longer than necessary - least intrusive means |
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Arizona v. Johnson stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
frisk allowed for officer safety even when person is con-sensually conversing with officer |
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Florida v. Harris stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
drug dogs detection on outside of car gives probable cause for search |
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Hayes v. Florida distinction between stops and arrests |
fingerprinting= arrest |
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US v. Sharpe distinction between stops and arrests |
investigative detention no unnecessary delay delays were related to stop |
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Navarette v. California stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
tips corroborated with officers all for reasonable suspicion necessary to stop upon content of info assessed |
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Heien v. North Carolina stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
reasonable mistake of law during stop is ok |
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Rodriguez v. US stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
can't use drug dogs at conclusion of traffic stop w/o reasonable suspicion |
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) stop & frisk/ reasonable suspicion |
allowed to ask to exit car if during stop |
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Michigan v. Long what can they do when they stop |
can search in area for weapon |
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Minnesota v. Dickerson what can they do when they stop |
plain feel doctrine |
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Hiibel v. 6th judicial dis. ct. of Nevada what can they do when they stop |
asking ?'s is part of investigation state can prosecute for refusal of id |
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US v. Arvizu Reasonable suspicion |
reasonable suspicion: particularized and objective basis of suspected wrongdoing mere hunch is insufficient |
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Alabama v. White Reasonable suspicion |
anonymous tip by self is usually not enough need to be corroborated by police work |
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Florida v. J.L. Reasonable suspicion |
anonymous tip had: No reasonable suspicion no future predictions no particularized knowledge |
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Illinois v. Wardlow Reasonable suspicion |
Unprovoked running can lead to reasonable suspicion |
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Hudson v. Michigan Exclusionary rule |
general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the 4th amendment does not apply to the "knock and announce" rule |
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Weeks v. US (1914) Exclusionary rule origins |
private documents used to convict were seized w/o warrant- violated 4th amendment exclusionary rule applies in federal court |
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Mapp v. Ohio (1961) Exclusionary rule origins |
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the constitution are inadmissible in a state court exclusionary rule applies in state court |
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Rakas v. Illinois who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
rights assured by 4th amendment are personal rights which may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure, not vicariously |
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Minnesota v. Carter who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
household visitors don't have the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as residents or overnight guests |
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Brendlin v California who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
passengers in vehicles are detained in traffic stop |
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Virginia v. Moore (2008) who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
exclusionary rule doesn't apply to statutory violations |
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Herring v. US who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
introducing evidence obtained from warrant that should've been recalled doesn't violate the 4th amendment |
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Jones v. US who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
the person who was aggrieved by search has standing |
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Rawlings v. Kentucky who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
a man could not raise the exclusionary rule when contraband was found in a woman's purse when visiting the premises |
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Minnesota v. Olson who can object and raise the exclusionary rule |
an overnight guest in a house has the expectation of privacy that the 4th amendment protects |
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Wold v. Colorado (1949) Exclusionary rule origins |
4th amendment applies to states exclusion rule does not (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio) |
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Murray v. US Exceptions to exclusionary rule Independent Sources |
independent sources doctrine "applies to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality |
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Segura v. US Exceptions to exclusionary rule Independent Sources |
Evidence, previously discovered illegally, found during valid warrant was admissible because discovered pursuant "independent source" |
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Nix v. Williams Exceptions to exclusionary rule Inevitable discovery |
evidence resulting in an arrest should not be excluded from trial b/c it was improperly obtained b/c it would've been discovered w/o statement |
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Brown v. Illinois Exceptions to exclusionary rule inadequate casual connection |
miranda warnings not enough that statements voluntary, but sufficiently act of free will to purge primary taint factors: voluntariness, temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, purpose and flagrancy of misconduct |
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WongSun v. US Exceptions to exclusionary rule inadequate casual connection |
statements at time of his arrest had to be excluded b/c it was a fruit of the poisonous tree 2nd statement was allowed b/c it no longer had the taint of the 1st |
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US v. Leon Exceptions to exclusionary rule Good Faith |
There is a good faith exception exclusionary rule is formed to deter police, not for individual rights |
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Davis v. US Exceptions to exclusionary rule Good Faith |
Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search that was authorized by precedent at the time of the search, but was later ruled unconstitutional |
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Bram v. US (1897) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
involuntary confessions violate the privilege against self-incrimination |
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Hopt v. People of territory of Utah (1884) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
confessions can't go to jury unless appears to court to have been voluntary |
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Brown v. Mississippi (1936) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
confessions gained involuntarily are inadmissible as violating the privilege against self-incrimination in the 5th amendment |
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Jackson v. Denno (1964) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
prosecution has the burden of proving that a confession is voluntary in order to admit it into evidence |
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Crane v. Kentucky (1986) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
a defendant can argue to a jury that the confession was obtained under circumstances and conditions that make it unreliable |
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Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
a confession can be deemed involuntary if the interrogation went on over a very long period of time especially where a suspect has been denied sleep, food, water, and/or access to a restroom |
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Payne v. Arkansas (1958) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
confession was found to be involuntary b/c no food was given for 24 hours |
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Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
fear of physical violence coerced defendant into confession this confession was tied closely to a 2nd confession had a substantial effect on trial (harmless error analysis- use to appeal) |
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Spano v. New York (1959) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
petitioner's will was overborne by official fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused |
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Colorado v. Connelly (1986) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness
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confession was involuntary only if it is product of police misconduct, regardless of mental condition |
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Chapman v. California (1967) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
if state can show beyond a reasonable doubt the constitutional error didn't effect the outcome |
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Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
deceptive promise of official action contributed to involuntariness |
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Leyra v. Dennis (1934) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
told lie that accomplice had confessed statements still voluntary |
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Frazier v. Cupp (1969) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
acted as friend statements still voluntary |
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Colombe v. Connecticut (1961) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
suspect was illiterate and of low intelligence statement deemed involuntary (overruled by Colorado v. Connelly) |
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Crooker v. California (1958) Due process and the requirement for voluntariness |
confession voluntary, noted suspect completed 1 year of law school |
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Chimel v. California search incident to arrest |
allowed to search person and immediate area w/o warrant (wherever easy access to weapon) |
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Knowles v. Iowa search incident to arrest |
can't search incident to citation requires arrest |
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US v. Robinson search incident to arrest |
search not limited to search for evidence of crime of arrest |
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Riley v. California search incident to arrest |
cell phone searches need warrants |
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Warden Pen v. Hayden searches made in hot pursuit |
if chasing person into house don't need a warrant |
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Payton v. New York Searches made in hot pursuit |
have to be in pursuit to enter house w/o warrant |
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire plain view |
can seize evidence in plain view requirements: need to be lawfully there; needs to be immediately apparent; inadvertance (overruled) |
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Horton v. California plain view |
lawfully where you can view the evidence immediately apparent lawfully where evidence is at inadvertance- not a necessary condition |
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Arizona v. Hicks plain view |
serial number on stereo not in plain view used additional steps to investigate |
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Minnesota v. Dickerson plain view |
if find evidence during frisk (plain feel) allowed to seize w/o warrant |
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Carroll v. US Automobile exception |
allowed to search w/o warrant b/c of mobility |
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California v. Carney Automobile exception |
mobile home= vehicle (lesser reasonable expectation of privacy factors of mobility: licensed to drive; where is it; is it on blocks' connected to utilities |
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California v. Acevedo Automobile exception |
closed container falls under the automobile exception |
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Wyoming v. Houghton Automobile exception |
passenger belongings= container |
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New York v. Belton Automobile exception |
drugs in passenger compartment of car= lawful search |
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Thornton v. US Automobile exception |
arrested, put in patrol car searched car- lawful (overruled by Arizona v. Gant) |
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Arizona v. Gant Automobile exception |
searched car after putting defendant in patrol car- need warrant |
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South Dakota v. Opperman Inventory searches |
impounded and inventory car - protect officers from claims - general safety - protect defendant no warrant needed; no probable cause or reasonable suspicion needed |
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Illinois v. Lafayette inventory searches |
on way to jail- searched (found drugs)-> safety issue is higher |
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US v. Flores-Montano border crossing |
no reasonable suspicion needed |
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US v. Ramsey border crossing |
letters and envelopes fall under border exception |
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US v. Montoya-Hernandez border crossing |
out of court statements by 3rd party used to prove guilt can warrant reversal |
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US v. Matinez-Fuerte border crossing |
suspicionless stops for questioning doesn't violate 4th amendment |
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Michigan dept. of state police v. Sitz checkpoints |
sobriety checkpoint reasonable; invasion is minor; interest is safety; follow guidelines for stop |
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City of Indianapolis v. Edmond checkpoints |
investigating drugs- not allowed |
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte consent |
consent has to be given freely and voluntarily w/o coercion (implicit or explicit) totality of the circumstances government doesn't have to prove their knowledge of the right to not consent |
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Georgia v. Randolph consent |
have to have consent from all residents |
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Ohio v. Robinette consent |
doesn't require informing of right to leave |
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US v. Drayton consent |
reaffirmed test for consent |
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US v. Matlock consent |
1 occupant can consent to search for non-present occupant |
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US v. Knights searches of those on probation and parole |
balance of protecting citizens and observing probationers requires no more than reasonable suspicion to search house of probationer |
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Samson v. California searches of those on probation and parole |
allowed to search people w/no suspicion of wrongdoing if based on statute |
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Camara v. Municipal Court of city and county of san francisco "special needs" circumstances |
administrative searches violate 4th amendment need warrant to search |
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New York v. Burger "special needs" circumstances |
warantless inspections are permitted if part of "closely regulated industry" is a "substantial government interests, inspections are necessary to further regulation, inspection provides 2 basic functions of warrant (statute must be certainty and regularity that is substitute for warrant) |
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Skinner v. Railway Executives' drug testing |
federal requirement for private railroads special need of public safety |
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Vernonia school district 47J v. action drug testing |
random drug testing of high school athletes doesn't violate search and seizure of 4th amendment |
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Brd. of Ed. of Ind. School Dist. no 92 of pottawatomie city v. Earls drug testing |
can drug test anyone who participates competitive activities |
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Ferguson v. City of Charleston Drug testing |
patient has to consent to diagnostic test to obtain criminal conduct |
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Welsh v. Wisconsin exigent circumstances |
needed warrant to enter house - not hot pursuit - no preservation of evidence - no public safety interest |
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Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart exigent circumstances |
police may enter building w/o warrant when objectively reasonable basis to believe that occupant is seriously injured or threatened w/such injury |
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Michigan v. Fisher exigent circumstances |
domestic disturbance call search upheld - could've been throwing things at someone - danger to himself - public safety |
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Kentucky v. King exigent circumstances |
exigent circumstances including destruction of evidence allows entry w/o warrant |
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Missouri v. McNeely consent |
need consent or warrant to draw blood |
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Fernandez v. California consent |
warrantless search allowed when present cotenant allows, even w/previous objection of other tenant |
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) Miranda v. Arizona and its affirmation by the supreme court |
prosecutors couldn't use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant unless they used procedural safeguards (the miranda warnings) |
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Dickerson v. US (2000) Miranda v. Arizona and its affirmation by the supreme court |
congress can't legislatively overrule Miranda |
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Orozco v. Texas (1969) Miranda requirements
when is a person in custody? |
can't use admissions w/o required warnings while in custody (under arrest, not feel free to leave) |
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Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody? |
miranda required when restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody; voluntary meet and talked (made clear not under arrest) |
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Beckwith v. US (1976) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody? |
interview w/taxpayer; IRS is not required to issue Miranda |
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Minnesota v. Murphy (1964) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody? |
meeting with probation officer; Miranda is not requried |
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Stansbury v. California (1994) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody? |
police and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody |
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Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody? |
officer's don't have to consider age or police history when deciding is in-custody and entitled to miranda (not clearly established in supreme court cases that age is a factor) |
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Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) Miranda requirements when is a person in custody?
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statements made upon stop did not require miranda statements made upon arrest required miranda |
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Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) Miranda Requirements what is interrogation |
miranda applies wherever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or the equivalent; interrogation: any words or actions in the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect |
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Arizona v. Mauro (1987) Miranda Requirements what is interrogation |
speaking w/wife in police officer presence is not an interrogation |
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Illinois v. Perkins (1990) Miranda Requirements what is interrogation |
Miranda warnings are not required when an undercover agent asks questions that could result in incriminating statements |
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California v. Prysock (1981) Miranda Requirements what is required for police |
the rigidity of miranda did not extend to the precise formulation of warnings given |
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Duckworth v. Eagon (1989) Miranda Requirements what is required for police |
do not have to use the specific language of Miranda as long as the subject is reasonably conveyed of their constitutional rights |
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Michigan v. Tucker (1974) what are the consequences of a miranda violation (exclusionary rule) |
prosecutors can use a witness that was learned from an interrogation w/o the Miranda warning |
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Oregon v. Elstad (1985) what are the consequences of a miranda violation (exclusionary rule) |
the mere fact that a suspect made an unwarned admission doesn't warrant a presumption of compulsion |
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Missouri v. Siebert (2004) what are the consequences of a miranda violation (exclusionary rule) |
the oregon v. elstad rule doesn't apply when the initial confession is a result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold their miranda warning |
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US v. Patane (2004) what are the consequences of a miranda violation (exclusionary rule) |
physical evidence found as a result of un-mirandized but voluntary testimony can be used in court |
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Harris v. NY (1971) what are the exceptions to miranda impeachment |
Harris' post-arrest statement did not violate his 5th amendment rights right to testify doesn't equal the right to commit perjury |
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NY v. Quarles (1984) what are the exceptions to miranda emergencies |
the "public safety" exception allows for the statements to be allowed in court even though the Miranda warning was not given |
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Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) what are the exceptions to miranda booking exception |
slurred speech did not violate exception, but asking date of 6th birthday |
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North Carolina v. Butler (1979) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
a court could find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where an accused did not expressly state as much; waiver has to be determined on the facts, circumstances, background, experience, and defendant conduct |
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Fare v Michael C. (1979) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
totality of circumstances is adequate to determine whether there was a waiver even w/the interrogation of juveniles is involved |
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Michigan v. Mosley (1975) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
when questioning for different crimes, by different police officers, in a different situation, after an extended period of time w/o questioning, the request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored (offense specific) |
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Edwards v. Arizona (1981) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
if request of counsel is made no further interrogation can be made w/o counsel and statements made w/o counsel are inadmissible unless defendant initiates contact |
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Minnick v. Mississippi (1990) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
when accused asks for counsel, interrogation must cease and cannot begin again until counsel is present during interrogation (not just enough to have consulted) |
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Davis v. US (1994) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
"maybe I should talk to a lawyer" "i think I want a lawyer before I say anything else" need to unequivocally request a lawyer |
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Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
re-interrogation is allowed even after the defendant invoked their 5th amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent if a substantial amount of time has elapsed between invocation of rights and second interrogation can re-engage after 14 days |
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Florida v. Powell (2010) Miranda requirements what is required for police |
the question is whether the warnings conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda, not the words in which the info is conveyed |
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Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) what are the exceptions to miranda waiver |
defendant waived right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement need to unequivocally request silence |
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JDB v. North Carolina (2011) Miranda requirements when a person is in custody |
courts should consider the age of a juvenile suspect in deciding whether they are in custody for Miranda purposes |
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Howes v.Fields (2012) what are the exceptions to miranda when a person is in custody |
mere imprisonment and private questioning about events in the world outside the jail were not sufficient to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes; prisoner was told at beginning he could leave and go back to cell whenever he wanted, was not physically restrained, and was given food and water |
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Hiibel v. 6th Judicial Dist. Crt of Nevada (2004) the privilege against self incrimination in other contexts requirements for it to apply |
must be an individual, not an entity; what is sought must be "testimonial"; there must be "compulsion"; and there must be the possibility of incrimination |
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Hale v. Henkel (1906) only individuals may invoke the privilege of self-incrimination |
corporations or unions are not entitled to invoke the privilege |
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Bellis v. US (1974) only individuals may invoke the privilege of self-incrimination |
privilege exists to protect that "private enclave where (a person) may lead a private life |
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Schmerber v. California (1966) self-incrimination applies only to that which is testimonial |
applies only to compelled communications or testimony, not blood test |
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US v. Wade (1967) self-incrimination applies only to that which is testimonial |
requiring participation in a police lineup does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because its not testimony |
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Miranda v. Arizona self-incrimination must be compulsion |
privilege against self-incrimination protects a person from being compelled to give testimony against themself; voluntary statements don't violate the privilege |
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Giffin v. California (1965) self-incrimination must be compulsion |
no adverse inference can be drawn in imposing punishment from a defendant's failure to testify during sentencing proceedings |
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Mitchell v. US (2002) self-incrimination must be compulsion |
no adverse inference can be drawn in imposing punishment from a defendant's failure to testify during sentencing proceedings |
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Ohio Adult Parol Authority v. Woodward (1998) self-incrimination must be compulsion |
no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination when a person applying for clemency had to answer questions that could indicate incriminating information |
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McKune v. Liele (2002) self-incrimination must be compulsion |
no violation of the privilege to require a prisoner seeking admission to sex offender rehabilitation program to "admit having committed the crime for which he is being treated and other past offenses"
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Ullman v. US (1956) self-incrimination possibility of incrimination |
the fact that a statement could lead to civil liability and even social stigma was not enough to trigger the privilege unless there also was the possibility of criminal liability |
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Hiibel v. 6th judicial dist. crt. of nevada (2004) self-incrimination possibility of incrimination |
disclosing your name presents no reasonable danger of incrimination |
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Fisher v. US (1976) self-incrimination when may the government require production of documents and other things |
5th amendment protects witness from being witness against himself in a criminal trial, doesn't protect documents given to attorney, once it is given compulsion and 5th amendment doesn't apply summons requiring disclosure of document is not compelling testimony |
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Transactional may the government require testimony if it provides immunity types of immunity |
promises that they will not be prosecuted for offenses related to the compelled testimony |
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Use and derivative use may the government require testimony if it provides immunity types of immunity |
promises the person that the government will not use the statements gained under immunity, or anything derived from those statements, in a criminal prosecution |
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Kastigar v. US (1972) may the government require testimony if it provides immunity types of immunity |
the government may compel testimony from an individual that has immunity even though they have invoked the privilege against self-incrimination burden of proof is on the government to prove evidence is derived wholly from independent source of the compelled testimony |
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US v. Hubbell (2000) may the government require testimony if it provides immunity types of immunity |
the 5th amendment privilege against self-incrimination does protect a witness from being compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents that the government is unable to describe w/reasonable particularity. If the witness produces said documents the government can't use them for criminal charges against him |
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Booking Exception |
allowed to ask: name; address; Birthday; Height; weight |
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Massiah v. US the 6th amendment right to counsel during interrogation |
law enforcement officials may not attempt to interrogate and deliberately elicit a confession from a defendant after indictment without the presence of counsel; 6th amendment attaches when adversarial proceedings began |
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Brewer v. Williams the 6th amendment right to counsel during interrogation |
once judicial proceedings begin, the suspect has a right to counsel |
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McNeil v. Wisconsin the 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific |
asserting the right to counsel in police-initiated interviews has to be offense-specific |
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Texas v.Cobb the 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific |
the 6th amendment right to counsel doesn't extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have been actually charged "same offense" doctrine from 5th amendment double jeopardy; Miranda must be given, society interest in convictions |
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Michigan v. Jackson 6th amendment waiver |
after respondents requested at arraignment, but before counsel arrives, no interrogation can take place unless defendant initiates (overruled by Montejo v. La.) |
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Maine v. Moulton 6th amendment what is impermissible police eliciting of statements |
once a person is represented by counsel, the 6th amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between him and the state |
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US v. Henry 6th amendment what is impermissible police eliciting of statements |
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce incriminating statements without assistance of counsel, violates 6th amendment snitch was deliberately eliciting statements question is were the informants deliberatly eliciting statements |
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Rothgery v. Gillespie County 6th amendment what is impermissible police eliciting of statements |
a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liability is subject to restrictions marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger the 6th amendment |
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Montejo v. LA 6th amendment what is impermissible police eliciting of statements |
defendants that have invoked their right to counsel can voluntarily waive their right to counsel, and remain silent, even after the court has appointed an attorney (overrules Michigan v. Jackson) |
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Muran v. Burbine (1986) 5th amendment wavier |
withholding information that attorney wants to speak to you is irrelevant "events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirley unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right |
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Habeas Law - before 1996 |
question is whether it is a violation of the constitution |
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Habeas Law - after 1996 |
Anti terrorism and effective death penalty act (DEOPA) Passed to curtail overly expansive use of federal habeas Death penalty appeals take too long No habeas relief unless state court violated clearly established US Supreme Court law gives states more deference |
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6th amendment |
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. |
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4th amendment |
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. |
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5th amendment |
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . |
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Doe v. US (1988) self-incrimination applies only to that which is testimonial |
release of bank records, is allowed, it's not testimony |
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Statute 18 USC 601 |
allows for "use and derivative use" immunity statements made immunity can only be used in perjury prosecution |
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Kuhlman v. Wilson (1986) 6th amendment/ confessions what is impermissible police eliciting of statements |
passive informant is okay question is were the informants deliberatly eliciting statements |
