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95 Cards in this Set

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Powell v. Alabama (1932)
In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assigned counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment as such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case
Fundamental Rights Theory
The state must afford a defendant the "fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice." Under this theory, a practice may violate fundamental fairness even if it is not specifically prohibited by the Bill of Rights.
Selective Incorporation Theory
Once a right itself is accepted as fundamental, the entire right comes through the due process clause, including all of its applications, and is applied to the states to the same extent that it applies to the federal government.
Exclusionary Rule
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal trial.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
First time the Supreme Court held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court.
United States v. Leon (1984)
"Leon good-faith exception" to the exclusionary rule- evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is admissible even if the warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.
Hudson v. Michigan (2006)
The "knock-and-announce" requirement is not necessary when circumstances present a threat of physical violence or if there is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given, or if knocking and announcing would be futile.
Does the exclusionary rule apply to violations of the "knock-and-announce" rule?
No. The interests violated in knock-and-announce cases have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, because the interests protected by this rule are the protection of human life and limb, and preventing the destruction of property.
Herring v. United States (2009)
-To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.
-Therefore, evidence obtained during a search pursuant to arrest does NOT have to be excluded if the arrest was made upon a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee.
Katz v. United States (1967)
The government's activities in electronically listening to and recording Katz's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using a telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment.
California v. Greenwood (1988)
(Trash case) A warrantless search and seizure of trash bags left at the curb outside the Greenwoods' house violated the 4th Amendment ONLY IF the Greenwoods had an expectation of privacy in their trash that society deems reasonable. Court found that the Greenwoods exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to 4th Amendment protection.
Smith v. Maryland
No reasonable expectation of privacy with the numbers you dial on the telephone because you are sharing the numbers with the telephone company, and thus are sharing them with the police.
Florida v. Riley (1989)
"In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that the marijuana plants growing in his partially covered greenhouse were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eyed from the [air]."
Bond v. United States
The squeezing of soft luggage placed by passengers in the overhead rack of a bus is a search because police touched the bags in an "exploratory manner," not in the way other passengers normally touch bags on an overhead rack.
United States v. Place
Having a drug dog sniffing bags for drugs is not a search, because dogs do not touch the bags, they merely smell the air, and people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a smell.
Kyllo v. United States (2001)
Obtaining any information regarding the interior of a home by sense-enhancing technology (in this case, thermal imaging) that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search- at least where the technology in question is not in general public use.
United States v. White (1971)
However strong the defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the 4th Amendment when it turns out the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities. (False friends doctrine). Therefore, if the law gives no protection to a wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither does it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence.
Jones v. United States (2012)
Since a car is an effect as described in the 4th Amendment, the installation of a GPS tracker and the use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search.
Rakas v. Illinois (1978)
The glove compartment of a car, or the area under the seat, are NOT places in which mere passengers of the car would have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus, passengers have no 4th Amendment rights infringed by the search of a car and the seizure of evidence from those areas.
Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980)
(Stashed drugs in his girlfriend's purse) 1. Rawlings did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's purse because at the time he dumped the drugs in her purse he had only known her for a few days and had never sought or received access to the purse before.
2. Even if the initial detention of Rawlings was illegal, the only way his statement could be excluded properly was if the statement was the result of the illegal detention. It was not, because the intervening circumstance of the discovery of the drugs in the purse was what prompted Rawlings to admit ownership.
3. The search of Rawlings's body was clearly incident to his formal arrest because it happened after he admitted ownership of the drugs and the police placed him under arrest.
Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
In order to claim the protection of the 4th Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that this expectation is reasonable. One who is not an overnight guest but is present with the consent of the householder may not claim 4th Amendment protection.
Spinelli v. United States (1969)
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which information from a confidential informant was obtained, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation
Test for determining whether an informant tip is adequate under the law
1. Basis of knowledge- Look at the trustworthiness of the information itself (the informant must either tell the officer how they know, or must give information so specific that nobody would know those details unless they were on the inside)
2. Veracity- Can be met in two ways: Trustworthiness in the identity of the informant, and trustworthiness of the circumstances in which the information was gathered (ex. statements against interests)
Illinois v. Gates (1983)
Overturned the Spinelli two-prong test and reaffirmed the totality of the circumstances analysis for determining probable cause.
Probable cause
Requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, NOT an actual showing of such activity.
Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
Issue was whether the police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant specifically (out of the other people he was with) was the perpetrator of felony cocaine possession. Court held it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise of drug dealing.
Maryland v. Garrison
The discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing magistrate.
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)
In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime.
United States v. Banks
In determining how long a wait is necessary before police may reasonably conclude that they have been refused admittance, the test is whether it reasonably appeared to police that an occupant has had time to get to the door.
Gerstein v. Pugh (1975)
A law enforcement officer can arrest a suspect without a warrant, but the suspect must then be seen by a magistrate for determination of probable cause within a reasonable amount of time after the arrest.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
A jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein; however, if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably, even within the 48 hour period, it may still violate Gerstein.
United States v. Robinson (1973)
A search incident to lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment, and has been separated into two propositions: 1) a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest; 2) a search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.
-"It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and in the case of a lawful custodial arrest the search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment."
Whren v. United States (1996)
Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the 4th Amendment and thus such stops are subject to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. The decision to stop a car is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
The standard of probable cause applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. Therefore, if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 4th Amendment, arrest the offender.
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)
Police cannot use deadly force in apprehending a suspect unless they have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a direct and immediate danger to the officer or others.
Payton v. New York (1980)
Absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. Unless there are exigent circumstances, when police are going into a suspect's own home to arrest him, they MUST have an arrest warrant.
Chimel v. California (1969)
A search incident to arrest should be limited to the suspect's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
Kentucky v. King (2011)
Police-created exigency doctrine- this doctrine says that police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evidence when that exigency was created or manufactured by the conduct of the police.
California v. Carney (1985)
Automobile exception to the warrant requirement- The ready mobility of an automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of individual's privacy interests. Reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on public highways.
Arizona v. Gant (2009)
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.
California v. Acevedo (1991)
The police do NOT have to obtain a warrant to open a package in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car.
United States v. Ross
A warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause.
United States v. Chadwick
Search of luggage is not like the search of an automobile because a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his automobile.
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
Police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.
Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
Reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the 4th Amendment.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to locate any weapons which may be found on the persons
Terry test
In determining whether the search and seizure were unreasonable, the inquiry is 1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and 2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Florida v. J.L. (2000)
Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who is responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity. When this is the case, the anonymous tip is only sufficient if it has other sufficient indicia of reliability.
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing crime, but officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.
Florida v. Royer (1983)
Where the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.
Investigative detention
Must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.
United States v. Drayton (2002)
The appropriate test for whether a seizure has occurred is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Brendlin v. California (2007)
During a lawful traffic stop an officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety risk.
Submission
What may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.
United States v. Place
When an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances which aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope. The brevity of the invasion of the individual's 4th Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. In assessing the effect of the length of the detention it should be taken into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation.
New Jersey v. T.L.O.
A school search must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, that is, not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and nature of the infraction.
Samson v. California (2006)
The 4th Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.
Board of Education v. Earls
A school policy requiring drug testing of the school's students does not violate the 4th Amendment so long as the policy reasonably serves the school district's legitimate interest in detecting an preventing drug use among its students.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)
Only when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Voluntariness of consent
A question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
Florida v. Jimeno
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent is neither the suspect's intent nor the officer's perception but rather that of objective reasonableness- what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.
Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
Any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
Alabama v. Shelton (2002)
A suspended sentence constitutes imprisonment even though incarceration is not immediate or inevitable.
Rothgery v. Gillespie County
The 6th Amendment right of the accused to assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions does not attach until a prosecution has commenced; once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of counsel during any "critical stage" of the postattachment proceedings.
Douglas v. California (1963)
Whether the issue is a transcript on appeal or the assistance of counsel on appeal, the evil is the same. There can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys depends on the amount of money he has. Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.
Ross v. Moffitt (1974)
Because a state need not provide any appeal at all, the fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to appoint counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way.
*States do not have to provide counsel for discretionary appeals*
Ake v. Oklahoma
When an indigent defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at the trial, the state must provide the assistance of a psychiatrist for his defense.
Halbert v. Michigan
Counsel must be appointed for indigent defendants seeking first-tier discretionary appellate review of guilty pleas and nolo contendere pleas.
Strickland v. Washington (1984)
For a defendant to win a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show two things:
1. Deficiency of counsel's performance- show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the 6th Amendment.
2. Prejudice- show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable
Measure of attorney performance for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
Reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
How to determine the reasonableness of counsel's actions
Reasonableness must be judged based on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. Courts must determine if, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by defendant's own statements or actions.
Lafler v. Cooper (2012)
Where counsel's ineffective advice led to an offer's rejection, and where the prejudice alleged is having to stand trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under its terms would have been less severe than under the actual judgment and sentence imposed.
Justice Jackson's dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee
A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention.
Massiah v. United States
Police cannot deliberately elicit statements to be used at trial from a defendant after indictment and without defendant's counsel present.
Escobedo v. Illinois
When the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory- when the focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession- our adversary system begins to operate and the accused must be permitted to consult with an attorney. The accused must already have a lawyer, and the accused must ask for the lawyer.
Miranda v. Arizona
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
Custodial interrogation
Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Miranda rights
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina
So long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis is appropriate.
Rhode Island v. Innis
The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement from the suspect.
Illinois v. Perkins
Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is talking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.
Berguis v. Thompkins
A waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver. Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.
Edwards presumption of involuntariness
Once a suspect indicates that he is not capable of undergoing custodial questioning without advice of counsel, any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the inherently compelling pressures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.
Maryland v. Shatzer
Once a suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect, officers may try to interrogate the suspect again.
Montejo v. Louisiana (2009)
Overruled the Jackson rule which forbid police to initiate interrogation of a criminal defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding. Now, they can ask.
New York v. Quarles (1984)
There is a public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, and the availability of the exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.
United States v. Patane (2004)
Violations of the Miranda rule occur only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial. Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause, and thus do not have to be excluded from evidence at trial.
Missouri v. Seibert (2004)
When a suspect has not been given Miranda warnings, makes a statement, and then is warned of his rights, a repeated statement after the warnings have been given is not admissible at trial because the "midstream" warnings after interrogation can not effectively comply with Miranda.
Elstad doctrine
A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.
Moran v. Burbine (1986)
Deliberate police deception of an attorney, and the police's failure to inform a suspect that his attorney is trying to contact him, does not taint the validity of any waivers of rights, and does not require exclusion of confessions.
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
Held that Miranda is a constitutional rule and Congress can not supersede it legislatively.
Chavez v. Martinez (2003)
A violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.
Brewer v. Williams (1977)
Waiver requires not merely comprehension but relinquishment, and a suspect's consistent reliance upon the advice of counsel in dealing with authorities refutes any suggestion that he waived that right.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986)
A defendant does not make out a violation of the right to counsel simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported the defendant's incriminating statements to the police. The defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.