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87 Cards in this Set
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New York v. Belton (1981) |
Held: passenger compartment is considered“grab area” and can be searched incident to arrest ·Most courts have interpreted Belton to mean that police canautomatically search passenger compartment; bright-line rule ·Does not allow search of thetrunk, but allows full search of the interior of the car oGlove compartment, and closedcontainers inside the car |
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Thornton v. United States (2004)
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Held: search power granted by Belton applied whenever the personarrested was a “recent occupant” of the car to be searched. |
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ARIZONA V. GANT (2009) |
Held: The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant clause of theFourth Amendment does not apply to the arrestee when he/she is secured andcannot access the car’s interior **JusticeStevens now says that police can search the passenger compartment of the carif: ·it is actually in the grab area ofthe arrestee AND ·when it is reasonable to believe (new standard) that the passenger compartmentcontains evidence that is relevant to the crime of arrest |
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Knowles v. Iowa (1998)
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Issue: Are the police allowed to do asearch-incident-to-arrest when there is no actual arrest?Held: Nope! Search is unconstitutionalhere b/c there was no actual arrest ·Why? There was no threat toofficer safety or possibility of destruction of evidence ·But: rules like this mightencourage police officers to arrest people for minor traffic violations, inorder to search you |
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WHREN V. UNITED STATES (1996) |
*Plainclothes officers patrolling high drug area of DC *Per Fourth Amendment, police only need reasonablesuspicion to stop you; In DC, police need probable cause to stop you fortraffic violation Held: Stop was unconstitutional *Police reasoning must be objectively reasonable *Officer intent not considered/important |
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HORTON V. CALIFORNIA (1990)
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*2requirements for plain view doctrine: ·Item that is seized must have anincriminating character that is immediately apparent ·The officer must lawfully belocated in a place where she can see the object, and her right of access to theobject must also be lawful Issue: Whether the gun was admissible even though the police did not findit inadvertently ; Does the discovery have to be inadvertent? Held: Inadvertence not required for aplain-view seizure *Inorder to seize something, the incriminating character must be immediatelyapparent |
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Arizona v. Hicks |
*Onlyallows seizures w/o warrant, not searches ·not even allowed to do cursoryinspection Held: Probable cause is necessary to justify a search that precedes a plain view seizure |
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Minnesota v. Dickerson |
*Plain Touch Doctrine Held: the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of evidence discovered through the sense of touch in the course of a lawful search *but must be mere touch, not poking and prodding |
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The Carroll Doctrine |
Carroll v. United States Held: Police may search an automobilew/o a warrant if they have probable cause that the car contains evidence of acrime ·Why? (1) Probable Cause (2) The car is movable (3) The occupants are alerted (4) The car’s contents may neverbe found again if a warrant must be obtained *UnderCarroll, police can search a car evenif the driver is 10 miles away from the car, as long as they have probablecause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime ·they can also search the day after ·they can also search the trunk ·**all these contradict Gant |
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CHAMBERS V. MARONEY (1970) |
Issue: Whether evidence “seized from an automobile, in which petitioner was riding at the time of his arrest, after the automobile was taken to a police station and was there thoroughly searched without a warrant” is admissible. Held: admissible! |
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California v. Carney (1985) |
*Courtsays lesser expectation of privacy w/ regard to automobiles *reasons for vehicle exception: 1.) cars are readily mobile 2.) cars are heavily regulated--subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls |
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differencebtwn Carroll doctrine and searchincident-to-arrest doctrine? |
·Carroll doctrineis exception to the warrant requirement, not an exception to the probable causerequirement; ·Search incident-to-arrest isexception to the probable cause requirement |
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rule about whether police can search a closed container without awarrant? |
Chadwick saysthat they can seize the container, but they need a warrant before they can actuallysearch it |
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Arkansas v. Sanders |
Held: a warrant was required to search a suitcase that had been placed in the trunk a taxi |
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CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO |
*Court overruled Ross ·new rule: The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband |
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BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART |
Issue: Whether the police may enter a home w/o warrant when they have anobjectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriouslyinjured or imminently threatened w/ such injury Held: They may! Law enforcement officers may enter a home w/o a warrant torender emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupantfrm imminent injury |
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Wyoming v. Hougton |
Held: police officers w/ probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search |
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hot pursuit
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if officers are in hot pursuit of a suspect, this excuses an arrest w/o a warrant AND a search w/o a warrant *but hot pursuit CANNOT apply if the suspect doesn't know he is being pursued by police Warden v. Hayden |
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police and public safety |
a warrant is excused if the delay in obtaining it would result in a significant risk of harm to the police or to members of the public |
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911 calls and public safety |
United States v. Martinez Held: a static 911 call is insufficient to create an objectively reasonable belief tat someone inside the home is in need of aid *distinguished static calls from dropped calls |
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the risk of destruction of evidence |
if evidence will be destroyed in the time it takes to obtain a warrant, then the warrant requirement is excused |
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Dorman v. United States |
*Givessome factors used to determine whether exigent circumstances justified awarrantless entry; how do we know if there is an “urgent need” to render aid ortake action? 1. The gravity or violent natureof the offense w/ which the suspect is to be charged 2. Whether the suspect is“reasonably believed to be armed” 3. “A clear showing of probablecause…to believe that the suspect committed the crime” 4. “Strong reason to believe thatthe suspect is in the premises being entered” 5. “A likelihood that the suspectwill escape if not swiftly apprehended” 6. The peaceful circumstances of the entry |
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Kentucky v. King |
Issue: Does the exigent circumstances rule apply when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence?Held: In such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies...exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry into a premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of 4th amend. |
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Kentucky v. King (more stuff) |
*the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense *OBJECTIVE STANRDARD |
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Missouri v. McNeely |
Held: exigency must be assessed by the time it takes to obtain an electronic warrant |
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Segura v. United States |
Held: even if the warrantless entry of premises was illegal, the later search conducted pursuant to warrant can be based on an independent legal search; AND the seizure of a premises pending a warrant is reasonable, even absent exigent circumstances |
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Illinois v. McArthur |
Held: officers have authority to maintain the status quo of a premises while a warrant is being obtained *see pg. 414 |
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Camara v. Municipal Court |
*While a warrant is required for an administrative safety inspection of a home, the warrant need not be based upon a finding of probable cause that a particular home is in violation of a safety code |
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New York v. Burger |
*General rule for businesses is the same for safetyinspection of homes (Camara) ·Does the general rule apply here? Held:Warrants nor probable cause requiredfor pervasively regulated businesses But it still has to be reasonable oWhynot? ----> if it is a pervasively regulatedindustry, probable cause and warrants are not required |
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how do we know if a business is pervasively regulated? |
does it have pervasive regulations? ex: mines, places that sell firearms, liquor stores, etc |
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how do we know if a warrantless search of a business is reasonable? |
3 criteria must be met: 1. There must be a “substantial”government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which theinspection is made; 2. The warrantless inspectionsmust be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; 3. The statute’s inspectionprogram must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. *see pg. 420-421 |
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New Jersey v. T.L.O. |
*school official searched the handbag of a student Held: warrant not required for searches conducted by school officials *special needs searches permitted based on reasonable sus rather than prob. cause |
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Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding |
Issue: whether a 13-year-old's Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra & underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had drugs Held: b/c there were not reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, the search did violate the Constitution |
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives |
*Court upheld a program mandating drug tests for allrailroad personnel involved in certain train accidents *Special needsexception *Government interest v. individual interest ·What government interest did thecourt identify? oStrongdeterrent—the idea is that people would not use drugs before driving a trainb/c at any time you could have an accident and then end up getting drug tested… |
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National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab |
*Court upheld compelled urinalysis of certain Customs Service employees *suspicionless testing reasonable as applied to two of the three covered types of employees--those involved in drug interdiction & those carrying handguns -b/c diminished expectation of privacy |
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Vernonia School District v. Acton |
Held: Suspicionless (random) drug testing of student athletes isreasonable. “Special needs” exception *What is the special need here? --->Keeping kids off drugs *Remember: in special needsanalysis, first identify what thespecial need is *no significant invasion of students' privacy b/c of minimally intrusive nature of sample collection |
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Board of Education of Independent SchoolDistrict v. Earls |
Held: Suspicionless (random) drug testing of all students engaged inextracurricular activities is okay. Special needs exception *What is the special need here? --> To detect and prevent drug useamong students *What is the individual privacyinterest here? Very low |
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CHANDLER V. MILLER (1997) |
Issue: Does a drug test of a politician fall under the “special needs”exception of a search? Held: The drug testing of the politicians is Constitutional. *Government interest is preventing people from doing drugswhen running for office. How? Deterrent. |
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Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001) |
Issue: Is state hospital policy requiring drug testing of pregnant motherssuspected of cocaine use Constitutional? Held: Nope. The drug tests were not “special needs” searches b/c “thecentral and indispensable feature of the policy” was fulfillment of the State’slaw enforcement goals. |
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Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders (2012) |
Issue: Was this a reasonable search? Was it special needs? Held: Search was Constitutional. 5-4 decision*What is the special need here? -->Safety in the correctionalfacility *Strip search of people arrested |
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City of Ontario v. Quon (2010) |
Issue: Was the reading of Officer Quon’s text messages an unreasonablesearch? Held: Yes. “There was reasonable grounds for suspecting that the searchwas necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. *What was the special need here? ·To see if he needed to be allottedmore monthly texts |
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United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) |
Issue: Are roadblock-type stops reasonable?Held: Yes. Court invoked Terryprinciples to approve suspicionless stops at permanent checkpoints removed fromthe border. *Necessary to implement the state interest in regulating the flow of illegal aliens *also minimally intrusive |
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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990) |
*Court upheld suspicionless stops at temporary sobriety checkpoints, relied on Terry cases *special need beyond criminal law enforcement not required to support reasonableness balancing for stops at fixed checkpoints *limited intrusiveness...state interest in eradicating drunk driving |
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CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND (2000) |
*Roadblocks are a type of special needs seizure Held: The roadblocks are unconstitutional. Why? ·“we decline to approve a programwhose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interestin crime control.” (see p. 466) |
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Illinois v. Lidster (2004) |
Held: The roadblocks are constitutional.Why? ·Unlike the roadblocks in Edmond, these were information-seekingstops ·“We have never approved acheckpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinarycriminal wrongdoing.” ….what is “ordinary criminal wrongdoing? See Maryland v. King |
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MARYLAND V. KING (2013) |
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze DNAfrom people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes?Held: Yes. It is a lawful seizure |
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purpose of an inventory search? |
1. Protect owner’s property whilein police custody 2. To protect the police againstclaims of lost or stolen property 3. To protect the police and thepublic from potential danger |
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Colorado v. Bertine (1987) |
Held: Police officers could inventorythe contents of a van, including a closed backpack and a nylon bag and othercontainers within it *re-read |
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Florida v. Wells |
*unanimously found that the opening of a locked suitcase could not be justified as an inventory search where the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatsoever concerning the opening of closed containers |
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UNITED STATES V. FLORES-MONTANO |
Issue: Whether the removal anddismantling of the defendant’s fuel tank is a “routine” border search for whichno suspicion whatsoever is required. Held: Suspicionless search wasreasonable. Why? Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwantedpersons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. *No reasonable suspicion required for routine border searches |
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez (1985) |
Issue: What is the appropriate standard of proof for highly intrusiveborder intrusions? Held: Reasonable suspicion is standard for non-routine searches |
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voluntary consent |
*A search based upon voluntaryconsent is reasonable even in the absence of a warrant or any articulablesuspicion. *AS LONG AS THE CONSENT IS VALID |
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) |
Issue: What are the requirements forvalid consent? Held: Consent is valid if it isvoluntary! Voluntariness of consent must be determined by the totality of thecircumstances *suspect's knowledge of his right to refuse consent is relevant, but absence of a consent warning is not dispositive |
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United States v. Ickes |
*an officer can turn on your laptop and peruse all the material on the harddrive without any suspicion if you are carrying it across the border into the US
*classified as routine border search |
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United States v. Prescott |
Held: a person cannot be penalized for exercising the right to refuse to permit a search, and that "passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing" |
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Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) |
*Thegovernment has the burden of proof. Theymust prove that the suspect’s consent was voluntary |
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United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto (1990) |
*6 factors relevant to whetherconsent is voluntarily obtained (non-exclusive list): (1) the voluntariness of D’scustodial status (2) the presence of coercivepolice procedures (3) the extent & level of D’scooperation w/ police 4) the defendant’s awareness ofhis right to refuse consent (5) the defendant’s education andintelligence 6) the defendant’s belief that noevidence will be found |
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Illinois v. Rodriguez |
Issue: Is a search valid when based on the consent of a third party who hasapparent but not actual authority? Held: The entry was valid if the officers had reasonable belief that thefriend had authority to consent. |
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United States v. Dearing |
Held: a live-in babysitter lacked apparent authority to consent to a search of his employer's bedroom. *officer should have inquired into the extent of the babysitter's authorized access into his employer's bedroom |
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Georgia v. Randolph |
Held: Even though one occupantconsents, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entryprevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him *So the police are allowed tosearch, but they cannot use what they find against the un-consenting party;they can only use what they find against the consenting party |
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Florida v. Jimeno |
*scope of a consent is determined by a standard of objective reasonableness Held: an officer could reasonably conclude that when a suspect gave general consent to a search of his car, he also consented to a search of a paper bag lying on the floor of his car |
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UnitedStates v. Price |
(replied“sure”), debated about what that meant, look at totality of the circumstances.When they started search he should have stopped them. He didn’t so inferred itwas a sure to go ahead. |
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withdrawing consent |
*consent cannot be revoked retroactively after the officer has found incriminating information *revocation must be clear and explicit |
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Weeks v. United States (1914) |
*Creates the exclusionary rule *Only a federal rule at this point!! *Court says they made up exclusionary rule b/c it was theonly effective means of protecting the Fourth Amendment *evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial |
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Mapp v. Ohio |
applied exclusionary rule to the states! |
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Elkins v. United States |
abolished silver platter method! *since exclusionary rule only applied federally, federal officials would let state officers obtain evidence illegally then hand it to them on a "silver platter" |
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WOLF V. COLORADO (1949) |
Issue: 1) Is the Fourth Amendmentimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty? and, 2) Is the exclusionary rulethe only remedy that states have to follow? *So court is trying to decide ifthe Fourth Amendment should be incorporated! Aka Does the Fourth Amendmentapply to the states?Held: Yes, Fourth Amendment is incorporatedb/c it is implicit in concept of ordered liberty! But also said that the statesdo not have to follow the exclusionary rule….dissent thinks this is strange |
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four points in favor of exclusionary rule |
1. The rule preserves judicialintegrity, by insulating the courts from tainted evidence 2. The rule prevents thegovernment from profiting from its own wrong 3. The rule is not costly, b/c itonly excludes what should never have been obtained in the first place 4. The rule is necessary to deterpolice misconduct |
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remedies for Fourth Amendment violations |
exclusionary rule civil damages administrative remedies |
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UNITED STATES V. LEON (1984) |
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit introducing illegallyobtained evidence in court; in prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures *Cost/benefit analysis *Cost(s)of exclusionary rule? The guilty go free or get better plea bargains *Benefit(s)of exclusionary rule? Deterring police misconduct (not applicable in this case) |
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good faith exceptions |
United States v. Leon 4 exceptions to exclusionary rule: 1.If the magistrate was misled 2. 3.The affidavit is so lacking in probable cause 4.Warrant so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonablypresume it to be invalid |
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Arizona v. Evans (1995) |
Issue: Can a government official whomakes a mistake that leads to illegal search or seizure can be deterred byoperation of exclusionary rule? Held: No, b/c consistent w/ Leon it would not apply the exclusionaryrule in this case. No misconduct happened. |
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Illinois v. Krull (1987) |
*a good faith claim must have an objective basis |
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HERRING V. UNITED STATES (2009) |
Issue: Whether contraband found during a searchincident to an arrest where an officer reasonably believed there was an outstanding warrant must be excluded in a later prosecution Held: Nope! The jury should not be barred from considering all theevidence. |
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Jones v. United States (before Katz) |
*2categories of ppl have standing to challenge the legality of a search 1. If you were on the premises 2. Anyone charged w/ a possessionoffense Held: if evidence of possession wasdiscovered in a government search or seizure, then anyone on the premises hadstanding to challenge it (automatic standing) |
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RAKAS V. ILLINOIS (1978) |
*Court thinks "legitimately on the premises" test too broad *Courtsays the test is the same as the Katz2-prong test; ·he 1) manifested a subjectiveexpectation of privacy, and 2) that expectation was reasonable *Purposeof exclusionary rule? To deter police misconduct *Isthere a practical difference btwn the Rakastest and the Katz test? ·Well, the test is the same, butthere are two different issues, and the test doesn’t always lead to the sameresult |
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Minnesota v. Carter |
Held: Nope! Persons who aretemporarily on the premises for a commercial transaction have no FourthAmendment rights at stake in a search of the premises. Factors? 1. The purely commercial nature ofthe transaction engaged in 2. The relatively short period oftime on the premises 3. The lack of any previousconnection btwn respondents & the householder |
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BROWN V. ILLINOIS (1975) |
*Brown was illegally arrested & then confessed*Court says burden is on the state to prove whether theevidence is admissible*Supreme Court establishes a test for causation &attenuation in the Wong Sun case: ·Look at whether the police haveexploited their original illegal conduct in order to get the evidence, or ifthey got their evidence in a way that was not tainted by illegal activity |
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isthe derivative evidence fruit of the poisonous tree? |
Courtsays it’s a totality of the circumstances test! Factors: 1. The Miranda warnings 2. Temporal proximity of thearrest and the confession 3. Presence of interveningcircumstances 4. Purpose and flagrancy of theofficial misconduct |
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Wong Sun v. United States |
*we need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simple because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. *more apt question is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint |
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Hudson v. Michigan (2006) |
Held: violation of knock-and-announcerequirement does not justify the exclusion of evidence found in the warrantlesssearch *Scaliadoes cost/benefit analysis of exclusionary rule ·Cost: excluding relevantincriminating evidence; “The guilty go free” ·Benefit: deterrence, but massivedeterrence not required |
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MURRAY V. UNITED STATES (1988) |
independent source doctrine! *Evidence will not be excluded asfruit of the poisonous tree if the government can show that the evidence camefrom an independent source & w/o reliance on any illegal police activity |
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United States v. Andrade (1986) |
inevitable discovery doctrine! *Evidence will not be excluded ifthe government can show that the evidence in question would have beendiscovered eventually Held:Evenif the search could not be justified as incident to arrest and was thusunlawful, “the cocaine was admissible b/c it would have been inevitablydiscovered through a routine inventory search.” |
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establishing inevitability |
*government must prove by a preponderance that the illegally obtained evidence inevitably would have been discovered by legal means (Nix) *Courts must focus on what the officers actually would have done, not what they could possibly have done (United States v. Feldhacker) |
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United States v. Janis |
Held: evidence illegally seized by state police can be used by federal tax officials in civil tax litigation |
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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza |
Held: illegally seized evidence may be used in a deportation proceeding |
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Walder v. United States |
Walder testified that he had never possessed or sold narcotics in his life, then they used the illegal evidence they had seized against him. SCOTUS said okay because he had "opened the door" to this evidence |
