Crim Pro After Spring Break

Front 1

Blanton v City of NOrth Las Vegas NV | SCOTUS 1989 | 1067

Back 1

Offenses w/ possible punishments of 6 months or less are presumed "petty"

Front 2

Lewis v US | SCOTUS 1996 | 1067

Back 2

The presumption of "pettiness" for offenses w/ 6 months or less imprisonment as possible punishment is rebutted "if D can demonstrate that any additional sttutory penalties, viewd in conjunction w/ the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is "serious"

Front 3

Singer v US | SCOTUS 1965 | 1070

Back 3

(whether requiring prosecution to consent to waiver of trial is unconstitutional abuse of right to jury trial)
(1) guarantee of a right is not the same as guarantee to insist on the opposite
(2) the constitution favors the trial as a way to ascertain truth and gov't has legitimate interest in seeing it through should it wish to
(3) if the consent is refused, D gets a constitutionally sound jury trial anyhow- no relinquishment of any right.

Front 4

Williams v Florida | SCOTUS 1970 | 1070

Back 4

(whether state can statutorily mandate 6- rather than 12-person juries)
(1) there is no indication that the Founders cared how many people were on the jruy, so long as it functioned
(2) jury's function is to be interposed in a group formate between accused and accuser and to represent the community, and we think 6 is enough, particularly when unanimity is required

Front 5

Ballew v Georgia | SCOTUS 1978 | 1071

Back 5

(whether 5-person juries are constitutional) Recent data shows that the smaller the jury, the less likely group deliberation will occur. We rule that 5 people is too few because it might lead to inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect application of common sense of the community.

Front 6

Apodaca v Oregon | SCOTUS 1972 | 1072

Back 6

(whether unanimous jury verdicts are required in state criminal trials) an 11-1 or 10-2 verdict does not violate the 6th amendment.

Front 7

Johnson v Louisiana | SCOTUS 1972 | 107

Back 7

(whether 9-3 verdict in state court violates constitution) A 9-3 verdict is acceptable, but we would have serious problems with anything requiring less than 75 percent minimum of jurors voting to convict

Front 8

US v Thomas | 2d Cir 1997 | 1127

Back 8

(1) jury nullification is a POWER, not a right, and a power incident to the right not to be subject to dbl jeopardy at that
(2) it is inappropriate to dismiss a juror for nullification if there is ANY indication that his intransigence is based on legitimate doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence

Front 9

Maryland v Craig | SCOTUS 1990 | 1141

Back 9

(1) Confrontation Clauses' central concern = ensuring reliability of evidence via rigorous testing in adversary proceeding
(2) Four things characterize proper 6th Am testimony: (a) individual examination (b) statements under oath (c) cross-examination (d) jury observation of witness during testimony; absence of (a) is not sine qua non of Confrontation right.
(3) NOTICE that the Maryland statute preserves three out of the four.
(4) we conclude that the preference for face-to-face Confrontation must occasionally, as here, give way to particularized finding of necessity to further an important public policy

Front 10

Olden v Kentucky | SCOTUS 1988 | 1153

Back 10

(whether ev. that white rape vic who dated black man who saw her leave car of black D should be admitted into D's trial under the Confrontation Clause)
(1) The right of confrontation in the 6th Am. includes the right of reasonable cross-examination
2) Trial judges have broad discretion, but generally defense should be allowed to impeach a witness
(3) ev. is not repeptitive, unreasonable, w/o foundation, etc... and it was crucial to the D's case. It should have been allowed into trial.

Front 11

Mattox v US | SCOTUS 1895 | 1157

Back 11

(whether prior testimony of now-dead individuals is admissible) This case is the basis for the "dying declaration" exception, but the opinion actually said that since it was already subjected to all the safeguards in the first trial. It is admissible IF: (1) defendant is dead and (2) cross-examination was preserved in original trial.

Front 12

Ohio v Roberts } SCOTUS 1980 | 1157

Back 12

(whether unfindable witness's prior testimony at prellim. hearing is admissible when defendant chose not to cross-examine at that time) According to Maddox, this absent witness is just like a dead one and the testimony is admissible under the same two guidelines as Maddox.

Front 13

US v Inadi | SCOTUS 1986 | 1158

Back 13

(whether Constitution permits hearsay statement from co-defendant into trial w/o cross-examination opportunity) So long as the hearsay statement is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause, it is admissible.

Front 14

White v Illinois | SCOTUS 1992 | 1159

Back 14

(whether hearsay statements of a 4-yr old to babysitter and police officer are admissible) This statement, because they were spontaneous declarations, bear sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause.

Front 15

Crawford v Washington } SCOTUS 2004 | 116

Back 15

(whether the reliability standard previously used to determine whether ex parte testimony to law enforcement is admissible in court regardless of cross-examination ability is appropriate)
(1) historically testimony is admissble if (a) the witness is unavailable and (b) the defendant had opportunity for cross at an earlier time.
(2) 6th am is concerned primarily with testimonial hearsay
(3) 6th am is a procedural safeguard designed to ensure not only the reliability of the testimony but also that the reliability is determined through cross

Front 16

Davis v Washington | SCOTUS 2006 | 1174

Back 16

(what statements will be w/in protection of the Confrontation Clause)
(1) testimonial statements only are w/in the protection of the Confrontation Clause
(2) statements are testimonial if they are elicited by law enforcement to establish/prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution
(3) statements are not testimonial if they are elicted by law enforcement to determine and resolve an ongoing emergency. [and here, it was: she was frantic and at risk, so the words are nontestimonial and therefore admissible]
(4) BUT NOTE: statements can be testimonial even in the absence of any interrogation (thats just not what this or most cases are about)

Front 17

Hammon v Indiana | SCOTUS 2006 | 1174

Back 17

(what statements will be w/in protection of Confrontation Clause- consolidate w/ Davis v WA) There was no emergency. There was no argument, no broken bones or objects, no frantic attitude of witness. Police were eliciting responses for use in further investigation and prosecution. This is testimonial and so not admissible.

Front 18

Bruton v US | SCOTUS 1968 | 1178

Back 18

The normal rule that a witness is not "against" a defendant when the jury is instructed not to consider the testimony will not be used to validate, under the Confrontation Clause, introduction of a nontestifying codefendant's confession implicating the defendant even with such instructions. The jury simply cannot be expected to separate this information in a joint trial.

Front 19

Parker v Randolph | SCOTUS 1979 | 1178

Back 19

Bruton is inapplicable to cases involving interlocking confessions- in such cases, the nontestifying confession will be allowed because it will not be devastating to the other defendants who all have corroborating confessions.

Front 20

Cruz v New York | SCOTUS 1987 | 1179

Back 20

(whether Bruton applies where defendant's own confession, interlocking w/ co-defendant's confession, is introduced against him)
(1) 'interlocking' confessions will be relatively harmless if the stories are different, but devastating if they confirm the self-incriminating details of the defendants confession.
(2) this case si really indistinguishable from Bruton
(3) where nontestifying codefendants confession incriminates defendant but is not directly admissible against defendant, conrontation clause bars its admission at their joint trial even if defendant's own confession is admitted against him.

Front 21

Gray v Maryland | SCOTUS 1998 | 1183

Back 21

(whether substituting defendants name for "deleted" allows co-defendants confession to be used in joint trial against co-defendant)
(1) replacing a name with "deleted" while defendant sits in the same courtroom as the co-defendant who is explicitly referred to in the confession hardly disguises who its supposed to be about
(2) Richardson does not apply because the type of inference is different; a jury that infers indirectly defendants' presence in a statement from surrounding facts and logic is not the same as a jury that infers defendant's presence through guesswork having to do with D's presence in the courtroom + "blanks" in the co-defendants statement.

Front 22

Richardson v Marsh | SCOTUS 1987 | 1184

Back 22

(whether co-defendants statement, redacted to omit ALL reference to defendant's existence, is admissible in joint trial) It is constitutional to admit a statement so redacted as to omit all reference to the defendant even if the jury manages to infer through normal logic and similar facts etc. that the defendant was there.

Front 23

Washington v Texas | SCOTUS 1967 | 1191

Back 23

(whether the right to compulsory process is violated by Texas statute prohibiting testimony from co-defendants)
(1) Framers did not intend to give D futile right to require attendance of witnesses whose testimony he cannot use
(2) statute is unconstitutional infringement on 6th amendment right to compulsory process; the fact that they might all lie to help each other is irrelevant

Front 24

United States v Burr | DC of VA 1807 | 1193

Back 24

(whether supboena can be served on the President of the US and whether it should in this case)
(1) the law does not discriminate between the president and a private citizen re: subpoenas
(2) President can be subpoena'd, so papers he has in his possession can be also
(3) if it appears to the court that all the testimony from president/papers is irrelevant, the subpoena will be useless and unnec.; if its relevant, D is entitled to them.

Front 25

Taylor v Illinois | SCOTUS 1988 | 1194

Back 25

(whether the refusal of a judge to allow an undisclosed (because unknown) witness to testify deprives D of right to compulsory process)
(1) this constitutional right may possibly be offended by a discovery sanction exluding the testimony of a favorable witness
(2) the rules of procedure are however essential to the adversary process and should be adhered to whenever possible
(3) the preclusion sanction is a historically allowed and effective deterrent to nondisclosure (3) we presume that evidence discovered after trial would NOT change the outcome
(4) defense has the burden of proving that the nondisclosure was in good faith and did prejudice the defendant, and here he has not done so.

Front 26

Rock v Arkansas | SCOTUS 1987 | 1204

Back 26

(whether categorical ban on hypnotically retrieved evidence is violation of D's right to testify) because the ban is categorical and not tailored to the reliability of the information, it is unconstitutional (we can't say that no hypnotic evidence anywhere should be admissible in trial)

Front 27

Montana v Egelhoff | SCOTUS 1996 | 1205

Back 27

(whether statute prohibiting evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate mens rea is violation of right to testify)
(1) state law may determine what categories of evidence are admissible unless that determination "offends some fundamental principle of our justice"
(2) the denial of voluntary intoxication evidence does not offend this principle [perhaps because voluntary intox usu. doesn't matter in context of mens rea]

Front 28

Griffin v California | SCOTUS 1965 | 1205

Back 28

(whether comment that D's failure to testify gives rise to negative inference violated 5th am)
(1) in federal courts, this is reversible error, but it was based ona federal statute not the 5th am
(2) nevertheless we think the spirit of the 5th requires that no comment be made on negative inference from not testifying
(3) comment by the prosecution AND instructions by the judge suggesting negative inference from failure to testify are both prohibited by the 5th

Front 29

Carter v Kentucky | SCOTUS 1981 | 1210

Back 29

A no-inference instruction by the judge (even over objection by defense) on failure to testify is NOT unconstitutional

Front 30

Mitchell v US | SCOTUS 1999 | 1210

Back 30

(whether Griffin applies to the sentencing phase) Judges MAY NOT draw adverse inference from D's failure to testify at the sentencing hearing.

Front 31

Portuendo v Agard | SCOTUS 2000 | 1211

Back 31

(whether prosecutor can comment on D's ability to hear all testimony before giving his own)
(1) Griffin does not apply to these facts because the right to hear all testimony before giving one's own is NOT guaranteed by the constittuion, as the right not to testify is
(2) Here, comments do not invite jury to use silence as inference of guilt, but to use position in testimony as information re: credibility; its just part and parcel of taking the stand

Front 32

Allen V US | SCOTUS 1896 | 1214

Back 32

A judicial instruction suggesting that minority holdout jurors reconsider their position is appropriate to avoid deadlocked juries.

Front 33

Ppl v Holloway | S Ct CA 1990 | 1215

Back 33

(when juror read newspapers after judicial instruction not to)
(1) misconduct of this type raises a presumption of prejudice
(2) verdict must be vacated whenever it is uncertain that misconduct may have led to guilty verdict
(3) we can never know what effect this had on the jurors so we vacate

Front 34

Remmer v US | SCOTUS 1954 | 1215

Back 34

(effect of jest remark to 'buy' off the jury) Reversed/remanded to determine whether there was harmful error; if not, the verdict stands.

Front 35

US v Stansfield | 3rd Cir 1996 | 1218

Back 35

(when juror read newspapers after judicial instruction not to)
(1) misconduct of this type raises a presumption of prejudice
(2) verdict must be vacated whenever it is uncertain that misconduct may have led to guilty verdict (3) we can never know what effect this had on the jurors so we vacate

Front 36

Schad v Arizona | SCOTUS 1991 | 1218

Back 36

(whether a general guilty verdict in an alternative-count murder trial (premed. and felony - both considered 1st degree) is appropriate) There is nothing wrong w/ charging different means of the same crime, or with jurors potentially agreeing on different means of commission of the crime. So long as they agree that D committed the same crime (here 1st degree), the exact manner in which it happened is not important

Front 37

United States v Powell | SCOTUS 1984 | 1219

Back 37

(whether logically inconsistent verdicts (guilty of use of telephone to commit conspiracy, not guilty of the conspiracy itself) are appropriate)
(1) argument from equity: we dont' know which direction the failure occured in and we don't want to reverse based on guesswork
(2) argument from uncertainty: general verdict is opaque
(3) argument from remedy: conviction can be reviewed for sufficiency of evidence so we dont need an ew procedure for review on inconsistent verdicts

Front 38

US v Dunnigan | SCOTUS 1993 | 1240

Back 38

(whether Constitution permits a court to enhance defendant's sentence under FSGs if the court finds the defendant committed perjury at trial)
(1) statute includes perjury as an obstruction of justice
(2) the DC's finding of perjury is supported by ample evidence
(3) Our authorities do not imposes a categorical ban on every gov't action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions whether or not to exercise constitutional rights
(4) Ds can still testify to things that aren't true/false and be convicted w/o risking perjury
(5) enhancement is more than a substitute for perjury prosecution- it advances the goals of deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation of the orginial crime because it makes sense that a D who perjures is more culpable than a D who does not nad htus worthy of higher punishment

Front 39

Koon v United States | SCOTUS 1996 | 1245

Back 39

(when a downward departure from FSGs may be appropriate)
(1) FSGs divide factors that may be relevant to departure from FSG to three types: prohibited, encouraged/not taken into account, discouraged/taken into account
(2) Four questions when considering departure: (a) What features of the case potentially take it outside the 'heartland' and make it special or unusual? (here, victim provocation, susceptability to abuse in prison, burden of successive prosecutions) (b) Are any prohibited? NO (c) Are any encouraged/not taken into account? (victim provocation, abuse in prison, successive prosectuion) (d) are any discouraged/taken into account? (loss of employment- included in consideration of Commission for this crime, the misconduct under color of law of a police officer)

Front 40

Williams v New York | SCOTUS 1949 | 1258

Back 40

(whether the confrontation clause applies to the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings)
(1) throughout history and modern penology, the trial judge has been given wide discretion in the sentencing phase so that he can gather as much informaiton as possible to make the punishment fit the criminal and not just the crime
(2) on the whole, this trend has been motivated to shorten sntences and limit punishments and it is not really a detriment to offenders for the most part
(3) due process is not a golden ticket to be used to hinder the carefully experimented procedures of courts to advance their punishment policies

Front 41

Gardner v Florida | SCOTUS 1977 | 1262

Back 41

(whether Williams hold true in morder capital jurisdprudence)
(1) Williams was decided before we began our 'death is different' series of decisions
(2) due process requires that capital cases receive higher scrutiny even in the sentencing phase

Front 42

Walton v Arizona | SCOTUS 1990 | 1262

Back 42

(whether AZ's capital sentencing scheme allowing judge alone to decide life/death is constitutional) not every fact underlying sentencing decision even in capital case need be proven to jury [but did it have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt to the judge?] OVERRULED IN RING V AZ!

Front 43

McMillan v Pennsylvania | SCOTUS 1986 | 1263

Back 43

(whether PA's statute mandating five year minimum [within range for offense] w/ presence of 'visible gun' by preponderance of evidence)
(1) every element of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but NOT every element of sentencing factors
(2) PA's legislature made it clear: gun is not an 'element' of the crime here
(3) it is significant that the statute does not raise the maximum penalty, but limits the discretion a jduge would usu. have based on a fact (gun presence) judge would usu. consider to a narrower range

Front 44

Mullaney v Wilbur | SCOTUS | 1267

Back 44

(whether Maine could force D to prove heat of passion to downgrade murder charge to manslaughter) The state cannot shift the burden of proof of proving an element of the offense to the defendant

Front 45

Patterson v New York | SCOTUS | 1268

Back 45

(whether NY statute requiring D to prove emotional disturbance to reduce murder to manslaughter is constitutional) Despite Mullaney, we note that state legislature can define an offense any way they like! they can leave the emotional disturbance out and make it a sentencing factor if they want? DISSENT: Powell, who wrote Mullaney: THIS LOOKS NOTHIGN LIKE MULLANEY! PHOOEY ON THE COURT FOR PRETENDING TO FOLLOW IT!

Front 46

Almendarez-Tores v US | SCOTUS 1998 | 1269

Back 46

(whether statue authorizing increase from two to twenty yrs imprisonment for illegal alien having criminal record is constitutional)
(1) Congress has the right to treat recidivism as a sentencing factor
(2) The fact that the statute increases the maximum penalty from two to twenty yrs is constitutionally irrelevant.

Front 47

Jones v United States | SCOTUS 1999 | 1269

Back 47

(whether statute could differentiate btwn how much injury was done in carjacking statute as sentencing factors)
(1) the legislature in effect describes three separate offenses in the sttute, with widely varying sentencing implications (from 15 yrs max to the death penalty)
(2) the 5th amendment requires that 'any fact aside from prior convictions that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt to a jury'

Front 48

Apprendi v New Jersey | SCOTUS 2000 | 1270

Back 48

(whether Due Process Clause 14th requires factual determination authorizing increase from 10 yrs to 20 yrs be made by jury beyond reaosnable doubt)
(1) the 14th am. incorporates the 5th to the states
(2) we incorporate our Jones v US decision verbatim to the states here, via 14th
(3) distinctions btwn sentencing factors and elements of crimes were nonexistent at the Founding
(4) almandarez-tores represents 'at best' an exceptional departure in our historic consideration of this topic

Front 49

Ring v Arizona \ SCOTUS 2002 | 1284

Back 49

Overruling Walton v Arizona

Front 50

Blakeley v Washington | SCOTUS 2004 | 1286

Back 50

(1) Jury trial ensures People's control over the judiciary, and cannot if their determination of guilt is nothing but a preliminary acknowledgment giving rise to judicial determination of facts the State has really decided to punish
(2) The Framers certainly wouldn't have approved of a system where the definition of jury power is a judge's personal discretion concerning "how far is too far"; therefore, we must conclude that Apprendi's bright-line rule applies here.
(3) A judge may sentence a convict solely on facts reflected in jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; no other facts (aside from prior convictions) may be considered.

Front 51

United States v Booker | SCOTUS 2005 | 1302

Back 51

(whether 6th Am. applies to FSG; whether FSG's are unconstitutional)
(1) We affirm Apprendi: any fact other than a prior conviction necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) FSGs are mandatory, and so they are unconstitutional. Still, we do not think that FSG's must be scrapped entirely; the long-supported concepts of severance and excision suggest that we should keep the good aspects of the guidelines and only rid ourselves of the unconstitutional aspects: from now on, the FSGs are discretionary.

Front 52

North Carolina v Pearce | SCOTUS 1969 | 1305

Back 52

(to what extent the Constitution limits imposition of a harsher sentence after conviction upon retrial than in the original trial)
(1) the concerns of judicial vindictiveness and chilling effect to defendants seeking their constitutional rights is a serious concern which must be addressed
(2) Double jeopardy mandates that CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED MUST be given on resentencing
(3) A harsher sentence is not invalid on its face, but the sentencing judge MUST set out affirmative reasons for the change; a PRESUMPTION in favor of the defendant exists such that the state must show reasons for the altered sentence

Front 53

Wasman v US | SCOTUS | 1308

Back 53

(the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of sentencing vindictiveness) (1) the presumption is rebuttable by the sentencing authority (2) the presumption does not always apply; where it does not, defendant must affirmatively prove the vindictiveness.

Front 54

Cunningham v California | SCOTUS 2007 | Supp. 17

Back 54

(whether CA's determinate sentencing scheme, where the level W/IN the statutory range is determined by mitigating/aggravating factors is constitutional) No.

Front 55

Rita v US | SCOTUS 2007 | Supp 19

Back 55

The law "permits" a court of appeal to "presume that a setnence imposed within a properly calculated United States Sentencing Fuideline range is a reasonable sentence"

Front 56

Gall v US | SCOTUS 2007 | Supp 19

Back 56

(whether extreme downward departures require "extraordinary circumstances"
(1) FSG's are now advisory; familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review therefore applies
(2) judge must give FSG's serious consideration and state reasons for departure, but there is no "extraordinary circumstances" standard required.

Front 57

Oregon v Itz | SCOTUS | class

Back 57

(whether judge has discretion to defendant should serve sentences concurrently or consecutively) YES.

Front 58

Alabama v Smith | SCOTUS 1989 | 1308

Back 58

(when the rebuttable presumption of judicial vindictiveness applies) Presumption only applies when ther is a 'reasonable likelihood' that increas in sentence is product of ACTUAL vindictiveness by sentencing authority.

Front 59

Texas v McCulloguh | SCOTUS 1986 | 1309

Back 59

Presumption of sentencing vindictiveness does NOT apply where different sentencers exist: jury at one trial, judge at the next.

Front 60

Chaffin v Stynchombe | SCOTUS 1973 | 1308

Back 60

Presumption of sentencing vindictiveness does NOT apply where sentence is by jury.

Front 61

Blockburger v US | SCOTUS 1932 | 1313

Back 61

(how to determine whether conduct constitutes single or multiple offenses)
(1) When the impulse is single, one indictment lies; when successive impulses, multiple indictments lie
(2) in order to be separate offenses, each offense must require a proof of fact that the other does not

Front 62

Prince v US | SCOTUS 1957 | 1316 AND Bell v US | SCOTUS 1955 | 1316 AND United States v Universal CIT Credit Corp | SCOTUS 1958 | 1316

Back 62

Support for the Rule of Lenity: we should not attribute stricter meaning to a statute than is strictly clear from Congressional intent

Front 63

Gore v United States | SCOTUS 1958 | 1317

Back 63

Tightening the screw: maybe lenity isn't such a high value after all

Front 64

Brown v Ohio | SCOTUS 1977 | 1318

Back 64

joyriding: the Blockburger test continues to apply; joyriding is a lesser included offense of auto theft so he can't be charged with both

Front 65

Fong Foo v US | SCOTUS 1962 | 1331

Back 65

Double jeopardy is violated when the court sets aside the judgment of acquittal and directs the petitioners to be tried again for the same offense, even if the trial court improperly ordered the acquittal.

Front 66

United States v Scott | SCOTUS 1978 | 1333

Back 66

Label of dismissal is unimportant; when the ruling of the judge actual represents a resolution in the defendant's favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charge, defendant has been 'acquitted.'

Front 67

Ppl v Aleman | Illinois 1976 | 1334

Back 67

Double jeopardy does not forbid a second trial when the judge was bribed to return an acquittal.

Front 68

Crist v Bretz | SCOTUS 1978 | 1344

Back 68

The calling of witnesses is the point at which double jeopardy attaches in jury trial; for a bench trial, it is when witnesses are sworn in

Front 69

Downum v US | SCOTUS 1963 | 1341

Back 69

When the prosecution's witness is unavailable and the jury must be discharged, dbl jeopardy attaches and no new jury may be emaneled

Front 70

Ashe v Swenson | SCOTUS 1970 | 1335

Back 70

preclusion applies when acquittal of one factual element nec. precludes other trials/charges

Front 71

US v Perez | SCOTUS 1824 | 1344

Back 71

Mistrial based on hung jury has no dbl jeopardy consequences

Front 72

Bartkus v Illinois | SCOTUS 1959 | 1348

Back 72

The Dual Sovereignty exception means that successive state/federal prosectuions are NOT dbl jeopardy

Front 73

In Re Winship | SCOTUS 1970 | 1355

Back 73

right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally guaranteed

Front 74

Jackson v Virginia | SCOTUS 1979 | 1355

Back 74

The Thomspon "no evidence" rule does NOT adequately protect the Winship right; relevant questions is whether, after viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, any reasonable trier of fact could have found essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt

Front 75

Chapman v California | SCOTUS 1967 | 1361

Back 75

(whether Griffin violation can ever be harmless)
(1) SOME constitutional errors can be harmless
(2) if the court can declare that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (w/ the burden of proof on the prosecution), the verdict need not be vacated

Front 76

Arizona v Fulminante | SCOTUS 1991 | 1364

Back 76

(whether harmless-error doctrine is applicable to coerced confessions) (1) "trial defects" are different from "structural defects"
(2) "trial defects" result in the harmless-error doctrine being applied and do not require reversal unless the harmless-error doctrine fails, but
(3) "structural defects" do require reversal regardless (no harmless-error doctrine applicable)
(4) this is a harmless trial defect, no reversal

Front 77

Neder v US | SCOTUS 1999 | 1376

Back 77

(whether faulty instruction on reasonable doubt burden of proof is a structural defect requiring reversal)
(1) this instruction does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable
(2) failure to instruct is different in kind from such structural defects- its a trial defect, and this particular error is harmless

Front 78

Linkletter v Walker | SCOTUS 1965 | 1377

Back 78

(whether Mapp v Ohio's ruling that exclusionary rule applies to the States must be retroactively applied) No.

Front 79

Johnson v new Jersey | SCOTUS 1966 | 1377

Back 79

According to Linkletter, Miranda will only be applied to trials commencing after the Miranda decision

Front 80

Griffith v Kentucky | SCOTUS 1987 | 1377

Back 80

(whether Linkletter applies to cases pending direct review at the time the new rule is announced)
(1) Linkletter would be patently unjust if applied to cases pending direct review at the time of the decision
(2) integrity of judicial review requirest applicability to all cases similar to the deciding case currently pending appeal
(3) new rule MUST be retroactively applied to all cases not final (INCLUDING pending direct review) at the time of the decision

Front 81

Fay v Noia | SCOTUS 1963 | 1381
[OVERRULED by later cases]

Back 81

(1) habeas doctrine requring the exhaustion of all state proceedings before habeas petition DOES NOT APPLY when state remedy is no longer available (EVEN IF unavailability is due to prisoner's own neglect) (2) the strong procedural default that failure to file timely appeal at state level to raise an issue only bars habeas petition on that issue if it amounts to a DELIBERATE WAIVER (3) the presumptive validity of state fact findings is weakened (4) res judicata DOES NOT APPLY to habeas; a liberal filling of successive petitions should be adopted

Front 82

Stone v Powell | SCOTUS 1976 | 1382

Back 82

the exclusionary rule is NOT part of the federal habeas review

Front 83

Withrow v Williams | SCOTUS 1993 | 1383

Back 83

(whether Miranda is excluded from habeas review) NO. Miranda is different than the exclusionary rule.

Front 84

Teague v Lane | SCOTUS 1989 | 1384

Back 84

(1) procedural/trial defect rules will not apply retroactively unless it falls w/in an exception
(2) EXCEPTIONS (a) if rule provides constituional protection to priamry private individual conduct (b) if rule requires observance of those procedures which are implicit in the concept of liberty
(3) basically, if new rule, no retroactivity (very RARE!)

Front 85

Schriro v Summerlin | SCOTUS 2004 | 1391

Back 85

(whether Ring v AZ is among the exceptions allowing retroactivity)
(1) not about primary, private individual conduct
(2) no watershed rule because although juries are favored, its not like judges are terrible decision makers- miscarriage of justice doesn't occur when judges are allowed to decide

Front 86

Davis v US | SCOTUS 1973 | 1396

Back 86

Review of grand jury claim not raised at trial in federal court is barred absent a showing of CAUSE for noncompliance and PREJUDICE resulting from alleged constitutional violations [the Cause/Prejudice Test for Habeas Review]

Front 87

Francis v Henderson | SCOTUS 1976 | 1396

Back 87

Cause/Prejudice test for Habeas Review applies to state as well as federal prisoners

Front 88

Wainwright v Sykes | SCOTUS 1977 | 1393

Back 88

(whether habeas review is available to a Miranda claim not properly preserved for appeal)
(1) Francis applies
(2) We see no cause, so we don't need to reach prejudice
(3) No habeas review of the improperly preserved Miranda claim

Front 89

Engle v Isaac | SCOTUS 1982 | 1402

Back 89

(1) The apparent futility of raising an objection in state court does not constitute "cause" in the cause/prejudice test
(2) however, Cause/Prejudice won't apply when comity/finally must give way to correcting "fundamentally unjust punishment"

Front 90

Smith v Murray | SCOTUS 1986 | 1403

Back 90

(whether argument advanced by amicus but not by counsel because state law wouldn't help is properly preserved for habeas review)
(1) no; C/P Test applies, we see no C [because amicus doesn't count] and don't reach P
(2) this is not one of the fundamentally unjust punishment exceptions

Front 91

Schlup v Delo | SCOTUS 1995 | 1409 AND Sawyer v Whitley | SCOTUS 1992 | 1409

Back 91

(what kind of showing qualifies for the 'actual innocence'/funadmentally unjust exception)
(1) IF claim = defualted const. claim depriving fact-finder of reliable, exculpatory evidence, THEN petitioner must show by preponderance that "no reasonable juror would have convicted w/ new evidence"
(2) IF claim = ineligibility for death penalty, THEN petitioner must show by clear and convincing proof that no reasonable juror would find eligibility

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House v Bell | SCOTUS 2006 | 1409

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The standard for actual innocence exception allowing habeas review of an ineffective counsel is less stringent than the standard for actual innocence as sole ground for habeas review.

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Coleman v Thompson | SCOTUS 1991 | 1414

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(1) we OVERRULE fay v noia and hold that C/P Test is applied even when entire appeal is forfeited
(2) there is no 6th am right to counsel in habeas actions, so you will NEVER win an ineffective counsel claim on habeas proceeding