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11 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Main points
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Fear of relative gains, stopping cooperation. Difficulties of cooperation. Underestimate threatening, SD, values. Life on the Pareto frontier. Institutions as interests of powerful. Bipolarity. US as unipole. Waltz and security.
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List to use
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Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation
Grieco, Powell, Snidal, Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation Jervis, Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation Snyder Waltz, Stability of a Bipolar World Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War Waltz, Origins of War in NR Theory Waltz, TIP |
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Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation
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Positional = fear of relative gains. Constrains cooperation. Fundamental goal – stop relative gains. Might forgo increase capabilities to achieve. Maintain power.
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Grieco, Powell, Snidal, Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation
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Cooperation possible but harder to achieve than some say. Anarchy – cheating, worry relative gains. Domineering friend today, foe tomorrow. 2 barriers to cooperation – enforcement/relative gains.
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Jervis, Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation
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People underestimate how threatening actions are. Think cooperating when not. Dimly aware SD. Overestimate hostility of others. I’m cooperating, you’re defecting. Osgood’s GRIP – effort to break through adversary’s perceptal biases – may get more cooperation than tt for tat. Force negatively valued unless remove menace, establish democracy. Common/conflicting values. Axelrod and metanorms. Realism ignores decision making LOA.
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Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation
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Difficult and important to cooperate. Krasner – life on the Pareto frontier – already cooperating to max.
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Snyder
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Realists – norms/institutions reducible to material interests of powerful. At best intervening variables. Independent effects in minor issues, away from struggle for power.
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Waltz, Stability of a Bipolar World
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How bipolar limits violence. Nukes distillation power. Middle have trouble keeping up.
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Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War
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US winner, behaves as unchecked powers do. How powerful acts. Nukes allows status quo focus on economy but doesn’t create GP.
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Waltz, Origins of War in NR Theory
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WWIII would be hard to start. Deterrence easily achieved.
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Waltz, TIP
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States seek security not power. SD. Min survive, max domination. Achieve through internal/external balancing. Self-help. Multipolar balancing external. Security first concern. Bipolarity don’t worry about alliances. May not be rational but then destroyed. Status quo. Differs from Morgenthau (human lust for power, animus dominandi). Constant threat of violence. States defensive positionalists. Relative gains. BOP (min sec max dom, balancing, 2 or more states in self-help). Predictions indeterminate. Internal conditions may stop balancing.
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