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50 Cards in this Set

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Contemporary Topics
Strategic Choice and ChangeCorporate GovernanceTop ManagementFirm knowledge and LearningFinancial MarketsSpinoffs and SpawningSocial CapitalReputation
Strategic Choice and Change
Sherer and Lee 2002Jensen 2006Plowman et al 2007Battilana and Casciaro 2012
Sherer and Lee 2002
Strategic Choice and Change. Defines industries and organizations most likely to result in innovative change; uses scarcity concept of RBV, institutional concept of legitimacy in adoption by prestigious law firms
Jensen 2006
Strategic Choice and Change. Choice to abandon affiliations in audit firms (Arthur Anderson after Enron scandal); legitimacy and accountability in the social network, acceptability heuristics, social comparison
Plowman et al 2007
Strategic Choice and Change. The authors use complexity theory and change theory to argue how and why a single decision (offering hot breakfast to nearby homeless) ultimately led to a radical change in an organization and its environment (changing the church demographics, mission, and surrounding environment).
Battilana and Casciaro 2012
Strategic Choice and Change. Contingency theory for how structural closure in a network (defined as the extent to which an actor's network contacts are conected to one another) affect the initiation of adoption in an organization.
Corporate Governance
Finkelstein, Hambrick, Cannella 2009Westphal, Stern 2006O'Mahoney and Ferraro 2007Kang 2008Bednar 2012
Finkelstein, Hambrick, Cannella 2009
Corporate Governance. Book chapter giving an overview of board structure and composition. Specifically, it looks at context conditions, board characteristics, board vigilance behavior, organizational outcomes, and firm performance.
Westphal, Stern 2006
Corporate Governance. Behavior as a substitute for credentials and majority status in obtaining board seats; corporate elites and ingratiation
O'Mahoney and Ferraro 2007
Corporate Governance. Governance in open source communities; emerge in a limited form bureaucracy, organization-building leadership style is preferred
Kang 2008
Corporate Governance. Director interlocks can act as channels where reputational penalties experienced by one firm can spillover to other firms.
Top Management
Hambrick and Mason 1984Hayward and Hambrick 1997Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007Crossland and Hambrick 2011Chin, Hambrick, Trevino 2013
Hambrick and Mason 1984
Top Management. Lays out upper echelon theory; incorporates bounded rationality on the part of top managers - restricted field of vision, selective perceptions, information filtered through cognitive biases and values
Hayward and Hambrick 1997
Top Management. CEO hubris is linked to higher price premia for acquisitions
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007
Top Management. CEO narcissism leads to more dynamism in a firm's strategy, greater number and size of acquisitions, and the more extreme its performance
Crossland and Hambrick 2011
Top Management. Country-level managerial discretion plays a role on how much impact CEOs have. Institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation
Chin, Hambrick, Trevino 2013
Top Management. Liberal CEOs exhibit greater advances in their firm’s CSR
Firm knowledge and Learning
Cohen and Levinthal 1990Crossan, Lane and White 1999Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003Yang, Phelps, Steensma 2010Dahlander and McFarland 2013
Cohen and Levinthal 1990
Firm knowledge and Learning. The ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities (absorptive capacity), and its a function of a firm's prior knowledge.
Crossan, Lane and White 1999
Firm knowledge and Learning. Organizational learning involves search and exploration. It is a multi-level process: individual, group, organization,.
Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003
Firm knowledge and Learning. Knowledge is localized within technological and geographical contexts. Mobility facilitates knowledge flows more than alliences.
Yang, Phelps, Steensma 2010
Firm knowledge and Learning. The effectiveness of learning from knowledge pool is size and similarity.
Dahlander and McFarland 2013
Firm knowledge and Learning. Tie formation depends on opportunity and preference, but persistence is tied to tie strength and types.
Exploration and Exploitation
Gupta, Smith, Shalley 2006He and Wong 2004Beckman 2006Taylor and Greve 2006Arend, Patel and Park 2014
Gupta, Smith, Shalley 2006
Exploration and Exploitation. Reviews four questions: What do exploration and exploitation mean? Are they two ends of a continuum or orthogonal to each other? How should organizations achieve balance—via ambidexterity or punctuated equilibrium? Must all organizations strive for a balance, or is specialization sufficient?
He and Wong 2004
Exploration and Exploitation. Explores if ambidexterity does improve firm performance. The interaction bewteen exploration and exploitation led to sales growth.
Beckman 2006
Exploration and Exploitation. Founding team's composition shapes new firm behaviors. Familiarity, having worked at the same company before, helps with exploitation. Variety in ecperiences helps with or encourages exploration.
Taylor and Greve 2006
Exploration and Exploitation. Exploration is best done by diverse teams. Exploitation is done best by experienced teams. Individuals do not have coordinating costs and can integrate knowledge better. Innovative ideas come from diverse knowledge, but finding out which of those are fruitful requires deep knowledge (or exploirarion).
Arend, Patel and Park 2014
Exploration and Exploitation. Extend the Knowledge Based View with a new typology. The dimensions are knowledge familiarity and knowledge source. Knowledge development significantly affects performance.
Financial Markets
Hayward and Boeker 1998Rao, Greve, and Davis 2001Fanelli, Misangyi, and Tosi 2009Benner and Ranganathan 2012Wiserma and Zhang 2013
Hayward and Boeker 1998
Financial Markets. They examined how the conditions underlying intragroup conflict affect analysts’ rating. They argue that an action that appears to be an act of self-interest may be explained by power structure between the departments of an organization, and such effect may be moderated by the reputation of analysts and his or her department.
Rao, Greve, and Davis 2001
Financial Markets. They examined a fragile nature of imitation-based institutionalization. They studied how Wall street stock price analysts’ initiate and abandon coverage of the securities of the firms. Drawing on social cognition literature, they argue that heuristics of social proof leads to imitation of others’ behaviors but it also leads to postestimation regrets that cause the decision makers to reverse their decision. Their findings show that analysts who initiate coverage by imitating peers are more likely to experience disappointment and abandon the coverage later.
Fanelli, Misangyi, and Tosi 2009
Financial Markets. They look at whether the projection of charismatic language (or CEO Charismatic Vision) in organizational discourse influences the judgements of institutional intermediaries (analysts). Yes, yes it does.
Benner and Ranganathan 2012
Financial Markets. They investigate how pressures from institutional environments influence firm's responses to technological change. Analysts' evaluations, as institutional pressure, affects strategic investment and firms that go against it try to offset it by share repurchasing.
Wiserma and Zhang 2013
Financial Markets. They look at how the board's response to corporate misconduct is influenced by the social context, Board sensitively reacts to the pervasiveness of the misconduct and the media attention. This is stronger then the firm is under investigation.
Spinoffs and Spawning
Phillips 2002Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, Sarkar 2004Fern, Cardinal, O'Neil 2012Campbell, Ganco, Agarwal 2012
Phillips 2002
Spinoffs and Spawning. He examined organizational geneology and its effect on the likelihood of organizational failure. His analysis of Silicon Valley law firm show that transfer of resources (esp. human capital and social capital) and routines between a parent organization and its progeny organization decrease life changes for the parent firms and increase life chances for the progeny.
Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, Sarkar 2004
Spinoffs and Spawning. They developed and tested a theoretical framework linking knowledge inheritance to spinout generation, development and survival. They considered two types of knowhow, i.e. technological and market pioneering knowhow. Their analysis of spinouts in the disk drive industry show that incumbents with both strong technological and market pioneering knowhow generate fewer spinouts than firms with strength in only one of these areas. An incumbent’s capabilities at the time of a spinout’s founding positively affect the spinout’s knowledge capabilities and its probability of survival.
Fern, Cardinal, O'Neil 2012
Spinoffs and Spawning. They look at how pre-founding experience influence strategy. They find that structural knowledge is more influential in deciding a strategy than content knowledge.Founders exploit their own knowledge and experience rather than imitate competitors.
Campbell, Ganco, Agarwal 2012
Spinoffs and Spawning. They investigate which types of employees are likely to leave. Highly compensated employees are less likely to leave, but if they do it is more frequently to a spin out. Losing employees to spin outs hurts the parent firm. Losing highly compensated employees hurts more.
Social Capital
Seibert, Kraimer, Liden 2001Adler and Kwon 2002Zjixing and Tsui 2007Galunic, Ertug, Gariulo 2012
Seibert, Kraimer, Liden 2001
Social Capital. They examined an individual’s social capital (network structure and access to social resources) and its effect on individual’s career success. Their findings show that network structure was related to social resources and the effects of social resources on career success was fully mediated by three network benefits: access to information, access to resources, and career sponsorship. (social capital→ network benefits → career success)
Adler and Kwon 2002
Social Capital. A review of social capital research with an aim to integrate the various relevant streams of research and to encourage dialogue across perspectives. Social capital: goodwill toward an actor that he can materialize in the unknown time in the future. It derives from opportunity, motivations and ability. A person tied to the actor, who is willing to and provides benefits. Its benefits include 1)information 2)influence, control and power 3) solidarity. The risk of social capital is inefficiency in some cases, trade off between power and information benefits, overembeddedness in the structure (free-riding, hinder entrepreneurship), negative externalities, downward leveling norms Three contingencies: task contingencies(strong vs weak ties; Coleman’s closed vs. Burt’s structural holes), symbolic contingencies (influence the value of a given stock of social capital).
Zjixing and Tsui 2007
Social Capital. They examined whether Burt’s structural holes theory holds in different cultural contexts. They argue that, on the level of national culture, the typical collectivistic culture of China will dampen the effects of structural holes and the benefits of brokerage benefits, and at the organizational level, in organizations that foster a high-commitment culture, the information benefits of structural holes cannot materialize due to the communal-sharing values in such organizations. In their study of four high-tech companies in China, they found evidence supporting their arguments.
Galunic, Ertug, Gariulo 2012
Social Capital. They ask if there are spillover effects to an actor's social capital. They specifically look at the second-order connections. In particular is their rank and sparseness had an effect. The found that second-order social capital matters when the contacts have senior positions.
Reputation
Lange, Lee, and Dai 2011Elsbach 1994Wade, Porac, Pollock, Graffin 2006Mishina, Dyke, Block, Pollock 2010
Lange, Lee, and Dai 2011
Reputation. They review the organizational reputation literature. They categorize definitions of reputation into three general ideas: 1) Being Known Being well-known, broad awareness of the firm irrespective of judgment, Disagreements on prominence distinction 2) Being Known for Something: Includes an assessment of a particular attribute of interest or value, Perceived quality, evaluation, judgment 3) Generalized Favorability: Includes an assessment based on aggregate multiple organizational attributes, Affective, long term. Effects can be positive (benefit of the doubt) or negative (raised expectations, burden of celebrity).
Elsbach 1994
Reputation. She examined how organizational verbal accounts were constructed after controversial events in order to manage organizational legitimacy, and how effective they are. She drew on impression management research and institutional theory. Her analysis of CA cattle industry shows that organizational accounts that combine acknowledging forms of accounts with references to widely institutionalized characteristics are the most effective in protecting organizational legitimacy.
Wade, Porac, Pollock, Graffin 2006
Reputation. They studied the effects of the certification of individual managers on organizational-, and individual-level outcomes. Using the data from Financial World’s CEO of the year context, they found that certified CEOs received higher compensation than noncertified CEOs when performance was high but lower remuneration (rewards) when performance was poor.
Mishina, Dyke, Block, Pollock 2010
Reputation. Previous studies suggest that high performing firm are less likely to do illegal activities but in reality there are number of instances. They ask why and under what conditions prominent and successful firms would take risks to do bad things? In their paper they discuss the effects of high aspirations, expectations, and prominence. They define Corporate illegality as an illegal act primarily meant to benefit a firm by potentially increasing revenues or decreasing costs. They discuss underlying psychological mechanisms: Loss aversion, house money effect and hubris impact corporate illegality. Loss aversion: if potential gains and losses are of similar magnitude, the negative consequences of losses will loom larger than the other, therefore dominate decision making. House money effect: prior gains tended to lead to higher levels of risk taking, thinking that prior gains are extra money, “the house’s money”, to gamble with.