Contemporary Philosophy

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Rigid Designator

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...designates x w.r.t. every world in which x exists

(and does not designate anything other than x w.r.t. any worlds where ~x)

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Persistent Designator

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...designates x w.r.t. every world in which x exists and doesn't designate anything w.r.t. worlds in which ~x

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Obstinate Designator

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...designates x w.r.t. every world, whether x exists in that world or not.

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Descriptional Designator

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is associated with K such that
(i) expresses the elements of K as its semantic content
(ii) w.r.t. any world w, designates whatever in w uniquely has all or at least sufficiently many, of K

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to be descriptional relative

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is to be a descriptional designator, and among K, is an intrinsically relational property of bearing R to x, for some relation R.

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to be thoroughly descriptional

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is to be a descriptional designator but not relative to anything

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Orthodox Thesis

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Ordinary proper names, indexicals and demonstratives are either thoroughly descriptional or descriptional relative only to items of the speaker's direct acquaintance

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Fregean Thesis

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All ordinary proper names, indexicals and demonstratives are thoroughly descriptional

As in they are not descriptional relative to anything, no definite description, they just have a sense expressed when you use them

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Thesis of Direct Reference

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An ordinary proper name, indexical, or demonstrative designating x is either non-descriptional or descriptional relative only to x itself by means of x's haecceity.

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Stronger Direct-Reference Thesis

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Ordinary proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives are altogether non-descriptional.

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Auxiliary Thesis

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If α is a non-descriptional designator of x, then α obstinately rigidly designates x.

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Thesis of Rigidity

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All ordinary proper names, indexical, and demonstratives are rigid designators

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Millianism

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Definite descriptions are descriptional designators, whereas ordinary proper names, indexicals and demonstratives are Millian designators.

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Disquotational Principle

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If a normal L speaker, one reflection and under normal circumstances, sincerely assents to 'ϕ' then he/she believes that ϕ.

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Stronger Disquotational Principle

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A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed unmber normal circumstances to sincere reflective assent to 'ϕ'

if and only if

s/he believes that ϕ

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Translation Principles

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IF a sentence of L expresses a truth in L, THEN any literal translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth in that other language.

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Modal Argument

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(M) ‘Shakespeare, if he existed, wrote R&J, H, M, etc.’

According to Thesis 5 this expresses a necessary truth. It doesn't. Shakespeare could have failed to write his plays.

Some anti-descriptivists contend that the Orthodox thesis holds that the plays had to be written by Shakespeare, and no one else. This actually is necessary.

(M) is not necessary

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Epistemic Argument

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(E) ‘Someone wrote R&J, H, M, etc., iff that person was Shakespeare.’

Is held to be a priori by thesis (5)

But this is just not true, we had to go out in the world and discover these properties and FURTHERMORE: we can imagine finding out we were wrong.

We can't imagine discovering that bachelors aren't unmarried males, or that 2+2≠4.

(E) is not a priori

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Thesis (5)

a priority of descriptional designators in OT

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The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the ϕs' is known a priori by the speaker.

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Why Thesis (5)

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(1)‘Someone wrote R&J, H, M, etc., iff that person was Shakespeare.’

means (by OT)

(2) ‘Someone wrote R&J, H, M, etc., iff that person was someone wrote R&J, H, M, etc.'

Since the two sentences are identical by OT;
(1)=a priori <-> (2)= a priori

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Thesis (6)

necessity of descriptional designators in OT

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The statement 'If X exists, then X has most of the ϕs' expresses a necessary truth.

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Why Thesis (6)

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(1) ‘Shakespeare, if he existed, wrote R&J, H, M, etc.’

means

(2) ‘The guy who wrote R&J, H, M, if he existed, wrote R&J, H, M, etc.’

Which is necessary, so if they mean the same thing (1) should be necessary.

So OT holds that 'x has most ϕ's' is necessary.

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Thesis (3)

how descriptional designators designate according to OT

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If most, or a weighted most, of the ϕs are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'X'.

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Semantic Argument

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(S) 'Gödel is the guy who discovered the IoA'

OT says that if Schmidt satisfies 'the guy who discovered the IoA,' then Schmidt is the referent of 'Gödel'.

.:. anytime we use 'Gödel' we are actually referring to Schmidt. But this is not what we're doing.

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Millian Designator

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...a designator whose semantic content of is simply it's designatum

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Salmon's View on Stronger Disquotation

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[NL~T(S) on R in C] Aϕ <---> Bϕ

........(i) [NL~T(S) on R in C] Aϕ --> Bϕ
........(ii) Bϕ --> [NL~T(S) on R in C] Aϕ
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(don't forget A=sincere assent)

Salmon believes (ii) is wrong because being a normal ~reticent speaker of L and sincerely assenting on reflection in normal circumstances to ϕ is not necessary for believing that ϕ.

The individual may believe ϕ and understand ϕ but not realize this is one of their beliefs.

On the other hand:

Believing that ϕ is necessary for being a normal ~reticent speaker of L and sincerely assenting on reflection in normal circumstances to ϕ.

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Salmon's Solution for the Puzzle

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...1. Londres est jolie.
...2. London is pretty.

A assents to ‘londres est jolie.’ (1)
A does not assent to 'London is pretty.' (2)
-------------------------

The problem here is that if A assents to (1) then A believes (1). If A does not assent to (2) then by SD we conclude that he does not believe (2). Now instead of A having a contradiction, we do.

We believe that Pierre believes London is pretty and we believe that he disbelieves London is pretty.

As it turns out we can believe 4 things.

a. Pierre B(r)
b. Pierre B(~r)
c. Pierre ~B(r)
d. Pierre ~B(~r)

We can assert (a) and (b) w/o asserting a contradiction.
We cannot assert (a) and (c) without asserting a contradiction.

The solution is that SD doesn't always apply, it's faulty under certain circumstances. D however is derivable from normal English definitions. Thus we assert (a) and (b), but not (c).

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De Dicto Necessity

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'All bachelors are unmmaried' is necessarily true.

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De Re Necessity

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All bachelors are necessary unmarried.

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Singular Term

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Frege believed that proper names were singular terms, whereas Russell believed it only looked like this. In reality they are disguised definite descriptions.

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Frege on Thoroughly Descriptional

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According to Frege proper names are thoroughly descriptional because they exhaust the entire description: They are not relative to anything.

They are singular terms.

Russell believed they only appeared this way, whereas in reality.

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Orthodox Thesis - Frege vs. Russell

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Russell thinks that proper names are abbreviated definite descriptions that involve specific objects (which are always ultimately items of direct acquaintance)

Frege thought that proper names are thoroughly descriptional.
Russell doesn’t believe we have direct acquaintance with people just sense-data.

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Frege's Puzzle

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(1) Hesperus is Hesperus
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus


Orthodox: Different sense, same designatum.
Millian: Same sense, same designatum {}

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Substitution Failure (I)

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(3) Necessarily 8 is even.
(4) 8 is the number of planets.
.:.
(5) Necessarily the number of planets is even.


Orthodox: Proposition that '8 is even' is different from 'that the # of planets is even'.
Millian: '8' is just the number. 'The # of planets' is a description.They differ in semantic content

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Substitution Failure (II)

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(6) George IV wonders whether Scott is Scott
(7) Scott is the author of Waverly
.:.
(8) George IV wonders whether Scott is Scott.


Orthodox: The word 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly' express different meanings.
Millian: 'Scott' refers to the guy, 'the author of Waverly' is descriptional

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Substitution Failure (III)

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(9) Jones believes that Hesperus appears in the evening sky.
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus
.:.
(10) Jones believes that Phosphorus appears in the sky.


Orthodox: Different sense, same designatum
Millian: Same sense, same designatum; but no obvious solution

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True Singular Negative Existentials

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(11) The present king of France does not exist.
(12) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

Orthodox: Sense, no designatum.
Millian: (11) is a description; (12) has no obvious solution

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Truth-Value & Content of Sentences with Non-Designative Terms

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(13) The present king of France is bald.
(14) Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.

Orthodox: Who cares if the term doesn’t designate anything? It’s descriptional, even if it doesn’t designate anything. Frege says the laws of logic break down. Frege says (13) is neither true nor is it false. However it means something. (14) gives some temptation to say its true, because Holmes plays the violin in the book, but actually the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is descriptional but it doesn’t designate anything so the statement isn’t true. For (15) there is no truth value but it means something.
Millian: Sentence (14) doesn’t express anything. There is no thing predicated. There is no proposition it just says ‘[null] plays the violin’. For (15) it can say that it doesn’t mean anything, it’s not true and not false

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3 Kinds of Substitution Failure

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Numbers

George IV

Belief

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A speaks L normally =df

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A speaks L sufficiently well such that for every commonplace expression of L (not too long, technical, etc.), A would normally use and take it to mean exactly what it in fact does mean in L; in particular, for every commonplace sentence S of L, if confronted with S, A would normally understand it to express the very proposition p(s) it in fact does express in L.

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A reflects with respect to S =df

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A considers S sufficiently enough such that A interprets S to express the very proposition p(as) that A normally takes it to express.

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A sincerely assents to S =df

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A verbally assents to S; furthermore A's verbal assent to S is appropriately occasioned by A's believing p(as), where p(as) expresses the exact proposition A normally takes it to express.

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A is reticent with respect to p =df

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A is not strongly disposed or else counter-disposed to reveal (through assent, dissent or abstention) that A believes p, disbelieves p, or suspends judgment.