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47 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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§1981 provides that all persons within the Jx of the US shall have the same right in every state to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. By judicial construction, 1981 applies to private action. African American parents of a child had been denied admission to private school because of race and sue under 1981. Does 1981 represent a constitutional exercise of congressional power over the 13th Amendment?
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Yes. Inability to enter a K, fundamental right denied to slaves. Congress could then rationally conclude that a racial barrier to the making of a contract is a badge or incident of slavery
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African American college student were stopped at gunpoint by three local white residents. Residents threatened to kill students if they did not leave community. On correct assumption that 1985(3) applies under given facts, dues the statute come w/in Congress Section 2 powers under the Thirteenth Amendment?
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Yes. African American students were exercising basic right to use public highways and thoroughfares. This is a conspiracy to deny right to African American that can be rationally related as a badge of slavery.
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Suppose that the 1983 statute provided that purposeful racial discrimination would be presumed if the Plaintiff showed that he had been dismissed from his job, and that he was a member of a racial minority, and the person hired as a replacement was not a member of a racial minority.
The state could rebut the presumption only by showing a legitimate, nonracial business necessity for the dismissal. Thus, Eugene could prevail w/o proving a necessary element of an equal protection violation, namely purposeful discrimination. Would such a statute be a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power? |
Yes, as long as Congress had reasonable grounds to believe that a presumption of intent under such circumstances was appropriate to the enforcement of a judicially recognized Fourteenth Amendment right.
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Example 1-S
Voting Rights Act that regulated electoral laws of states and local communities having demonstrated history of racial discrimination in voting and requires federal preclearance and approval of all their election related laws. The act bars implementation of a local voting rights law because it has a discriminatory effect. Allowed under Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision? |
Yes. Under City of Rome standard, Fifteenth Amendment Section 2 power of Congress allows it to prohibit practices that do not themselves violate section 1 of the Amendment, as long as the prohibition is reasonably directed toward enforcement of the Amendment’s underlying principles.
Here, the act curtails the purposeful discrimination/intent element |
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Example 2-D
Alice is 16 years old and was recently married. Shortly after her marriage, the state terminated her $550 welfare grant under a law that allows those who are under 21 to receive welfare benefits only if they are unmarried. Doe this law violate Alice’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment (substantive) Due Process Clause? |
Step 1 &2:
Marrying is a fundamental liberty Step 3: Unduly burden the fundamental liberty? While state has not specifically interfered with her right to get married, it has indirectly punished her for deciding to marry by terminating her subsistence benefits. The court held that termination for SS benefits to a child who marries does not imping on the liberty interest; the benefits were relatively low and were not intended to meet subsistence need. Step 4: Does the law substantially further a compelling government interest? State will argue encouragement of preventing families from being on welfare. A will argue saving money is not a compelling state interest. Step 5: Is the law narrowly tailored? There are less restrictive means (compelling children to go to work or school whether or not they are married) Law will probably be struck down |
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Example 2-H
A state law provides that before abortion may be performed, a woman must have two in person consultations with a physician, at least 48 hours apart, and another 48 hours must elapse between the second consultation and the abortion. At each consultation, the physician must seek to persuade the woman not to have an abortion. Does this law violate a woman’s right under the Due Process Clause? |
Law may be valid. Under the undue burden test, measure will be found invalid only if its effect is to place a substantial obstacle in a woman’s path by preventing her from having an abortion.
Increased cost or increased difficulty alone does not constitute an undue burden. |
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Example 2-I
Nebraska statute prohibits performance of a partial birth abortion unless the procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother. The statute defines partial birth abortion as “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery.” Nebraska statute prohibits both the dilation and evacuation and the dilation and extraction. |
Statue is vulnerable for two reasons: First, under Ro and Casey, even after the point of viability the government may not completely outlaw an abortion where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Second, the statute places and undue burden on a woman’s decision to obtain a pre-viability abortion. Must have an exception for either woman’s life OR health that is at stake. |
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Example 2-L
State X law requires that abortions be performed by a licensed physician. There is only one license d physician in the state who performs abortions. For many women eh time and expensive of traveling to his physician or to the nearest abortion provider in another state are prohibitive. Is the licensed physician requirement invalid under the undue burden test? |
Since the purpose of the law is valid (protecting woman’s health then the question is whether the effect to impose an undue burden.
Could have a facial (majority of women) or as applied (particular instance) showing undue burden. But law still may be upheld if it is proven that it is necessary health or safety. Challenger might say nurse practitioner is just as qualified. However, if the law is found to be nor more restrictive than necessary for the health or safety, it might be upheld despite the obstacle. |
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Example 2-M
Robert is suffering from a rare form of cancer. Indicted under state law for taking medication not approved by FDA. Can he raise violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process right to privacy and personal autonomy? |
Robert will probably lose, since the state’s interest in public health will probably be found to outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in choosing his or her own medical treatment.
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Example 2-N
As a result of an automobile accident, James lost use of legs and must breathe with a respirator. He is 36 years old, married, with two children. James has tried to remove his respirator, but each time the nurse promptly reconnected it, citing a state law that requires that all reasonable steps be taken to keep a patient lives. James brought suit, asking state law be declared unconstitutional and that he be allowed to disconnect his respirator and die. |
Unlike Cruzan, there is no doubt here concerning the patients’ wishes.
Assuming the court recognizes a fundamental liberty to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, Cruzan suggested that this interest must be balanced against the interest of the state. State’s interest: likely to assert preserving life, preventing suicide, and protecting innocent third parties. James liberty to reject life sustaining medical procedures will likely not outweigh state’s interest. |
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Example 2-O
City of Glenwood adopted a curfew making it illegal for anyone under the age of 18 to be on the streets between the hours of 11PM and 6AM. The purpose of the curfew is to protect children from becoming victims or perpetrators of crimes. Does the curfew violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause? |
Since the law impinges on children’s freedom to move about , the city would have to prove that the curfew is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
This assumes Court will treat this s a fundamental liberty. |
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Example 6-BB
Joe was denied admission to the State School of Nursing under a law providing that only women may attend the school. Joe challenged the state’s refusal to admit him as violating the Equal Protection Clause. The state defined its admissions policy on the ground that it serves the important objective of remedying pas societal discrimination against women in the workplace by offering professional training that will assure women a job. |
Analysis:
Suspect classification? No, but heightened scrutiny under gender Discriminatory intent? Compelling state interest? Remedying past societal discriminate against women is an objective that may justify gender classification. But, must prove this was the actual objective of the law. This goal would be weakened by the fact that nursing school is part of a state university that has been limited to women since it was created centuries ago. |
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Example 6-CC
A state law makes it a crime for male to have sexual intercourse with a female who is under the age of 18 unless that couple is married. Only the male partner is criminally punishable for such conduct. State defends gender classification on the ground that it is substantially related to the important goal of preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies. Female minors would be less likely to file a complaint if they could be prosecuted. Assuming the court accepts the state’s claimed objective as being both important and genuine, what should the state have to show to meet the “substantially related” requirement? |
State must persuasively demonstrate that its gender discriminatory law is more effective in achieve the state’s goal than would be a gender neutral law.
The state’s goal was not to maximize the number of complaints filed, but to reduce the number of teenage pregnancies. A gender neutral law could have a much stronger deterrent effect. |
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Example 6 DD
Under the INA, a child born overseas to unmarried parents only one of whom is a US citizen, will be deemed to be an American citizen of birth only if certain statutory requirements are satisfied. For the child to be eligible, a citizen father (but not mother) must agree in writing to support the child until it reaches age 18 and legitimate the child or formally acknowledge child white it is under 18. Nguyen’s father never too action to legitimate. Are INA provisions invalid as constituting forbidden gender discrimination? |
Government may argue intermediate scrutiny should not apply because the court traditionally shows deference to the political branches in cases involving immigration.
But this case involves acquisition of citizen. “Strict” applied of mid-level scrutiny: Government must show that these gender based classifications are substantially related to an important government interest: that a gender neutral law would not achieve its goals. Here, the government’s goal would be equally served by a gender neutral law requiring a parent to have developed at least minimal contact w/ the child. INA probably violates the Fifth Amendment by imposing support and acknowledge requirements solely on citizen father. In Nguyen v. INS, less strict mid-level scrutiny was used (probably because of political interest in immigration) and did not consider less restrictive means. |
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Example 6-EE
A state law requires female workers to pay higher annual premiums to the state requirement fund than men, on the theory that, because they live longer, women will draw retirement benefits for a longer period of time. The state has justified this discrimination the basis that it needs to maintain the fiscal integrity of its pension plan. Is his gender discrimination valid? |
Goal of preserving fiscal soundness of state pension fund is a compelling state interest.
Yet means chosen are not substantially related to that objective , since that state could achieve its invidious without engaging in gender discrimination. State could maintain the fiscal integrity of its plan by charging mean and women the same premium, with the total premiums collected being the same as they would have been under a gender discriminatory plan. |
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Example 6-FF
The prosecution in a paternity case used all of its preemptory challenges to excuse from the jury ten men who had previously been defendants in paternity actions. Does the prosecutor’s action violate the EPC? |
Court held such use of a gender proxy for bias was unconstitutional; instead of employing stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender, the state was required to look beyond the surface to discover possible bias based on gender neutral factors.
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Example 6-GG
State law provides that a father need not pay support on behalf of an illegitimate child unless paternity is established in an action profiled prior to the child’s fifth birthday. IF paternity is so established, the father’s support obligation shall not exceed 50 percent of the amount that would be owned to a legitimate child. Is that the statute constitutional? |
Unconstitutional.
Class: Discrimination on the basis of legitimacy Mid level scrutiny Difficult to imagine any reasonable for the 50% limitation other than to punish the mother for having baby out of wedlock. Five year limitations for filing paternity actions are also problematic. To meet the substantially related test, the state must allow a reasonable time for those interest in the wellbeing of such children to sue on their behalf. Five year limitation is likely unconstitutional. |
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Example 6-HH
Norman moved from IL to VT shorty after buying a car in IL. Vermont requires its citizens to pay a use tax upon registering a car that was purchased in another state. However, Vermont grants an exemption from the use tax for any sales tax paid to another state if, at the time of purchase, the registrant was a VT citizen. When Norman registered the car in VT, the state charged him the full use tax, with no credit for the sales tax he had paid to IL b/c at time of purchase he was not a VT citizen. Did VT violate EPC by discriminating against people, such as Norman, who were recently citizens of another state? |
Rational basis test: VT tax would easily be upheld. Difference in treatment may have been based on the assumption that those who lived in another state when they brought a car benefit from the state’s roads.
But in Williams v. Vermont could held the law was “an arbitrary distinction that violates the EPC.” One explanation is that the court applied an enhanced form of rational basis review. (What about a P&I challenge?) |
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Example 6-II
A state X law, known as the Marriage Protection Act 9MPA) defines marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex and specifically forbids the issuance of a state X marriage licenses to “same-sex couples.” Preamble provides that purpose is to promote integrity of marriage b/w a man and a woman. Sued the responsible state X authorities, claiming, among other things, that as applied to them the MPA violates the EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment. They claim the MPA unconstitutionally discriminates against them on the basis of sexual orientation and gender. |
Standard of review:
Sexual orientation=rational basis Romer v. Evans appears to have engaged in a somewhat more religious inquiry. As to rationality, the proponents of the MPA might argue that an alteration of the traditional marriage model would undermine respect for that institution and threatened the values of marriage. On the other hand, a court could conclude that even the rational basis standard require the proponent to provide some plausible evidence in support of the proposition being asserted. On this basis, lack of empirical evidence of any Supreme Court of MA concluded that MA ban failed rationality review. |
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Example 7-A
Roger is a 18 yrs old and father of a 3 year old girl who was born out of wedlock. Two years ago Roger was ordered to pay child support, $200/month. Because he has been unemployed, Roger has not paid support and owes $5,000. Roger recently applied for a marriage license. The license was denied under at state law prohibiting anyone from marrying who has not meet their child support. Roger sued claiming license violates EPC. |
The right to marry is a fundamental constitutional liberty. Loving v. Virginia. The classifying trait, payment of child support, does not warrant strict scrutiny.
State might argue that its discrimination against those who fail to support their children serves the compelling interest of assuring that minor children are cared for. Even if this is a sufficiently compelling interest, the state must show that the marriage ban is narrowly tailored to that goal in the sense that it is neither over inclusive nor under inclusive. Here, the ban is over inclusive. |
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Example 7-B
The state has passed a law providing that, from now on, the state attorney general shall be appointed by the governor rather than elected by the people. May state citizens successfully challenge the statute on the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of impairing their fundamental liberty interest in voting? |
The suit should be dismissed. There is no such fundamental liberty under the Due process Clause. Fourteenth Amendment protects only the right to vote an equal basis with other citizens. This right is not violated when all citizens are deprived of the right to choose the attorney general.
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Example 7-C
A state law provides that anyone who owes back taxes or fines to the state may not vote. Elmer, who has been out of work for two years, owes the state $35 in personal property taxes. As a result, he was barred from voting in a recent election to pick members of Congress and members of the state legislature. Where Elmer’s constitutional rights violated? |
The state violated the 24th Amendment which applies only to federal elections, prohibiting the vote by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
Elmer an also invoke EPC under strict scrutiny. State would have to show a compelling interest. A person’s failure to pay taxes does not threaten compelling interest to keep integrity of voting. |
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Example 7-D
State enacted voter ID law providing that anyone wishing to vote in person on election day must present a photo ID. Those unable to present such ID may case a provisional ballot at the polls, but must within ten days then go to the local court clerk’s office and present a valid photo ID or sign an affidavit that they are indigent and unable to obtain a photo ID because they cannot afford to pay for the necessary supporting documents. |
Must use the sliding scale balancing approach, under which a court must first assess the extent of the burden that the measure imposes on an individual’s fundamental right to vote.
With the burdens imposed by this law would not appear to be great for most people, it may have the practical effect of preventing some form voting, such as those who for some reasons of time, distance, expense, age or disability cannot make a post voting trip to the local courthouse or those in on indigents who cannot assemble the necessary documents The court must also look at protecting integrity and reliability of electoral process and safeguarding voter confidence so people will participate in the democratic process. On balance, case is arguable a close one. |
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Example 7-G
Following the 2000 Census, state adopted redistricting plans for the state senate and assembly and for the state’s congressional districts. The maximum population deviations under these plans were 7% for the state senate, 17% for state assembly, and 0.7 percent for congressional districts. P’s challenged these schemes by showing that alternative plans would have achieved equality in all government bodies. Are the state’s plans constitutional? |
The maximum deviation allowed for state senate is well below 10 percent, so small as to be de minimus.
Maximum deviation for state assembly is above 10%, and thus triggers strict scrutiny. |
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Example 7-K
Suppose that town of 60,000 is divided into three town council districts, each 20,000 people. Drew district lines w/ announced purpose of minimizing the voting strength of the town’s 27,000 Republicans. The plan achieved this by drawing district lines that each district contains 11,000 Democrats and 9,000 Republicans. Is the plan unconstitutional? |
The P’s have no difficulty proving intent element for the council has admitted its purpose. However, it is very unlikely that even three elections are sufficient to prove element of discriminatory impact.
In the absence of proof that Republican voters are consistently deprived of an opportunity to influence local political process, mere fact that Republicans are unable to elect any members will not establish a prima facie case. |
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Example 7-L
In example 7-H. Suppose that the three member town council chosen from three council districts, each containing 20,000 people town’s population is one third black and town third white. IF council wishes to make sure that blocks are able to elect of the three council members, how much it achieve this goal? |
Council could employ race based districting. In contrast to traditionally racial gerrymanders, race based districting does not produce group vote dilution. Rather, it gives a group legitimate voting strength.
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Example 7-M
In example 7-L, if blacks are concentrated in the southern end of town, district C, the majority black district is probably not bizarre or irregular in shape. What is the likelihood of proving the existence of race based districting? |
P’s would have to prove, through evidence other than district’s shape, that race as the predominant factor in creating district C. Council might also have been motivated by a desire to keep districts compact or preserve community of interest.
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Suppose that in Example 7-M a court found that race was the predominant factor in creating district C. How might the council defend the constitutionality of this majority-minority district?
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Might be able to show that the plan was necessary to eradicate the effects of past discrimination.
Tis will constitute a compelling interest if there is proof that it was the actual goal behind the plan and that at the time the council adapted the plan it had a strong basis in evidence to support a finding of past discrimination. |
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CA law provides that during their first year in the state, new residents who apply for welfare may receive a monthly grant no higher than what they would have been eligible for in the state form which they moved.
Purpose: reduce state’s welfare budge. As a result, P receive $200 less per month. Does this durational residency violate EPC or P&I Clause? |
Even though it imposes a one year waiting period, CA law might not be subject to strict scrutiny. IN contrast to Shpairo v. Thompson, CA does not withhold all welfare benefits from newcomers.
Under strict scrutiny, the state’s interest in reducing welfare costs is important but probably not compelling. Even if it were, the state’s discrimination against newcomers is not necessary to achieving its goal. (Saenz v. Roe) |
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Example 7-P
State law provides that to file a divorce action, P must have been a resident of the state for one year immediately proipr to filing the action. Carol moved ot the state five months ago and would like to bring a divorce action there so she can marry Ralph. I she challenges the validty of residencye requirement, will strict scrutiny apply? |
Classifies based or length of residency in the state.
Carol will argue state is penalizing her for having recently exercised her righ tot travel. Sate will respondtha tunlike wating period for welfare benefits, a dvocrce decree is not a vita govnerment benefit. So, probably constitutional. Result would have been different if the waiting period was onger. If challenged under P&I clause, strict scrutiny woul have been applied since the law discriminates against new resident of the state. Yet the measure might not be found unconstitutional. State may be allowed to impose a durational residency requriemetn when there is a danger that immdietaley elegibilty willencourage ciztns fo other State to estalibsh residency for just long enough to acquire some of the benfits, such as divorce or acollege education. |
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Example 7-Q
Under state Z law, those who were resident of state Z when they graduate from high school are entitled to free tuition at the state university. Ted is 25 years old and has been a resident of state Z for the last six years. He was admitted to the state university but was advised that he must pay tuition of $10,000 per year b/c when he graduated from high school he was a resident of state X. Ted has challenged state Z’s tuition policy under PEC and P&I clause. Will policy be struck down? |
State tuoin policy involved a fixed point residency require b/c to receive the benefit of free tuition, one must have been a state reisdnt at a fixed point in one’s life. This is not a fised date residen requirement.
Court has suggest durational resident requirements for reduced tuition do not impinge on EP right to travel. Under P&I clause, strict scrutiny should be called for. While the law involves a fixed point rather than a durational residency requirement, state is still denying a realty newcomer the right to be treated like native born or longer term resident of the state. However, Court adopts portability argument. Take the benefit and run. But this should not constitute a denial of PERMANENTLY DENYING such a benefit to a person like Ted who has resided in the state for six years. |
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Example 7-S
State A’s medical school, which is one of the best in the national, provides free tuition to all bona fide residents of the state. Students who attend the school, but do not maintain a permant resident, are charged full tuition. As a result, Sonya has now been chargedo out of state tuition fo $25,000. Has A violated Sonya’s constitutional right to travel? |
No. Sate A has merely imposed a bona fide residency requirement.
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Example 8-S Jones, an effort to freighted his new African America neighbors, ignited a large wooden cross on their front lawn. He hoped to frighten them into leaving the neighborhood. Upon which apprehended he was charged under a state law that provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person or person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn or cause to burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Does the first Amendment provide a defense to this charge?
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No. The burning of the cross was intended to convey a message of intimidation and fear. As such, it constitutes a true threat and falls into an unprotected category of speech.
This statue does not proscribe only the cross burning that convey a particular message message beyond intimidation. Focus on cross burning can be seen as partial proscription of the category based not very reason the entire class of speech is describable: intimidating nature of cross burning. |
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The state X constitution provides for the popular election of all judges, including justices of the state supreme court. Candidates running for judicial officer are prohibited form announcing their views on disputes legal or political issues. Does the restriction violate the First Amendment?
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Because this content based restriction does nto fall into any specific doctrianl category, the meausre of its constitutionality depends on whether the restriction can be properly characterized as narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interests.
State X might assert judicial office differs from other elective offices. Court rejects this argument in White. This interest was not found compelling. |
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A city ordinance prohibits picketing on public streets or sidewalks within 150 feet of a grade school or high school during hours when school is in session. Excluded from the ordinance is peaceful labor picketing. Is this ordinance properly characterized as a time, place, and manner restriction?
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No. Cannot be dependent on content
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Colorado statute amkes it unlawful for any person within a 100 foot radius of a health care facilitat's entrance to knowinlgy appraoch withina 8 feet of another perosn, without that person's consent, to pass out a "leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education or counselling with that person."
Measure was designed to apply to all health care facilities, including those that have nothing to do with family plannings. Is the law content neutral. |
Appears to be neutral. Does not apply to subject matter of facility or what's on the leaflet. Colorado has implied a "place: regulation that applies regardless of what the speak intends to convey.
One could argue oral protest, education, or counseling creates a content based restrict. A friendly greeting would not be covered. |
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The city of Los Angeles prohibits the distribution of "handbills" on any street, sidewalk or park within the city. Handbllis defined to encompass all forms of written literature, including circulars, leaflets, booklets, pamphlets, posters, and the like. Prohibition applies regardless of the content of the handbill. The asserted governmental interest is the prevent of littering. Is this ordinance narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest?
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No. Completely bans a time honored ode of communication.
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Example 8-Y
Ban on all forms of pecking in public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court to preserve integrity of the gourds and individual having business with the Court. Is this a compelling government interest? |
Yes, but must be narrowly tailored. Total ban is far too seeping.
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Ex 8-BB
Family planning Clinic is privately own facilities that has experienced a lot of problems with protestors and request an injunction against the protesters. A 15ft buffer zone around doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances. Are these two aspects of the injunction acceptable, time, place, and manner restrictions? |
Although the injunction focuses only on the activities of abortion protesters, the purpose of the injunction appears to be not the suppression of their point of view but of their secondary effects. Thus, the injunction will be treated as content neutral.
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State X has adopted a statute mandating a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day. One of the purposes of the statute is to provide students with an opportunity to pray in school Another purpose is to create a calming atmosphere in the classroom to better promote learning. Does this statue violate the first element of the lemon Test.
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No. Although the passage of the statue was partially motivated by religious considerations, there was also a secular propose sufficient to meet the deferential standards applicable to this first element of the Lemon test.
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State X has adopted legislation providing salary supplements to parochial school teachers who teach purely secular subjects in otherwise sectarian schools. The purpose of the supplement is to achieve parity between the salaries of such teachers and their public school counterparts. To ensure that the state money is not being used to advance sectarian goals, all parochial schools with teachers participation in this program must agree to intermittent inspection by state officers. Does this inspection foster an excessive enfeeblement between church and state?
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Arguably yes. The aid wlll tip the balancing toward finding an excessive entanglement.
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Unity City has adopted a Sunday closing law that porhbits the operation of any non essential business son Sundays. Must retial operations are included within the prohibition. Does theirs law violate the Astonishment Clause on the grounds that it grants a preferred status to a particular religion or group of religions?
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Arguably it does. Historically, Sunday closing laws were passed for Sunday worship. On the other hand, a court could construe the Sunday closing law a s promoting the secular purpose of rest and recuperation. No religion is granted a preferred statues and neither separation nor prefertionalist theories would be violated by the practice.
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Ex 9-E School board adopts a "moment of silent mediation or prary" and the atheist student challenges it.
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Student has a reasonably good argument under separation theory and the Lemon test. Under non-preferential theory, however, her argument is unavailable Neutral manner without preferring nay particular religion.
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Milford Cnetrla School permits local resident to use its facilitates after school for instruction in art,s education, and community welfare. Christian organization wants to rent it out. Does this volute the Establishment Clause?
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Probably not.
Separationist: secular purpose: religiously neutral promotion of community welfare. Lemon test: primary secular purpose. or does there appear to be excessive entanglement between lcubl and acitiies. |
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Ex. 9-J
Several taxpayers have filed suit in federal court challenging Establishment clause grounds the display of a nativity scene and menorah in the rotunda of City Hall. City permits such displays as long as the cost of constructing, maintaining and dismantling them are not borne by the city. HOw will the court rule? |
Dispate coudl violate first and second elemtns of the Lemon test.
Under teh endorsement modle, city appears to be enrosing two relgions. Coercion model would not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. Passerby in City Hall are not required to acknowledged the display in any manner. Non preferential, as long as teh city's policy is neutrla with the respect to religions symbols, there is no violation of Establishment clause. |
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Ex 9-L
Dickie is a member of a religious group that prohibits use of violence. Refuses to sign an oath affirming his duty of all citizens to defend with arms the Constitution of the US. Because of his refusal, he was denied a public school teaching job. Violation of free exercise clause? |
Yes. Although the oath may be considered conduct, he is primarlily being penalized for his belief.
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Example 9-R
State of Washington wards Promise Schoalrships to students who qualify for them by virtue of their high school grades, family income, and attendance at accredited college. Scholarships oar for both sectarian andnonsectarian schools. Student awarded decided to change his major to Pastoral Minstrelsy. State takes away scholarship. |
Must a government entity that provides tuition assistance for nonsectarian students at private college provide funding for sectarian studies at those same institution? State's lack of neutrality reflected nothing more than a legitimate desire to promote the anti establishment value of avoiding taxpayer support for religious institutions and practices.
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