Conlaw I

Front 1

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Back 1

The Supreme Court has the power of judicial review, and can thus invalidate laws contravening the Constitution.

Front 2

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US 304 (1816)

Back 2

The Supreme Court has the authority to review state court decisions involving federal law.

Front 3

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US 264 (1821)

Back 3

The Supreme Court has the authority to review state court judgments involving federal law, including criminal cases in which a state government is a party.

Front 4

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S Ct 2783 (2008)

Back 4

The right to bear arms is an individual right codified in the second amendment’s operative clause, which is neither expanded nor limited by the amendment’s prefatory clause, so that the right exists independently outside the context of militia service.

Front 5

United States v. Klein, 80 US 128 (1987)

Back 5

The President alone has the power of pardon. Congress, through legislation, can neither (1) limit the effect of a Presidential pardon; nor (2) exclude any class of offenders from a Presidential pardon.

Front 6

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992)

Back 6

Even while litigation is pending, Congress can change the underlying law, and directly impact the pending litigation, so long as Congress does not direct (a) any particular findings of fact; or (b) the application of law to particular facts.

Front 7

Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 409 (1792)

Back 7

It is probably unconstitutional to legislate a measure providing for the executive to review a judicial determination.

Front 8

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211 (1995)

Back 8

Congress may not legislate the reopening of federal courts’ final judgments.

Front 9

Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 US 249 (1933)

Back 9

A case seeking declaratory judgment is justiciable "so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy”.

Front 10

Allen v. Wright, 468 US 737 (1984)

Back 10

To satisfy requirements for standing, the alleged injury must be fairly traceable to the conduct challenged as unlawful.

Front 11

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)

Back 11

A State has standing to litigate a controversy with a federal agency when (1) the State faces a risk of actual and imminent emergency; and (2) the requested judicial relief bears a substantial likelihood of reducing that risk.

Front 12

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US 95 (1983)

Back 12

A federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.

Front 13

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992)

Back 13

Under the injury in fact test, if a claimant alleges injury to a cognizable interest, but has not himself suffered the injury, then the claimant generally does not have standing to litigate the claim.

Front 14

United States v. Hays, 515 US 737 (1995)

Back 14

If a claimant alleges a racial gerrymander, but cannot demonstrate that he, personally, has been subject to racial classification, then the claimant lacks standing to litigate the claim.

Front 15

Federal Election Commn v. Akins, 524 US 11 (1998)

Back 15

Congress, by statute, can create a right to information that otherwise would not exist, and can also grant standing to litigate the claim, for example, by authorization to bring suit for any person "aggrieved" by a [federal agency].

Front 16

Linda R. S. v. Richard D, 410 US 614 (1973)

Back 16

If a mother seeks a court order to prosecute fathers of illegitimate children for failure to pay child support, but the mere prosecution cannot be shown to result in payment of the child support, then the mother’s standing to litigate the claim fails on grounds of redressability.

Front 17

Warth v. Seldin, 422 US 490 (1975)

Back 17

If a claimant seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances but cannot demonstrate that appropriate housing would be constructed in the absence of those ordinances, then the claimant’s standing to litigate the claim fails on grounds or redressability.

Front 18

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 US 26 (1976)

Back 18

If a judicial determination is unlikely to result in the desired outcome, such as receiving hospital treatment, then the claimant lacks standing to litigate the claim.

Front 19

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc, 438 US 59 (1978)

Back 19

Under the causation test for standing, if the claimant can demonstrate that but for the challenged conduct, harm would not be suffered, then the claimant has standing to litigate the claim.

Front 20

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 US 106 (1976)

Back 20

If a litigant has a close enough relationship to the rights-holder, and there is a genuine obstacle preventing the rights-holder from asserting the right himself, then the litigant may enjoy an exception to the general prohibition on third-party standing.

Front 21

Barros v. Jackson, 346 US 249 (1953)

Back 21

If "it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court" then a third-party may enjoy an exception to the general prohibition against third-party standing.

Front 22

Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976)

Back 22

"Vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates for the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function”.

Front 23

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 US 1012 (1976)

Back 23

If the rights-holder waives the rights at issue, then a third-party will not enjoy an exception to the general prohibition against third-party standing.

Front 24

Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004)

Back 24

If the rights-holder’s interests are potentially adverse to the third party’s interests, then the third-party will not enjoy an exception to the general prohibition against third-party standing.

Front 25

United States v. Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974)

Back 25

If a claimant asserts standing as a taxpayer, but the claim does not challenge the taxing and spending powers, then the claimant lacks standing to litigate the claim.

Front 26

Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968)

Back 26

The Flast exception for taxpayer standing is a two-pronged standing test which requires allegations: (a) challenging an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I, § 8, of the Constitution; and (b) claiming that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and spending power.

Front 27

Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 US 587 (2007)

Back 27

The Flast exception for taxpayer standing, does not apply to challenges of executive action.

Front 28

Poe v. Ullman, 367 US 497 (1961)

Back 28

If a state’s penal statute comes with no real threat of enforcement, then a claimant’s challenge of its constitutionality is not ripe for adjudication.

Front 29

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 US 136 (1967)

Back 29

Determination of ripeness requires (1) an evaluation of the fitness of the issues for adjudication; and (2) an evaluation of the hardship to the parties of withholding adjudication.

Front 30

United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US 75 (1947)

Back 30

A hypothetical threat is not ripe for adjudication.

Front 31

Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 US 814 (1969)

Back 31

Rules of election enjoy an exception to the mootness doctrine because the controversy is capable of repetition but evading review.

Front 32

Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)

Back 32

Pregnancies enjoy an exception to the mootness doctrine because the controversy is capable of repetition but evading review.

Front 33

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 US 312 (1974)

Back 33

Rules concerning applications to law school do not enjoy an exception to the mootness doctrine because the controversy is not capable of repetition.

Front 34

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 US 167 (2000)

Back 34

Under the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine, the party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur.

Front 35

United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty, 445 US 388 (1980)

Back 35

Under the class action exception to the mootness doctrine, when there is no chance that the named plaintiff’s expired claim will recur, mootness can still be avoided through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named plaintiff’s personal claim.

Front 36

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)

Back 36

The court considers six factors in determining whether a controversy is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.

Front 37

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 US 267 (2004)

Back 37

Under the political question doctrine, if the court cannot find judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudication of a claim, then the claim is nonjusticiable.

Front 38

Powell v. McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969)

Back 38

The Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.

Front 39

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 US 996 (1979)

Back 39

If the President rescinds a treaty without Senate approval, the controversy is nonjusticiable as a political question.

Front 40

Nixon v. United States, 506 US 224 (1993)

Back 40

Impeachment of a federal judge is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.

Front 41

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819)

Back 41

Federal law is supreme. If Congress acts within its powers, a State does not have the power or authority to contravene that act.

Front 42

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824)

Back 42

A state cannot execute any power regulating commerce that is vested in the Congress.

Front 43

United States v. E.C. Knight Co, 156 US 1 (1895)

Back 43

Congress has the power to repress a monopoly through its power to regulate interstate commerce whenever (a) the repression comes through operation of the rules by which commerce is governed; or (b) whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce.

Front 44

Carter v. Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238 (1936)

Back 44

“Production” is not included under a narrow definition of “commerce”, so that regulation of interstate commerce does not include regulation of intrastate production.

Front 45

Houston, East & West Railway Co. v. United States, 234 US 342 (1914)

Back 45

Congress has the power to control the intrastate railroad rates in order to prevent unjust discrimination against interstate commerce.

Front 46

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US 495 (1935)

Back 46

The Commerce Power ceases where the currents of interstate commerce stop.

Front 47

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918)

Back 47

The power to regulate the manner of production of articles intended for interstate commerce is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.

Front 48

Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 US 321 (1903)

Back 48

Supreme Court applies commerce clause to uphold federal regulation prohibiting interstate shipment of lottery tickets.

Front 49

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937)

Back 49

The National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits unfair labor practices, may be construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority.

Front 50

United States v. Darby, 312 US 100 (1941)

Back 50

The power to regulate commerce is the power “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed,” which includes the power to regulate intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce, given a legitimate objective.

Front 51

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942)

Back 51

Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate the production of wheat, to include homegrown wheat for use exclusively for self-sustainment.

Front 52

Katzenbach v. McClung, Sr. & McClung Jr, 379 US 294 (1964)

Back 52

Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate private businesses to enforce civil rights, if the private business uses supplies from interstate commerce or serves interstate customers.

Front 53

Hodel v. Indiana, 452 US 314 (1981)

Back 53

A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if (a) there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce; or (b) there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted objective.

Front 54

Perez v. United States, 402 US 146 (1971)

Back 54

Extortionate credit transactions, though purely interstate, may in the judgment of Congress, affect interstate commerce and thus satisfy the rational basis test permitting regulation.

Front 55

National League of Cities v. Usery (overruled in 1985), 426 US 833 (1976)

Back 55

Balanced against the 10th Amendment, the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States “in areas of traditional governmental functions”.

Front 56

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985)

Back 56

National League of Cities is overruled because the "attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism”.

Front 57

United States v. Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995)

Back 57

There are outer limits to the expansive reading of the Commerce Power: there must be a rational basis that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce.

Front 58

United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000)

Back 58

Congress does not have the authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate crimes of violence that are not economic in nature and which therefore do not substantially affect interstate commerce.

Front 59

Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 US 129 (2003)

Back 59

Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate litigation discovery, if the measure removes an impediment to a good faith highway safety program.

Front 60

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 US 1 (2005)

Back 60

Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may criminalize the production and use of home-grown cannabis even in states that approve its use for medicinal purposes.

Front 61

New York v. United States, 505 US 144 (1992)

Back 61

Congress may not “commandeer the legislative processes of the States” by compulsion.

Front 62

Printz v. United States, 521 US 898 (1997)

Back 62

Congress may not compel the states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, and cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.

Front 63

Reno v. Condon, 528 US 141 (2000)

Back 63

When a state has a history of selling information for use by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contract drivers with customized solicitations, then the information is an article of commerce subject to congressional regulation.

Front 64

United States v. Butler, 297 US 1 (1936)

Back 64

Regulation of agriculture is a power retained by the States, which Congress cannot regulate, absent a nexus with interstate commerce.

Front 65

Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 US 548 (1937)

Back 65

Congress can use the Spending Clause, under the umbrella of general welfare, to regulate state laws through incentives and encouragement, but not coercion.

Front 66

Sabri v. United States, 541 US 600 (2004)

Back 66

Under the Spending Clause, Congress has the power to prohibit all bribes to all federally-funded organizations.

Front 67

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 US 203 (1987)

Back 67

Congress can withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states that do not adopt a prescribed uniform drinking age of 21-years-old.

Front 68

United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000)

Back 68

Congress cannot regulate private behavior under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.

Front 69

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507 (1997)

Back 69

Congressional action under § 5 of the 14th Amendment cannot create substantive rights.

Front 70

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976)

Back 70

Congress may authorize private suits against states under § 5 of the 14th Amendment that are impermissible in other contexts.

Front 71

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 US 44 (1996)

Back 71

The Indian Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.

Front 72

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank & United States, 527 US 627 (1999)

Back 72

Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases under § 5 of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.

Front 73

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000)

Back 73

Legislation must be congruent and proportional to a legitimate end to abrogate sovereign immunity under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.

Front 74

Board of Trustees, University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)

Back 74

Enforcement of a federal statute against a state under the Equal Protection Clause is barred by the 11th Amendment.

Front 75

Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 US 721 (2003)

Back 75

The anti-gender-discrimination provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act are a valid use of Congress’s 14th Amendment, § 5 power to abrogate a State’s 11th Amendment immunity.

Front 76

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 US 509 (2004)

Back 76

Title II of the ADA is a valid exercise of Congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to § 5 of the 14th Amendment.

Front 77

United States v. Georgia, 546 US 151 (2006)

Back 77

Insofar as Title II of the ADA creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the 14th Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.

Front 78

Alden v. Maine, 527 US 706 (1999)

Back 78

Congress cannot abrogate state immunity in state courts under a federal statute, unless the state waives its sovereign immunity (generally by passing a specific state law waiving the immunity).

Front 79

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952)

Back 79

The President does not have the authority through his power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to take possession of private property in a labor dispute.

Front 80

United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 418 US 683 (1974)

Back 80

Conversations between the President of the United States (the President) and his advisors are generally privileged, but that privilege is not absolute.

Front 81

William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of New York, 524 US 417 (1998)

Back 81

The Line Item Veto Power is unconstitutional.

Front 82

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935)

Back 82

It is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for Congress to delegate law-making authority to the President without imposing standards or rules limiting that authority.

Front 83

Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., Inc, 531 US 457 (2001)

Back 83

Congress can delegate legislative power to the Executive, and the Judiciary has the power to review the Executive’s interpretation of the delegating legislation.

Front 84

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)

Back 84

A one-house veto of executive actions violates the separation of powers doctrine.

Front 85

Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson, 487 US 654 (1988)

Back 85

Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 do not violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the limitations of Article III, nor do they impermissibly interfere with the President's authority under Article II in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

Front 86

Myers v United States, 272 US 52 (1926)

Back 86

A law that provides that appointed officials may be removed by the President, but with the advice and consent of the Senate unconstitutionally restricts the President’s power to remove officials.

Front 87

Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935)

Back 87

If a statute does not prohibit removal, but rather limits the removal to removal for good cause, then the law does not contravene the Constitution.

Front 88

Wiener v United States, 357 US 349 (1958)

Back 88

If there is an “intrinsic judicial character” to an agency established by Congress that requires a body “entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect” of either the Executive or Legislative branches, then the President does not have the power to remove at will, officials of that agency.

Front 89

Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986)

Back 89

If an officer is found subservient to the legislative branch, but is being asked to execute laws, then the officer’s functions assigned by Congress intrude on the prerogatives of the Executive and thus violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

Front 90

United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304 (1936)

Back 90

Exception to the Non-Delegation Doctrine: the President may be delegated certain powers by Congress in foreign affairs that may not be delegated in domestic affairs.

Front 91

Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654 (1981)

Back 91

When (1) the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between the United States and another country; and (2) Congress has acquiesced in the President's action; then the President does not lack the power to settle such claims.

Front 92

Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004)

Back 92

If an American citizen is apprehended in a foreign country as an enemy combatant, he cannot be indefinitely detained without any form of due process.

Front 93

Boumediene v Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)

Back 93

The Military Commission Act is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Front 94

Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942)

Back 94

Unlawful combatants are *** subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunal for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.

Front 95

Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731 (1982)

Back 95

A former President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.

Front 96

Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681 (1997)

Back 96

A sitting President of the United States is not entitled to immunity from damages liability predicated upon his unofficial acts before taking office.

Front 97

Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly, 533 US 525 (2001)

Back 97

If Congress has crafted a comprehensive federal scheme governing a matter within its legitimate powers, then State law concerning the same matter is pre-empted.

Front 98

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132 (1963)

Back 98

When a state and federal law exist with different standards, as long as they can coexist, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not decide which one preempts the other one.

Front 99

Pacific Gas & Electric Co v State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn, 461 US 190 (1983)

Back 99

State law is preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. However, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not interfere where there is a permissible and good basis for the state law.

Front 100

Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52 (1941)

Back 100

If a State law is an “obstacle to accomplishment” of a federal objective, then the state law is pre-empted by federal law.

Front 101

HP Hood & Sons, Inc. v Du Mond, 336 US 525 (1949)

Back 101

The State, within the federal scheme, does not have the power to limit interstate commerce for protectionist purposes.

Front 102

Cooley v Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 US 299 (1851)

Back 102

If a State law is not a pretext for an attempt to regulate interstate commerce, then it does not infringe upon the dormant Commerce Clause.

Front 103

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v Barnwell Bros., Inc, 303 US 177 (1938)

Back 103

If Congress does not regulate, and leaves that power to the States, then a State, pursuing its legitimate concern to preserve the good condition of its highways, has the power to regulate the weight and width of trucks on its highways.

Front 104

Southern Pacific Co. v Arizona, 325 US 761 (1945)

Back 104

When a law’s burden on interstate commerce outweighs its benefit, then the law is subject to invalidation under the Commerce Clause.

Front 105

City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 (1978)

Back 105

If a state law treats articles of commerce from out-of-state differently than those from in-state, and the state cannot demonstrate a legitimate reason for the discrimination, then the law is subject to invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.

Front 106

C&A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 US 383 (1994)

Back 106

State and Local governments may not enact laws that favor enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities.

Front 107

United Haulers Assn., Inc. v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007)

Back 107

Flow control ordinances that favor the government instead of a private facility are constitutional as long as they do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.

Front 108

Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 US 322 (1979)

Back 108

It is a violation of the Commerce Clause for states to enact laws that attempt to conserve natural resources for use by their own residents.

Front 109

Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v Washington State Apple Advertising Commn, 432 US 333 (1977)

Back 109

A facially neutral statute may be invalidated as discriminatory if it places an undue burden on interstate commerce or the effect of discriminating against out-of-staters.

Front 110

Exxon Corp v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117 (1978)

Back 110

A state law that merely causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to another does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce.

Front 111

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food & Agriculture, 512 US 186 (1994)

Back 111

A state pricing order, which imposes a tax on the sale of local products the proceeds of which are distributed as a subsidy to in-state producers of the product, discriminates against interstate commerce and thus is unconstitutional under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.

Front 112

State of Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 US 456 (1981)

Back 112

A facially neutral state law violates the Commerce Clause if the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

Front 113

Dean Milk Co. v City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 US 349 (1951)

Back 113

If a law is inherently discriminatory to out-of-state participants in interstate commerce, and reasonable alternatives are available, then the law is subject to invalidation under the Commerce Clause.

Front 114

Maine v Taylor & United States, 477 US 131 (1986)

Back 114

A patently discriminatory law is not subject to invalidation under the Commerce Clause if the state can demonstrate (1) a legitimate purpose for the law; and (2) that the purpose cannot be achieved by available nondiscriminatory means.

Front 115

Loren J. Pike v Bruce Church, Inc, 397 US 137 (1970)

Back 115

Where a state statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

Front 116

Bibb, Director of Public Safety of Illinois v Navajo Freight Lines, Inc, 359 US 520 (1959)

Back 116

In determining whether a state’s nondiscriminatory highway safety law violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the Supreme Court must look to the total effect of the law as a safety measure. If it is too slight, or problematic, so that it does not outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences that seriously impede it, then it cannot stand.

Front 117

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v Raymond Kassel, 455 US 329 (1981)

Back 117

Although state regulations concerning highway safety are important, if the furtherance of safety is marginal or the burden on commerce substantial, the regulations will be declared invalid under the United State Constitution’s Commerce Clause.

Front 118

Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v State Board of Equalization of California, 451 US 648 (1981)

Back 118

Congress, pursuant to the Constitution, may give States the power to enact laws that restrict the flow of interstate commerce.

Front 119

Reeves, Inc. v William Stake, 447 US 429 (1980)

Back 119

States that are “market participants” in the buying and selling of goods, as opposed to “market regulator”, are not bound by the Constitution’s Commerce Clause and can favor their in-state businesses.

Front 120

South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska, 467 US 82 (1984)

Back 120

Although state-owned businesses may favor in-state purchasers, they may not attach conditions to the sale of products that will burden interstate commerce.

Front 121

Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385 (1948)

Back 121

If a State violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court must determine whether the law discriminates against citizens of other states and if so, whether there is a substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of another state.

Front 122

United Building & Construction Trades Council of Camden County v Mayor & Council of the City of Camden, 465 US 208 (1984)

Back 122

The Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents states (and cities in this case) from discriminating against non-residents if two elements are met. First, the discrimination burdens a “fundamental” privilege. Here the fundamental privilege was employment. Second, there is no “substantial reason” for the discriminating treatment.

Front 123

Lester Baldwin v Fish & Game Commn of Montana, 436 US 371 (1978)

Back 123

“[O]nly with respect to those privileges and immunities bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must a State accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment.

Front 124

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Kathryn A. Piper, 470 US 274 (1985)

Back 124

The opportunity to practice law is a “fundamental right.” There is no substantial reason for denying nonresidents admission to the New Hampshire to and the discrimination does not bear a close relationship to the State’s objectives.

Front 125

Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)

Back 125

The 5th Amendment Takings Clause does not apply to city government

Front 126

Slaughter-House Cases: Butchers’ Benevolent Assn. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughter-House Co, 83 US 36 (1872)

Back 126

The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution apply only to former slaves. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and immunities of national, not state citizenship

Front 127

Saenz v. Roe, 526 US 489 (1999)

Back 127

Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a State must provide the same benefits to new residents as it does to other residents

Front 128

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US 78 (1908)

Back 128

Certain provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, if the provisions are necessary for the due process of law

Front 129

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937)

Back 129

In 1937, although some Bill of Rights guarantees are applied to the States via the 14th Amendment, protection against double jeopardy is not one of them

Front 130

Adamson v. California, 332 US 46 (1947)

Back 130

In 1947, the 14th Amendment’s Due Process clause does not apply the 5th Amendment’s right against self-incrimination to the States

Front 131

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)

Back 131

"The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States”

Front 132

The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley, 109 US 3 (1883)

Back 132

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to pass laws prohibiting discrimination by private citizens

Front 133

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946)

Back 133

A private entity that acts like a governmental body and performs a public function is subject to the United States Constitution

Front 134

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 US 345 (1974)

Back 134

The actions of a private entity are not considered state action unless there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action

Front 135

Terry v. Adams, 345 US 461 (1953)

Back 135

A private political party that controls the outcome of elections is engaging in state action, thereby making it subject to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution

Front 136

Evans v. Newton, 382 US 296 (1966)

Back 136

Transfer of management from public officials to private individuals to circumvent 14th Amendment protections does not disentangle a private institution from its public character

Front 137

Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc, 391 US 308 (1968)

Back 137

Shopping centers serve a public function and therefore, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution applies

Front 138

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 US 551 (1972)

Back 138

The 1st and 14th Amendments limit state action and not private property owners, so that merely inviting the public to use the property for its intended purpose, without more, does not transform private property into public property

Front 139

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 US 507 (1976)

Back 139

A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution

Front 140

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948)

Back 140

Private parties may voluntarily abide by the terms of a restrictive covenant but may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant because enforcement by the courts would constitute state action contravening the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment

Front 141

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, 457 US 922 (1982)

Back 141

Using the court and government officials to seize property without due process of law involves state action for purposes of the 14th Amendment

Front 142

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co, 500 US 614 (1991)

Back 142

When a private litigant in a civil action makes peremptory challenges based on the jurors’ race, he violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment

Front 143

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961)

Back 143

When a State becomes entangled in a private party’s actions so that the State and the private party have a symbiotic relationship, the private party must comply with the 14th Amendment

Front 144

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972)

Back 144

A private club that obtains a state liquor license does not necessarily engage in state action for purposes of the 14th Amendment

Front 145

Norwood v. Harrison, 413 US 455 (1973)

Back 145

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, a State may not provide aid to private institutions that practice racial discrimination

Front 146

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US 830 (1982)

Back 146

Publically-funded and regulated private organizations are not state actors under the 14th Amendment unless the government compels or influences their actions

Front 147

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 US 830 (1982)

Back 147

The State is not liable for decisions made by private parties which the State did not coerce or significantly encourage

Front 148

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US 369 (1967)

Back 148

A state constitutional provision that bars laws prohibiting discrimination involves the State in discrimination in violation of the 14th Amendment

Front 149

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn, 531 US 288 (2001)

Back 149

A private organization can be considered a state actor if there is sufficient entwinement between the state and the organization, such as here where the majority of members are public schools, and the leadership and governing body is made up of public school officials acting within their official capacity

Front 150

Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578 (1897)

Back 150

Liberty, as used in the 14th Amendment, means not just the right of a citizen to be free from physical restraint, but also free to enjoy all faculties and to use them in all lawful ways

Front 151

Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905)

Back 151

Legislation enacted using a state’s police powers that interferes with an individual’s right to contract must directly relate to the goal of protecting public health or safety and must have an appropriate and legitimate end

Front 152

Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1 (1915)

Back 152

The freedom of contract includes the right to make contracts affecting personal employment without arbitrary interference by the state

Front 153

Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908)

Back 153

The general right to contract is subject to reasonable restrictions placed on that right by the government

Front 154

Adkins v Children's Hospital, 261 US 525 (1923)

Back 154

Mission Accomplished. In 1923, because gender equality has been achieved, minimum wage laws infringe upon freedom to contract and thus contravene the 14th Amendment

Front 155

Weaver v Palmer Bros. Co, 270 US 402 (1926)

Back 155

To satisfy 14th Amendment requirements, if a law aims to protect public health, that law must be the only reasonable way to eliminate a known health risk

Front 156

Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502 (1934)

Back 156

State price controls are constitutional if they are nondiscriminatory and bear a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose

Front 157

West Coast Hotel v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937)

Back 157

Regulation that is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community satisfies the due process clause of the 1st Amendment

Front 158

United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144 (1938)

Back 158

When reviewing legislation, the existence of facts supporting the legislation is to be presumed and such legislation shall not be pronounced unconstitutional unless it is such character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis

Front 159

Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483 (1955)

Back 159

Economic legislation will be upheld so long as there is any conceivable justification for it

Front 160

BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore, 517 US 559 (1996)

Back 160

A punitive damages award that can fairly be characterized as grossly excessive in relation to a state’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring repetition of such conduct is arbitrary and violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment

Front 161

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 US 408 (2003)

Back 161

In evaluating the appropriateness of a punitive damages award, a court must weigh the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the disparity between the actual harm caused and the amount of the punitive damages awarded, and the difference between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties imposed under state law

Front 162

Phillip Morris USA v Williams, 127 S Ct 1057 (2007)

Back 162

An award of punitive damages based on a desire to punish the defendant for harming persons not before the court is an unconstitutional taking of property without due process

Front 163

Home Building & Loan Assn v Blaisdell, 290 US 398 (1934)

Back 163

A state may impose temporary conditions on the creditor-debtor relationship so long as there is an emergency, the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the relief afforded is proportional and reasonable

Front 164

Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v Kansas Power and Light Co, 459 US 400 (1983)

Back 164

A state may enact legislation that infringes on the contractual rights of parties so long as the substantial impairment is justified by a significant and legitimate purpose

Front 165

Allied Structural Steel Co v Spannaus, 438 US 234 (1978)

Back 165

A state may not unilaterally change the contractual obligations of parties to a pension fund absent a reasonable justification

Front 166

United State Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1 (1977)

Back 166

Legislation abdicating a government’s obligations will only be upheld if it is both reasonable and necessary to serve the purposes claimed by the government

Front 167

Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419 (1982)

Back 167

Any permanent physical intrusion by the government or authorized by the government constitutes a taking for which just compensation must be paid

Front 168

Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922)

Back 168

Land use regulation that goes too far will be recognized as a taking

Front 169

Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272 (1928)

Back 169

In extreme exigent circumstances, the state may choose to destroy one property without paying just compensation in order to save another, so long as the taking is necessary to protect the health, safety, moral, or general welfare of the public

Front 170

Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978)

Back 170

A land use regulation that does not deprive a property owner of all uses of the property does not constitute a taking

Front 171

Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992)

Back 171

Government regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use constitutes a taking for which just compensation must be paid

Front 172

Nollan v California Coastal Commn, 483 US 825 (1987)

Back 172

A land use regulation advancing a legitimate governmental purpose is not a taking, but if the nexus between the regulation and the original purpose no longer exists, then conditioning the permission for land use becomes a taking

Front 173

Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994)

Back 173

Permit conditions will only be upheld where there is an essential nexus between the legitimate state interest and the government shows that some sort of individualized determination has been made that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development

Front 174

Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606 (2001)

Back 174

When a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of property, the Takings Clause requires just compensation to the landowner

Front 175

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302 (2002)

Back 175

A regulation that prohibits economic use of land for an extended but finite period of time does not constitute a taking requiring that the owner of the property be compensated

Front 176

Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984)

Back 176

What constitutes public use for purposes of the Takings Clause is determined by the legislature, whose determination will be upheld except in the most narrow of cases

Front 177

Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005)

Back 177

“Public purpose” is defined broadly so that legislative judgments on the issue are accorded deference

Front 178

Brown v Legal Education Foundation of Washington, 538 US 216 (2003)

Back 178

Just compensation is measured by the property owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain