Civproii Caselaw: Keyed To Spencer (Before Spring Break)

Front 1

Conley v Gibson | SCOTUS 1957 | 40

Back 1

(a) the FRCPs are designed to require notice pleading, no more
(b) 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] cannot be granted unless there is NO SET OF FACTS that would allow plaintiff to state a claim

Front 2

Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA | SCOTUS 2002 | 408

Back 2

(a) resolving split in C of As: notice pleading is ALL THAT IS REQUIRED
(b) the enumerated extra standards in FRCP 9(b) [fraud] are the ONLY ones that need more than notice pleading
(c) McDonnel DOuglass is an EVIDENTIARY and not a PLEADING standard

Front 3

Leatherman (SCOTUS 1993 - 425)

Back 3

(a) NO higher state of pleading is required for anything other than FRCP 9(b) enumerated instances
(b) NOTICE PLEADING IS FINE.

Front 4

Bell Atlantic Corp et al v Twombly | SCOTUS 2007 | 41

Back 4

(a) advent of "plausibility pleading" standard
(b) "simple" Conley quote is retired; what Conley means is that notice pleading is required where the plausibility of the action is evident
(c) policy reasons to require plausibility pleading: no coercion of defendants to settle to avoid expensive and lengthy discovery in complex cases

Front 5

Erikson v Pardus | SCOTUS 2007 | 425

Back 5

Two weeks after Twombly, the Court resurrects notice pleading by CITING TO TWOMBLY and no one gets it

Front 6

Denny v Carey | ED PA 1976 | 427

Back 6

(a) FRCP9(b) does not require "rigorous" pleading; it harmonizes with and only extends 8(a) to the extent that the defendant gets enough info to prepare an adequate answer
(b) this was BEFORE Twombly... might be diff now because it doesnt make sense for 8(a) to require somethign more than 9(b)

Front 7

Rio Properties, Inc. v Rio International Interlink | 9th Cir 2002 | 432

Back 7

(a) FRCP 4(f)(3) allows court to order "special forms of service" in compliance w/ international agreements [treaties]; foreign laws, however, don't matter
(b) 4(f)(3) is equal to the other parts of 4(f) and does not have to be attempted only AFTER the other forms are tried
(c) 4(f)(3) must still comply w/ Due Process; here it does because RII tailored and conducted all its business thru email and did not maintain any other adequate means of service, so it can't complain about this.

Front 8

American Nurses Association v Illinois | 7th Cir 1986 | 443

Back 8

(a) Ps almost pled themselves out of court by providing too much info on equal worth study, etc
(b) plaintiffs did in one part of complaint allege just enough and not too much for cause of action
(c) incompatible claims are very common and thats ok, so it doesnt defeat their valid claims
(d) the case may survive a 12(b)(6) [but this too is BEFORE TWOMBLy]

Front 9

Zielinski v Philadelphia Piers, Inc | ED PA 1956 | 459

Back 9

where a mistake known to the defendant, when amended, will deprive P of cause of action the am. cannot be permitted [no bad faith here, but unfair prejudice would result]

Front 10

Beeck v Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp | 8th Cir 1977 | 467

Back 10

(a) burden of NONmovant to show bad faith/unfair prejudice if am. allowed
(b) here, court would have to ASSUME that P would be foreclosed from pursuing other D's in order to deny am.
(c) here teh ct was rightly unwilling to make such assumptions

Front 11

Worthington v Wilson | Illinois DC 1992 | 47

Back 11

FRCP 15(c)'s mention of "mistake" refers to the earlier pronouncement that a party must be "changed or added"; it does not constitute a separate requirement (because that wouldn't make sense in the notice context of the Rules; mistake refers to pleader's mind, not new party's notice.

Front 12

Hadges v Yonkers Racing Corp | 2nd Cir 1995 | 489

Back 12

(a) sanctions are largely discretionary but should not inappropriately bring up issues not presented or personal attacks (ie whether the attorney's firm partner is a bad lawyer)
(b) sanctions against represented defendant are inappropriate; snactions belong tocounsel when present becasue counsel knows better

Front 13

United States v Heyward-Robinson | | 510

Back 13

The term "transaction/occurrence" means being tied by a "logical relationsihp"; often, this is proven by the "same evidence" test: if separate trials require substantial duplicity of evidence, it is appropriate to join them in the interests of efficiency

Front 14

Mosley v General Motors Corp | | 522

Back 14

(a) FRCP 20 allows claims arising from same transaction/occurrence AND sharing question of fact/law to be joined
(b) claim arising from same POLICY, even as applied in vrying situations and places, is related to same t/o
(c) the issue is question of law OR fact, not law AND fact; even when facts are different, when law is the same joiner is OK

Front 15

Lehman v Revolution Portfolio LLC | | 529

Back 15

(whether a 3rd party contribution claim can be added despite the original claim not specifically requiring damages, and whether that impleaded 3rd party may assert independent claims against opposing party)
(1) review impleader for abuse of discretion
(2) damages may be awarded in lieu of rescission, so contribution claim is still appropriate
(3) FRCP 18(a) allows 3rd party as many claims as it has, as long as the 3rd party is in court anyway on a valid 14(a) claim; the rule is broad and the claim is appropriate
(4) court must supervise 3rd party practice w/ goal of 14(a) in mind: no duplicity of action.

Front 16

Temple v Synthes Corporation Ltd | SCOTUS 1990 | 539

Back 16

(whether joint tortfeasors must always be joined as necessary parties under FRCP 19(b))
(1) the rule is that it is NOT nec. to join all joint tortfeasors
(2) judicial economy is important, but only AFTER the threshold requirements of the Rule are satisfied; 19(b) specifically states that joint tortfeasors are permissive not necessary

Front 17

Wilbur v Locke | 9th Cir 2005 | 543

Back 17

(how to apply Rule 19)
(1) Whether absent party is one "to be joined if feasible" because it has 'legally protected interest' that might be 'impaired' by the suit [19(a)];
(2) whether it is feasible
(3) if not feasible, whether case can proceed w/o the absent party in light of (a) prejudicial potential of judgment to suit's parties (b) protective provisions in judgment that might lessen prejudice (c) whether judgment in absence will be adequate and (d) whether plaintiff will have adequate remedy w/o being able to proceed [19(b)]

Front 18

Natural Resources Defense Council v US Nuclear Regulatory | | 552

Back 18

(whether FRCP 24(a)(2)'s requirement that impairment of an interest exist requires strictly legal implications) (1) the rule notes "as a practical matter," so we are not limited to reigid legal tests for interest impairment (2) even when res judicata fails because a 3rd party is not required to follow an action, stare decisis may still prevail to impair the rights of the 3rd party before having a chance to litigate the issue

Front 19

Hubler Chevrolet Inc v General Motors Corp | | 569

Back 19

(whether an identifiable group of 258 can be certified as a class even though their factual circumstances differ when the same unerlying company policy is the foundation of the claim)
(1) Numerosity has no magic number but above 40 gives inference of satisfaction; even identifiable groups can be too numerous/far flung/impractical to join as separate defendants.
(2) Factual variation among class grievances does not defeat a finding of commonality, for class certification purposes, as long as the class claims arise out of the same legal or remedial theory

Front 20

United Mine Workers v Gibbs | SCOTUS 1966 | 229

Back 20

(proper pendent/supplemental JD in fed ct)
(1) At III gives federal courts JD over all "cases" and "controversies."
(2) Case means the basic set of circumstances (NOT each indiv. claim in w/in the circumstances, but ALL claims arising same CNOF.
(3) Because we have JD over all "cases" arising under not just all "claims," we are able to take JD over a "case" where a plaintiff could reasonably expect to try all claims in one proceedings, even not all of the claims are strictly w/in specified jurisdiction

Front 21

Aldinger v Howard | SCOTUS 1976 | 234

Back 21

(whether a qualifying civil rights claim allows pendent party JD over counties as Ds)
(1) in this instance the statute (§ 1983) suggests that counties cannot be proper defendants so we think that congressional intent is that it not be permitted.
(2) HOWEVER, we think that in general congressional silence on the issue favors a presumption IN FAVOR OR PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION, so long as no relevant statute suggests otherwsie.

Front 22

Owen Equipment and Erection Co v Kroger | SCOTUS 1978 | 235

Back 22

(whether qualifying tort claim based on DIVERSITY JD support pendent party JD) The federal diversity statute (28 usc § 1332) requires that pendent jurisdiction be disallowed in diversity cases. it would be inconsistent w/ the complete diversity rule to allow it.

Front 23

Finley v US | SCOTUS 1989 | 235 -

Back 23

(whether pendent party JD is allowed in cases of the FTCA) the statute must explicitly ALLOW pendent party jurisdiction; we are NOT looking for silence (as Aldinger said), but on EXPLICIT intent to allow jursidiction. if congress doesn't like this, they should fix it via statute.

Front 24

Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Services Inc | SCITUS 2005 | 240

Back 24

(whether 1367(b) overrules Finley AND Zahn or just Finley)
(1) the statute is not ambiguous so we cant look at leg. history.
(2)failure of diversity "contaminates" whole case but failure of amt in controversy only defeats that claim.
(3) this difference + the fact that allowing a lesser claim into court with a qualifying claim doesnt defeat the purpose of diversity we should allow supp. JD when at least one claim is large enough. The statute (1367) overruled Finley- everyone agrees with that. We also believe it overruled Zahn.
DISSENT: Ct of Apps wouldn't be confused if it was clear; committee report says Zahn is left intact; law professor drafters say leg his. was manipulated

Front 25

American Roller Co LLC v Foster-Adams Leasing LLP | DC Illinois 2006 | 591

Back 25

(whether evidence that previous lawsuits may have been brought in bad faith is relevant to the claims/defenses of the parties in this lawsuit)
(1) We can't say that evidence of past actions is truly relevant to the case at hand. we are only dealing with these circumstances and this suit.
(2) We cannot even broaden discovery to "subject matter" because that would require us defining as "relevant to subject matter" any transaction involving CM and its principals, and we cannot justify such a wide-ranging description of relevance.

Front 26

Gonzales v Google | ND CA 2006 | 600

Back 26

(whether queires/urls are relevant to gov't case for child pornography; whether they are discoverable from NONPARTY google despite trade secret, economic burden, duplicity and privacy issues)
(1) items asked for don't have to directly prove anything, they just need to be reasonably calculated to lead to probative evidence
(2) user trust, google resources, google time are all valuable
(3) since gov't does not ask for any private user info (in amended) and offers to compensate google for reasonable expenses, we rule that those issues do not defeat this disc. request

Front 27

Upjohn v Unites States | SCOTUS | printout flex case

Back 27

(whether the A/C privilege covers communications between employees that don't include the lawayer)
(1) the Control Group Test [saying that only corporate officials who impact legal policy are applicable to the privilege) is rejected
(2) if communications are at the behest of (but not nec. with) counsel, the privilege applies
(3) if commnuication is between counsel and employees to solicit legal advice, the privilege applies
BUT ALWAYS USE LOCAL CASELAW!!

Front 28

Hickman v Taylor | SCOTUS 1947 | 631

Back 28

(application of the "Work Product" doctrine)
(1) depositions, notes, etc. are not covered by the privilege because the requirements aren't met
(2) it is essential to the adversarial process that the mental workings of the attorney remain private (3) we hereby subscribe to the work product doctrine in order to protect the adversarial process
(3) work product is any material prepared in acnticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative