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90 Cards in this Set

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LIMIT – NR (%) Digital Readout
0–94 Transient operation (RED)
95–105 Normal operation (GREEN)
106 High rotor warning annunciated
106–110 Transient operation (YELLOW)
110 Maximum (>110 RED)
LIMITS – ENGINE1 OR 2 OIL PRESSURE (PSI)
23 Minimum, PWR LVR at IDLE <23 RED
23–120 Normal operation (GREEN)
120 Maximum (>120 RED w/box)
LIMITS – HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
1260 Minimum (<1260 RED w/box)
2750 – 3300 Normal operation (GREEN)
3310 – 3400 Transient – operation permitted for 5
minutes (YELLOW) ( ≥ 5 minutes RED w/box)
>3400 Transient operation permitted for 5 seconds
(YELLOW). ( ≥ 5 seconds RED
w/box)
LIMITS – 701 TGT (°C) DIGITAL READOUT
0–807 Normal operation (GREEN)
807 Maximum continuous power
808–864 Intermediate rated power, 30 minute limit(YELLOW)
869 Maximum during start
865–919 Single engine contingency, 2.5 minute limit (YELLOW)
920–965 Single engine transient, 12 second limit
(YELLOW)
965 Maximum (> 965 RED)
LIMITS – 701C TGT (°C) DIGITAL READOUT
0–810 Normal operation (GREEN)
810 Maximum continuous power
811–870 Intermediate rated power, 30 minute limit (YELLOW)
851 Maximum during start
871–878 Intermediate rated power, 10 minute limit (YELLOW)
879–896 Single engine contingency, 2.5 minute limit (YELLOW)
897–949 Single engine transient, 12 second limit
(YELLOW)
949 Maximum (>949 RED)
LIMITS – ENGINE1 OR 2 NP (%) Digital Readouts
0–105 Normal operation(GREEN)
106–121 Transient operation, 12 seconds(YELLOW, w/box at 107)
115 Engine overspeed annunciated
121 Maximum (>121 RED w/box)
LIMITS – ENGINE1 OR 2 NG (%) DIGITAL READOUT
63 Minimum engine out warning annunciated
(<63.0 RED w/box)
63.1–102.2 Normal operation (GREEN)
102.3–105.1 Transient 12 second limit (YELLOW)
105.1 Maximum (>105.1 RED)
LIMITS – TORQUE (%) DIGITAL READOUT WITH NR LESS THAN 50%
0–30 Normal operation(GREEN)
30 Maximum (>30 RED)
LIMITS – TORQUE (%) DIGITAL READOUT DUAL ENGINE
0–100 Normal operatio(GREEN)
101–115 Transient 6 second limit (YELLOW)
115 Maximum ( >115 RED)
LIMITS – TORQUE (%) DIGITAL READOUT SINGLE ENGINE
0–110 Normal operation(GREEN)
110 Single engine maximum continuous power(GREEN)
111–122 Single engine contingency, 2.5 minute limit(YELLOW)
123–125 Transient 6 second limit (YELLOW)
125 Maximum (>125 RED)
Airspeed Limits For Autorotation.
Maximum airspeed for autorotation is 145 KTAS
Airspeed Limits With One Engine Inoperative.
Maximum airspeed with one engine inoperative is the greater of:
a. 67% of VNE determined from figure 5-13 using the
GROSS WEIGHT line.
b. The speed for minimum power determined from
the Chapter 7 or Chapter 7A cruise charts using
the MAX END/MAX R/C lines.
Maximum Airspeeds During Manual Stabilator Operations.
Maximum airspeeds are based on stabilator position. The stabilator position and nominal airspeed restrictions are displayed on the FLT page, FLT SET
page, as well as the SYS page, as described in paragraph 2.68.
Maximum Rearward/Sideward Flight Speed.
Maximum rearward/sideward flight speed is 45 KTAS for all gross weights
Maximum Airspeed for Searchlight Extension.
The searchlight is designed for operation (extend/
retract/rotate) at speeds up to 90 knots. However, as long
as operation is not attempted, the lighthead can be left in any extended position at speeds up to 200 knots.
Maximum Airspeed with Symmetrically Loaded
External Fuel Tanks (2 or 4) Installed
Maximum airspeed with symmetrically loaded external fuel tanks (2 or
4) installed is 130 KTAS.
Maximum Airspeed for Stores Jettison.
Jettison of external armament stores is not authorized except for emergency conditions and then only from unaccelerated
flight during:
a. Maximum airspeed for stores jettison is 130 KTAS.
b. Hover to 45 KTAS (minimize side slip, if possible).
c. 45 to 130 KTAS (ball centered, if possible).
Maximum Airspeed for External Tanks Jettison.
Jettison of external fuel tanks is not authorized except for emergency conditions and then only from airspeeds less than 100 KTAS. Jettison from level flight if possible, and if not, jettison at an airspeed which minimizes the rate of descent at the time of jettison.
Airspeed Operating Limits Chart.
Referring to figure 5-13, sheet 1, note that a FAT scale and pressure altitude scale are provided in the upper grid and a weight
scale and true airspeed scale on the lower grid. Using the observed FAT and altitude obtained from the aircraft instruments and the calculated aircraft weight, enter the chart as directed in the chart example. Determine maximum true airspeed at the left side of the lower grid. To determine
the maximum indicated airspeed, refer to figure
5-13, sheet 2 and enter as directed in the chart example
with the KTAS and density altitude determined from figure 5-13, sheet 1.
Prevent Excessive Tail Rotor Loads.
Avoid large pedal step inputs in arresting right hovering/low speed yawing turns greater than 60°/second
Flight with Canopy Enclosure Open.
Flight,
hovering flight and air taxiing with the canopy enclosure open are prohibited, except for smoke/fume elimination
Landing Limits.
Do not complete a landing on
terrain which produces a pitch attitude change from a hover greater than 7° nose up or 12° nose down; or a roll attitude greater than 10°
Flight into Turbulence.
Flight into known or
forecast extreme turbulence or into known severe turbulence is prohibited.
Flight In Icing Conditions.
Intentional flights
into moderate icing conditions are prohibited. Flight into known or forecast trace or light icing conditions is authorized and not considered a hazard unless the condition is
encountered for an extended period (over one hour)
External Tanks.
With external fuel tanks (2 or 4)containing fuel, symmetrically installed, the following restrictions
apply:
a. Normal load factor of 2 Gs shall not be exceeded.
b. Maneuvers are limited to those required to takeoff,
climb to optimum altitude, heading/course corrections, obstacle avoidance, descend and land.
c. 230 gal external fuel tanks shall be in the flight stow position (4° nose-up) with respect to the waterline (WL).
d. Rapid and step-shaped pedal inputs in excess of
1/2 in. shall be avoided.
Flight In Instrument Meteorological Conditions.
The aircraft is not qualified for IMC flight. The
back–up flight instruments are required to be installed and operational for all flights.
Rotor Limitations – Start and Stop Limits.
Maximum wind velocity for rotor start or stop is 45
knots.
USE OF FORCE TRIM.
Force trim will not be selected OFF except in a failed or partial failed mode.
Helicopter Class.
Army AH-64D Apache helicopter
is in Class 2.
Left Aft Equipment Storage Bay.
The aft storage bay is on the left side from fuselage station 280.0 to station 310.0 and can be loaded to 15 pounds per square foot with a capacity of 60 pounds
Survival Equipment Stowage Bay.
The survival equipment stowage bay is reached from either side. From fuselage station 310.0 to station 340.0, it can be loaded to
15 pounds per square foot with a capacity of 100 pounds. A single concentrated load of 45 pounds with a load density
of 45 pounds per square foot may be carried.
Flyaway Storage Bays.
The Flyaway Storage Bays are located on the left and right sides of the aircraft
from fuselage stations 155.0 to 189.0. The bays have a
load capacity of 33.5 pounds per bay. The floor area is
approximately 2 square feet with a volume of 3.5 cubic
feet per bay.
Land Without Delay
The term LAND WITHOUT
DELAY is defined as a landing in which the primary consideration is continued control of the aircraft and survival of the occupants.
Land as Soon as Possible
The term LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE is defined as landing at the nearest
suitable landing area (e.g., open field) without delay.
Land As Soon As Practicable
The term LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE is defined as landing at a suitable landing area. The primary consideration is the urgency
of the emergency.
Autorotate
The term AUTOROTATE is defined as adjusting the flight controls as necessary to establish an autorotational descent and landing.
Emergency Engine Shutdown
The term EMER ENG SHUTDOWN is defined as engine
shutdown without delay. Engine shutdown in flight is usually not an immediate action item unless a fire exists. Before attempting an engine shutdown, identify the affected engine by checking engine-out warning messages on the UFD/EUFD and observe the MPD ENG instrument page for TGT, NP, NG, TORQUE %, and engine oil pressure(OIL PSI) indicators.
POWER lever (affected engine) – OFF.
When shutting down an engine that has malfunctioned in flight, it is important
to identify the malfunctioning engine
to avoid shutting down the wrong engine.
Monitor TGT after shutdown. If TGT rises above 540 °C, or there is evidence
of combustion as indicated by a rapid rise in TGT, place the engine
START switch in IGN OVRD position and motor engine until TGT decreases
below 540 °C.
Wing Stores Jettison
The term WING STORES
JETTISON is defined as jettisoning any or all of the wing stores as appropriate using one of three methods listed in
para. 9.26.1.
The method to be used will be determined by the aircrew depending on the situation at the time of the emergency.
AFTER EMERGENCY ACTION
After a malfunction of equipment has occurred, appropriate emergency actions have been taken and the helicopter is on the ground, an entry will be made in the RemarksSection of DA Form 2408-13-1 describing the malfunction.
Ground and flight operations will be discontinued until
corrective action has been taken.
EMERGENCY EXIT AND ENTRANCE
• Activation of the canopy removal system when combustible fuel/vapors are
present in the cockpit can result in an explosion/fire. An explosion/fire can
also occur if the aircraft has rolled on its side and fuel vapors have gathered
on the ground adjacent to the canopy side panels. The crewmembers survival knife may be used to fracture the
canopy side panel as an alternate means of egress.
• Continuing to twist the canopy jettison handle while trying to push may cause the actuator to jam and thereby
prevent operation of the canopy severance system. If the canopy jettison does not occur on the first attempt,
ensure the handle is in the 90° position,and push again. A push force of 140 – 150 lb may be required to overcome
the jam and initiate canopy jettison.
• In the event that canopy jettison does not occur when the canopy removal system is actuated, the personal survival knife should be used to fracture the canopy panel and permit egress.
• In all cases of canopy jettison, remain clear of canopy side panels to avoid
high velocity canopy fragments.
• If emergency egress is required before the rotor blades have stopped,
ensure MSTR IGN – BATT and cyclic remains centered to prevent rotors from striking personnel/ground.
Emergency Egress
1. Helmet visors – Down.
2. Area around helicopter – Clear of personnel.
3. CANOPY JETTISON handle – Turn 90°, release,then push to jettison canopy.
ENGINE POWER LOSS – PARTIAL OR COMPLETE ENGINE MALFUNCTION OR POWER–LIMITING
WARNING-Prior to movement of either POWER lever,it is imperative that the malfunctioning engine and the corresponding POWER
lever be identified.
Flight Characteristics
The flight characteristics and the required crewmember control response after a dual engine failure are similar to those during a normal power-on descent.
Full control of the helicopter can be maintained during autorotational descent. When one engine has failed, completely or partially, the helicopter can often maintain altitude
and airspeed until a suitable landing site can be selected.
Engine Failure and Engine Power Loss: General
The various conditions under which an engine may fail
or experience a power loss, prevent a standard procedure for all cases. A thorough knowledge of both emergency procedures and flight characteristics will enable the pilot to respond
correctly and automatically in an emergency.
Engine failure is normally indicated by a rapid drop in NG, NP, torque, TGT, oil pressure and the symbolic torque value on the MPD/HMD displays flashing.
Performance limiting will continue to display normal Ng and oil pressure indications; as power demand increases, Np and
NR will collectively decay and the TGT will remain at the engine limiter setting; torque indications will vary as a result of collective manipulation. Engine failure is annunciated by a voice message ENGINE 1 (or) 2 out as applicable,
[ BLK 1 ENG1 OUT/ENG2 OUT (UFD)] [ BLK 2 ENGINE
1 OUT/ENGINE 2 OUT (EUFD] messages, MPD message
ENGINE 1 (or) 2 OUT, and flashing MSTR WARN lighted push button. The MPD will autopage to the ENG Page
if not already displayed.
A partial engine power loss may follow certain mechanical
failures, such as an ECU/DEC malfunction, or an operator
may make a power demand that exceeds an engine’s performance capability.
SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE – LOW
ALTITUDE/LOW AIRSPEED AND CRUISE
A voice message will announce ENGINE 1 OUT (or) ENGINE 2 OUT. The [ BLK 1 UFD will display ENG1 OUT/
ENG2 OUT ]. The [ BLK 2 EUFD will display ENGINE 1 OUT/ENGINE 2 OUT.]
1. WING STORES JETTISON – As appropriate.
2. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
ENGINE RESTART DURING FLIGHT
WARNING-
• A failed engine should not be restarted unless it can be determined that it is reasonably safe to do so.
• When attempting to restart ENG1 following a single engine failure, a malfunctioning crossfeed valve could cause the remaining engine (ENG2) to
fail.
NOTE-
• After an engine failure in flight, an engine restart may be attempted.
• Inflight restarts do not need to utilize a warm start procedure.
DUAL ENGINE FAILURE: GENERAL
WARNING- In the event of an inadvertent activation of the engine chop switch, initial indications from NP and NR could be interpreted
as a dual engine failure. Engine chop is annunciated by a voice message ENGINE CHOP, UFD/EUFD, and MPD
messages ENG CHOP/ENGINE CHOP
and engine idle indications for NG, TGT, and NP.
DUAL ENGINE FAILURE – LOW ALTITUDE/LOW AIRSPEED AND CRUISE
A voice message will announce ENGINE 1 OUT and ENGINE 2 OUT. The [ BLK 1 UFD will display ENG1 OUT
and ENG2 OUT.] The [ BLK 2 EUFD will display ENGINE
1 OUT and ENGINE 2 OUT.]
CAUTION-With the POWER levers in FLY, resetting
the CHOP button will cause an erroneous engine 1 out and engine 2 out warning to be activated.
1. AUTOROTATE.
2. CHOP button – Reset only if an engine chop warning message is present.
3. WING STORES JETTISON – As appropriate.
ENGINE 1 OR 2 OVERSPEED – NP FAILED HIGH
A voice message will announce ENGINE 1 OVERSPEED
or ENGINE 2 OVERSPEED. The [ BLK 1 UFD will display
ENG1 OVSP or ENG2 OVSP.] The [ BLK 2 EUFD will display ENGINE 1 OVERSPEED or ENGINE 2 OVERSPEED.]
1. Collective – Adjust to maintain NR within limits.
If condition persists:
2. POWER lever (affected engine) – Retard to
equalize torque.
3. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
ENGINE ALTERNATOR MALFUNCTION
CAUTION-
• – Complete failure of the alternator or of the winding providing NG speed signal will activate the MSTR WARN
light and engine 1 out or engine 2 out voice message and UFD/EUFD messages.
The pilot shall check the NR on ENG page and be prepared to carry out the actions for a high side failure.
Thereafter, refer to TGT and engine oil PSI, along with engine fuel PSI and nose gearbox oil PSI messages.
• – Following a complete failure of an alternator, operation of the corresponding engine and all indications from engine instruments will be normal,
except that NG indications will be lost and will activate the MSTR WARN
light and engine 1 out or engine 2 out voice message and UFD/EUFD messages.
LOW RPM ROTOR – NP FAILED LOW
A voice message will announce ROTOR RPM LOW. The
[ BLK 1 UFD will display LOW RTR.] The [ BLK 2 EUFD will display LOW ROTOR RPM.]
1. Collective – Adjust to maintain NR within limits.
If condition persists:
2. POWER lever (affected engine) – LOCKOUT and then retard to equalize torque output of both engines.
If manual control is not possible:
3. POWER lever (affected engine) – IDLE.
4. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
If continued flight is not possible, proceed as in paragraph
9.7 SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE.
ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALL
1. Collective – Reduce.
If condition persists:
2. POWER lever (affected engine) – Retard. If TGT decreases and there is no further evidence of a stall;
3. POWER lever (affected engine) – FLY. If stall condition recurs:
4. POWER lever (affected engine) – IDLE.
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
ROTORS, TRANSMISSIONS, AND DRIVE SYSTEMS
WARNING-Pilot situational awareness is critical in
the successful accomplishment of these
procedures. The low inertia rotor system, coupled with high rates of descent during vertical autorotation, may not provide the pilot with adequate reaction time and cushioning pitch. Activation of the CHOP button or reduction of the POWER levers prior to reduction of the collective will result in a rapid decay of rotor rpm. Successful completion of an out-of-ground effect hovering autorotation is doubtful.
CAUTION-If engine chop is used to minimize main
rotor torque, increasing collective pitch without first retarding POWER levers to IDLE may cause engine acceleration and uncommanded yaw.
Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust in Cruise Flight
WARNING-If airspeed is allowed to approach effective
translational lift, the sideslip angle may become quite severe and helicopter
control may be lost.
a. Continued Flight Possible. At cruise airspeeds, it may be possible that level flight at some stabilized yaw angle can be maintained. The degree of sideslip will depend on the airspeed and power required to maintain
flight. Some left cyclic should be used to stop the slow right turn induced by the loss of thrust. Care should be taken to avoid slowing the helicopter. The airspeed indicator may not provide useful information once the sideslip is established, but true airspeed, yaw angle, engine torque, and rate of climb or descent should provide cues necessary to maintain flight. If yaw angle becomes excessive, reduce power and lower the nose to retain adequate airspeed.
A minimum of 90 KTAS during a shallow approach to a roll on landing should be maintained until approximately 10 to 20 ft above the touchdown point. Begin a gradual deceleration to arrive at approximately 5 to 10 ft above touchdown as the yaw angle begins to increase (to the right). At this point, retard the POWER levers as necessary to align the helicopter fuselage with the landing direction. Care should be taken to use minimum collective pitch to cushion the landing during touchdown. After touchdown, the wheel brakes should be used to maintain heading and the collective should be lowered to minimize torque effect.
1. Airspeed – 90 KTAS minimum (until 10 to 20 ft
above touchdown).
2. WING STORES JETTISON – As appropriate.
3. POWER levers – Retard as necessary (5 to 10 ft above touchdown)
b. Continued Flight Not Possible. If powered flight is not possible at an airspeed sufficient to maintain helicopter control, enter autorotation, and power levers off. In autorotation, the sideslip and roll angles can be significantly reduced by maintaining a sufficient high airspeed to allow the fuselage to streamline. A roll-on landing during touchdown will minimize the required pitch application and should be used if terrain permits.
1. AUTOROTATE.
2. POWER levers – OFF (prior to touchdown).
3. WING STORES JETTISON – As appropriate.
Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust at Low Airspeed/Hover
Loss of tail rotor thrust at slow speed may result in
extreme yaw angles and uncontrolled rotation to the right. Immediate collective pitch reduction should be initiated to reduce the yaw and begin a controlled rate of descent. If the helicopter is high enough above the ground, an attempt
should be made to increase airspeed to streamline
the helicopter. This may permit continued flight with a stabilized and manageable yaw angle. If this increase does reduce yaw, proceed as outlined for Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust in Cruise Flight – Continued Flight Possible. If the aircraft cannot be accelerated into forward flight, initiate a
power-on descent. Collective should be adjusted so that
an acceptable compromise between rate of turn and rate
of descent is maintained. At approximately 5 to 10 ft
above touchdown, perform a hovering autorotation by
POWER levers – OFF.
NOTE-Continuous right rotation during descent
and touchdown can be expected.
1. Collective – Reduce.
2. POWER levers – OFF (5 to 10 ft above touchdown).
Tail Rotor Fixed Pitch Malfunction
a. In-Ground Effect. If a failure occurs during inground-effect hover, reaction may vary from adjusting collective
and POWER levers during a left rotation to activating
the CHOP button to stop a right rotation. In any case,
the primary concern should be to land the aircraft with as little yaw rate as possible.
• If the aircraft has an uncontrolled turn to the left, a reduction in the POWER levers coordinated with
an increase in collective may slow or stop the
rotation so that a controlled power on descent to landing can be accomplished.
• If the aircraft is not turning, a slight reduction in collective pitch will begin a descent. During the
descent, a slight rotation to the left may be present;
increasing collective just prior to touchdown should stop the rotation.
• If the aircraft has an uncontrolled turn to the right, reduce collective to begin descent. At approximately 5 to 10 ft AGL, perform a hovering
autorotation by CHOP button –Press or POWER Levers – OFF.
b. Out-of-Ground Effect.
• If little or no right rotation or if left rotation is experienced and control can be maintained, the
aircraft should be accelerated into forward flight and perform approach and landing appropriate to
power setting and condition of flight at time of failure.
• If the aircraft cannot be accelerated into forward
flight, initiate a power-on descent. Collective should be adjusted so that an acceptable compromise
between rate of turn and rate of descent is
maintained. At approximately 5 to 10 ft above touchdown, perform a hovering autorotation by CHOP button– Press or POWER levers OFF.
Main Transmission Input Drive Clutch Failure
An input drive clutch malfunction is most likely to occur during engine start or when an engine POWER lever is advanced. Indications may include:
• Erratic torque indication on affected engine.
• Complete loss of torque indication on affected engine.
• NP of affected engine exceeding NR.
If the failure is a sudden disengagement, the torque of the opposite engine will double as it attempts to carry the load. A sudden high torque input drive clutch engagement may cause severe engine and/or drive train damage. A sudden engagement is indicated by a loud noise and/or sudden increase in engine torque. Should an input drive clutch malfunction occur, perform the following:

CAUTION-
• When a clutch fails to disengage, damage to the affected engine will result
(due to lack of oil pressure) if both
engines are not shutdown simultaneously.
• When a clutch fails to engage, do not shut down both engines simultaneously.
Damage may result if there is
sudden engagement.
a. In Flight
1. POWER lever (affected engine) – IDLE.
If NP (affected engine) is below NR (indicating the clutch is
disengaged).
2. EMER ENG SHUTDOWN (affected engine).
3. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
If NP (affected engine) does not drop below NR (indicating
the clutch has failed to disengage).
4. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
5. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN (both engines simultaneously).
b. On Ground. (with indications that a clutch has
failed to engage).
1. EMER ENG SHUTDOWN (affected engine only).
2. Check NG is less then 10% (affected engine).
3. Normal engine shutdown – Perform.
c. On Ground. (with indications that a clutch has
failed to disengage).
EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN (both engines simultaneously).
FIRES
NOTE-• The FIRE switches will remain illuminated
until the sensors no longer detect a fire. For a crewstation to discharge or reset the system, that crewstation FIRE pushbutton must be armed/dearmed.
• Signals sent from the Signal Processor (SP) will automatically turn off the Air Particle Separator (APS) blower under ALL fire detection conditions. ”AFT DECK FIRE”, ”ENGINE 1 (or) 2 FIRE”, and ”APU FIRE” preventing smoke ingestion
into the ECS fresh air system via the APS
blower inlet.
• The PRI bottle should be selected first; in
the event of a malfunction or failure to extinguish
the fire, select RES.
• If APU is running, accomplish an APU
shutdown prior to evacuating the aircraft. The safety of the helicopter occupants is the primary consideration
when a fire occurs. On the ground, it is essential
that the engine(s) be shut down, the crew evacuated,
and fire fighting begin immediately. If time permits, a MAYDAY radio call should be made before
electrical power is OFF to expedite assistance from fire
fighting equipment and personnel. If airborne, the most important single action that can be taken by the crew is to land the helicopter. If time permits, a radio call should be
made to expedite assistance from fire fighting personnel.
Consideration should be given to jettisoning external
stores prior to landing.
WARNING-Prior to moving PWR lever or pressing any ENG FIRE button, either achieve a
safe single engine airspeed or prepare for a single engine landing.
Engine Fire – In Flight
If an ENG1 or ENG2 FIRE push button on the FIRE DET/EXT panel illuminates, a voice message will announce ENGINE 1 (or) ENGINE 2 ON FIRE. When the fire is confirmed:
1. EMER ENG SHUTDOWN (affected engine) – when conditions permit.
2. Illuminated ENG FIRE button – Press and RDY
light illuminates.
3. FIRE DISCH button(s) – Press as required.
4. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
APU Compartment Fire
If fire is observed in
APU compartment, a voice message will announce
APU FIRE.
a. On Ground:
1. APU – OFF..
2. Illuminated APU FIRE button – Press and RDY light illuminates.
3. FIRE DISCH button(s) – Press as required.
b. In Flight:
1. Illuminated APU FIRE button – Press and RDY light illuminates.
2. FIRE DISCH button(s) – Press as required.
3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Deck Fire
If fire is observed in the deck area or if the AFT DECK FIRE warning is annunciated which will activate an AFT DECK FIRE voice message. The UFD/ EUFD will display an aft deck fire message.
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Engine Fire On Ground
If an engine fire is detected
while aircraft is on the ground, a voice message will
announce ENGINE 1 or 2 FIRE and pushbuttons illuminate.
When fire is confirmed:
1. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
2. Illuminated ENG FIRE button – Press and RDY
light illuminates.
3. FIRE DISCH button(s) – Press as required.
Fuselage Fire On Ground
1. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
2. APU – OFF (If applicable).
Electrical Fire In Flight
Prior to shutting off all
electrical power, the pilot must consider the equipment
that is essential to a particular flight environment which
will be affected; e.g., flight instruments, flight controls, etc. With electrical power off, engine anti-ice is automatically
ON. If an immediate landing cannot be made, the defective
circuit may be isolated by selectively turning off electrical equipment.
1. GEN1 and GEN2 – OFF (SYS page).
2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Smoke and Fume Elimination
1. Airspeed – Slow to 20 KTAS maximum.
2. Canopy door (affected crewstation) – Open to
intermediate position.
3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Aborting Engine Start
WARNING- 701C-Aborted engine starts may cause fuel to collect in the engine nacelle. Subsequent engine starts may be attempted only after the nacelle door/work platform is opened and the nacelle inspected for
fuel. If during the initial start an abnormal TGT rise was evident, or fuel is evident in the nacelle, the ignition system shall be
checked IAW standard maintenance procedures.
CAUTION-Abort start for any of the following reasons:
• If it becomes apparent that TGT will exceed 869° C or 851° C before NG idle speed (63% or more) is attained.
• If TGT does not increase within 45 seconds after moving POWER lever to IDLE.
• If no NP within 45 seconds after moving POWER lever to IDLE (unless rotor
is locked).
• If positive oil pressure indication does not occur within 45 seconds after
moving POWER lever to IDLE.
• If engine 1 or 2 start advisory is removed prior to attaining 52% NG.
ABORT START PROCEDURES are as follows:
1. POWER lever – OFF.
2. ENG START switch – IGN ORIDE for 30 seconds or until TGT is below 540° C.
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
NOTE-In the event of an In–Flight electrical system
malfunction, the power interrupt protection may cause blanking of one or
more MPDs for as long as 6 seconds. When on the ground during an electrical
system malfunction, MPD blanking may occur up to 12 seconds in duration due to
increased BIT cycle.
Failure or reset of the number two (2) generator may result in BUCS FAIL caution
and FMC DISENGAGE and a loss of one or more channels of SAS. After completing
the Generator Fail emergency
procedure (GEN RESET), reset the BUCS FAIL and the FMC DISENGAGE by re-engaging the affected SAS channels. If the BUCS FAIL is not associated with the GEN FAIL or the reset, the pilot
should assume other problems have occurred and complete the BUCS FAIL emergency procedure.
• A battery charged to 80% will normally supply the battery busses for approximately 12 minutes at 25°C. Time will decrease
accordingly if the temperature is increased or decreased from 25°C.
Both Generators Fail/Complete Loss Of Electrical
Power
1. GEN1 and GEN2 – Reset Pilot GEN RST panel.
If condition persists:
2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Single Generator and Single RTRU Failure
1. Affected GEN1 or GEN2 – Reset Pilot GEN RST panel.
If condition persists:
2. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
Dual TRU Failure (Transformer Rectifier 1 and
Transformer Rectifier 2)
When a dual TRU failure occurs, a number of Cautions
and Advisories will be displayed on the UFD. These may include BUCS FAIL and FMC FAIL. Conduct Emergency
Procedures for the displayed UFD Cautions in order of importance. All DC services will be lost, except those provided by the battery. Charging of the battery will no longer be conducted. The aircrew can expect the following:
a. TADS/PNVS and HDU’s will be inoperative.
b. All navigational functions will be lost.
c. Some primary flight information will be lost (altitude, heading and airspeed).
d. FMC functions will be lost.
e. Stabilator control will be lost.
f. Primary crewstation lighting will be lost.
g. Engine Anti–Ice will activate.
h. The Keyboard Unit will be inoperative.
i. The crew will be able to transmit and receive on the pre set radio frequencies but will not be able to input new frequencies with the Keyboard Unit.
j. WP’s will be inoperative and weapons systems will not
be functional.
k. The ECS will be inoperative.
l. The ice detector will be inoperative.
m.The left and right pitot heater will be inoperative.
LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
WARNING-• Immediate emergency action must follow
failure of both hydraulic systems. Any hesitation could result in loss of
helicopter control.
• With emergency hydraulic power in use, flight control inputs and elevated G loading must be kept to an absolute minimum.
• Hydraulic power availability is a function
of the frequency and magnitude of the control inputs and G loading
placed on the aircraft. In static conditions the hydraulics will bleed down in
approximately 6 minutes. If the controls are moved continuously at an
approximate 1hz rate this may be as little as 30 to 41 seconds.
• The amount of control movement may be reduced to zero depending on the
severity and location of hydraulic fluid loss within the utility hydraulic system.
• Once the EMERG HYD pushbutton is pressed ON, it must remain ON. Flight
control loss will occur when emergency accumulator pressure drops to
approximately 1650 psi.
• Failure of both primary and secondary drives to the accessory gearbox would result in the complete loss of all AC power and the failure of both the
Primary Hydraulic System and the Utility Hydraulic System. All electrical
systems, sights, communications, and lighting equipment not powered
by the emergency bus would be lost. The crew must activate the Emergency
Hydraulics and land immediately.
Primary Hydraulic Pressure Low and Utility
Hydraulic Pressure Low
1. EMERG HYD button – Press ON.
2. LAND WITHOUT DELAY..
3. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
Primary Hydraulic Pressure Low and Utility
Hydraulic Level Low
In the event of a PRI HYD PSI
failure and UTIL HYD LVL condition, hydraulic power to
the Tail Rotor (T/R) servo may be lost. This may require a landing in accordance with T/R FIXED PITCH MALFUNCTION. The UFD/EUFD will display TAIL RTR/TAIL ROTOR HYD.
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
EMERGENCY LANDING IN WOODED AREAS(POWER OFF)
AUTOROTATE – Apply full collective to decay rotor rpm as helicopter settles.
DITCHING (POWER ON)
1. Approach to hover.
2. Canopies – JETTISON prior to entering water.
3. Pilot shoulder harness – Lock.
4. CPG – Exit helicopter.
5. Hover downwind to a safe distance.
6. POWER levers – OFF.
7. Perform hovering autorotation – Apply full collective to decay rpm as helicopter settles.
8. Cyclic – Position in direction of roll.
9. Exit when main rotor has stopped.
DITCHING (POWER OFF)
If autorotational landing over water becomes necessary:
1. AUTOROTATE – Apply full collective to decay rotor rpm as helicopter settles.
2. Canopies – JETTISON prior to entering water.
3. Cyclic – Position in direction of roll.
4. Exit when main rotor has stopped.
FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS
Failure of Components. Failure of components within the flight control system may be indicated through
varying degrees of feedback, binding, resistance, sloppiness or abnormal control responses. These conditions should not be mistaken for the malfunction of the stabilization
equipment.
BUCS FAIL.

WARNING-
• Activation of one of the BUCS FAIL cautions in–flight shall signal a flight
control emergency. It can mean either a failure within the system or a mistrack
between the crewstation controls. The CPG should only activate the BUCS trigger select if the pilot is incapable of maintaining control of the aircraft.
• If BUCS has been activated, attempt to
land as far away from any known transmitters as practical.
1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. APU ON.
3. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
BUCS ON. Activation of the BUCS ON caution informs the crew that the BUCS system is now in use to control one or more flight control axes. The system is a non–redundant fly–by–wire system and long duration flights should not be attempted.
1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. APU ON.
3. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
Main Rotor Components
WARNING-Danger exists that the main rotor system
could collapse or separate from the aircraft after landing. A decision must be
made whether occupant egress occurs before or after the rotor has stopped.
Imminent failure of the main rotor components may be indicated
by a sudden increase in main rotor vibration and/
or unusual noise. Severe changes in lift characteristics
and/or balance condition can occur due to blade strikes,
skin separation, shift or loss of balance weights or other material. Malfunction may result in severe main rotor flapping. If the main rotor system malfunctions, proceed as follows:
1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN.
EGI IN–FLIGHT MISALIGNMENT
CAUTION-In flight, depending on airspeed, an uncommanded
scheduling down of the stabilator can generate significant aircraft
pitch changes and decelerative forces.
The instinctive aft cyclic input applied will begin to slow the aircraft. However, a
reduction in collective generates an additional pitch down moment which aggravates the situation and should be avoided.
NOTE-
• Dual in–flight EGI alignments are prohibited.
• Single in–flight alignments are authorized
on the secondary EGI, however, level uncelebrated
flight with a constant heading must be maintained.
• In-flight misalignment of an EGI will be indicated
by a position confidence error of 1.85K and erratically climbing and/or descending of EGI present position information
on the TSD page is more than 1 NM in error and growing. In the event of an EGI misalignment perform the following.
1. Position update – Perform. Monitor POSITION
CONFIDENCE.
If misalignment continues.
2. Airspeed – Adjust to 80 KTAS or less.
3. Stabilator – Monitor position. Manually control
as required.
4. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.
STABILATOR AUTOMATIC MODE FAILURE
WARNING-Do not exceed the nominal indicated airspeed
displayed on the FLT page.
1. RESET button – Press.
If automatic mode is not restored:
2. Use manual stabilator control.
STABILATOR AUTO/MANUAL MODE FAILURE
WARNING-Do not exceed nominal indicated airspeed
limit shown on the FLT page.
LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE
STABILIZATION EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
Stabilization equipment malfunction may manifest itself as
uncommanded control inputs; which may cause unusual
rotor disc movement or aircraft attitude/heading changes.
1. FMC release button– Press.
2. FMC – Re-engage unaffected FMC axes (A/C
UTIL page).
MISSION EQUIPMENT FAILURE
CAUTION-Do not jettison Hellfire missile if a hangfire is
in progress.
Wing Stores Jettison
a. Selected Armament Wing Stores.
1. Airspeed – 130 KTAS maximum.
2. Selected STORES JETTISON
buttons – Press to ARM.
3. JETT button – Press.
b. All Armament Wing Stores:
1. Airspeed – 130 KTAS maximum.
2. Collective JETT button – Press.
c. External Fuel Wing Stores:
1. Airspeed – 100 KTAS maximum.
2. Selected STORES JETTISON
buttons – Press to ARM.
3. JETT button – Press.
PNVS/IHADSS
PNVS Failure
WARNING-If night NOE, reaction to the following
malfunctions must be immediate. Exit the NOE environment immediately.
NOTE-Switch over to the TADS WFOV FLIR image should occur in about 3 seconds. TADS
slew rates noticeably slower in azimuth than PNVS. Some gain and level adjustment is
usually necessary for optimum image.
NVS select switch (Pilot) – TADS.
b. IHADSS/HDU Failure or [ BLK 2 IHADSS STALE]. If necessary, the following procedure will enable
the flight crew to fly an MPD fixed panel mounted display.
1. NVS MODE switch – FIXED.
2. NVS select switch – TADS or PNVS.
3. MPD VID – PLT or CPG HMD (as necessary)
TADS TEU Failure
When the TEU fails, the
PNVS is commanded to direct mode by the weapons processor. If the TEU completely fails, operation of the TADS is severely limited. The TADS cannot be selected as a sight or an NVS sensor. Laser ranging is inhibited by TADS. The LINK function is not available. Some partial TEU failures will allow the TADS to continue in the currently
selected mode, but will not allow changes to the TADS
modes of operation. The AND may blank, depending on
the particular failure and whether the TADS is in the OIP configuration. If the PNVS is ON, it will be commanded to the Direct mode and PNVS DIRECT will be displayed on the HAD. In this mode, the PNVS turret movement is controlled
by IHADSS and the PNVS Electronics Unit (PEU).
Direct mode limits the azimuth movement of the PNVS to +/– 75° and the accuracy is degraded. In PNVS direct, the PNVS turret cannot be commanded to fixed forward using the pilot/CPG NVS MODE switch. When shutting down
the aircraft, the PNVS turret will not stow properly until the TEU is repaired
IHADSS Single DP Operation
WARNING-
• Do not perform targeting operations with HMD as the selected sight when your HMD presents information for the
opposite crewmember.
• While conducting IHADSS operations during single DP failure, the possibility
of IHADSS video going stale increases.
If the IHADSS video goes
stale, refer to paragraph 9.26.2 PNVS/IHADSS.
During single DP operation both crewstations share common symbology and imagery on their HMDs. Symbology
brightness is controlled by the crewmember whose
symbology and imagery is presented on both HMDs. Control of the HMD presentation is as follows: If the NVS MODE switch is OFF in both crewstations the pilot’s symbology and imagery will be presented on both HMDs. If only one crewmember’s NVS MODE switch is NORM or FIXED, that crewmember’s symbology and imagery will be presented on both HMDs. If both crewmember’s NVS MODE switches are NORM or FIXED, the symbology and imagery of the pilot will be displayed.
[ BLK 2 During single DP operations, if the active DP is detected of having stale data, a caution will be displayed and the DP will not be allowed to reset until the other DP is successfully reset and back online. LEFT or RIGHT MPD
STALE, or IHADSS/ORT STALE cautions will be displayed
on the UFD/EUFD to inform the crew of any possible stale data displayed.]
If, during single DP operation, the IHADSS video and format of the crewmember on the controls changes to the video and format of the crewmember not on the controls.
1. NVS SELECT Switch – Reselect (PNVS or TADS).
or
2. Crewmember (not on controls) – Assume control
Dual DP Failure
a. MPDs non-operational.
b. KUs non-operational.
c. HDUs non-operational.
d. Center display non-operational.
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Single SP Failure
If the failed SP is primary,
and the PROCESSOR SELECT switch is in AUTO, the other SP will automatically assume the role of primary SP. If the PROCESSOR SELECT switch is in any position other
than AUTO, the CPG must manually select the opposite
SP if an SP failure has occurred. If the PROCESSOR
SELECT switch is in AUTO and there are symptoms of an
unsuccessful automatic switchover, the CPG must manually select an SP (select the last known secondary SP, or SP2 if not known). If the symptoms do not clear, the CPG must manually select the other SP. Symptoms of an unsuccessful switchover include the following:
a. The SP1 and SP2 lights on the PROCESSOR SELECT panel are both ON.
b. Several different types of dynamic data is displayed
on the MPD and/or UFD/EUFD displays (e.g., time of day, engine performance data, etc.) are frozen.
c. The MPD and/or UFD/EUFD displays become erratic or blank
Dual SP Failure
Following a dual System Processor failure, the aircrew can expect the following:
a. Primary flight controls will operate as an independent hydraulic
mechanical system. FMC disengages and stabilator reverts to MAN mode. Force trim will remain in last set ON/OFF state. Manual stabilator controls will be
fully functional without position symbology.
b. All hydraulic systems will continue to operate, including the emergency function.
c. Both engines will continue to operate with full control capability.
d. Fire Detection
Extinguishing panel status and controls(including fuel shutoff and engine shutdown) are fully operational.
e. All backup (standby) instruments are fully functional.
f. All interior and exterior lighting controls (including
searchlight) are fully operational.
g. Stores jettison capability is fully operational.
h. Canopy de-fog and Windshield wipers are fully operational.
i. ICS remains fully functional. Radios remain operational at last selected state. Radios can be RTS’d but crew cannot tell by visual cues for proper radio selection. Transponder will continue to operate in last set state, but Mode C altitude reporting is not updated. EMERGENCY GUARD and XPNDR remain in last set state.
j. Aircraft ARM/SAFE state remains in last commanded
selection. Actioned and ARMED weapons remain in
last selected state; Crew must de-WAS weapon to safe
weapons. Weapons degradation is severe (no inhibits
available) and firing is not recommended.
k. Fuel system, ECS system, Anti-Ice systems and IPAS bleed valves will continue to operate but will remain
at last commanded state.

NOTE-Attempting to change NVS MODE will result in extreme NVS system degradation.
l. If TADS /PNVS were operating in NVS NORM at
the time of failure, they will continue to function and provide imagery without flight symbology. HDUs will continue to function but without flight symbology. ORT will display video in the last commanded state. NVS will remain in the last commanded state.
m. MPDs function in a degraded mode due to no data
update, missing data, or lack of control functions (paging is available).
n. Except for fire warning lights, loss of all W/C/A notification including voice messages.
o. KUs and UFD/EUFDs non-operational.
p. ARC–164 and IDM cannot be zeroized.
q. CHAFF dispenser is not available.
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.