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37 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
resource allocation
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na
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common value
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A type of auction in which every participant values a good in the same way.
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private value
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A type of auction in which agents have their own valuation for goods, which they do not necessarily share with others.
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correlated value
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A type of auction in which agent's valuations are related to one another, but not necessarily common value.
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first-price auction
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A type of auction in which the amount the auction winner pays for a good is the amount of the highest bid.
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second-price auction
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An auction in which the winner of the resource pays the amount of the second highest bid (aka Vickrey auction) - bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy in second price auctions.
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open cry
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A type of auction in which every agent gets to see the bids of every other agent.
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sealed bid
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A type of auction: in a sealed bid auction, bidders submit bids in private to the auctioneer ( in contrast to open cry auctions).
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one-shot auction
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An auction in which there is a single round of bids.
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ascending auction
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An ascending auction is one in which bids start low and get progressively higher.
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english auctions
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A type of auction in which bidding starts at some low reserve value, and then bidders submit increasing bids until no bidders are willing to go higher.
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winner's curse
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The idea that if you win in an auction, then you probably overestimated the value of the good, since nobody else was willing to bid as much as you.
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dutch auction
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A type of auction in which bidding starts with a high value, and is then reduced by an auctioneer until som participant is willing to bid.
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vickrey auction
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Another name for a second-price auction.
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valuation function
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na
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free disposal
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The idea of having more of a particular resource is never worse than having less.
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winner determination problem
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In combinatorial auctions, winner determination amounts to findinf an allocation of goods that maximizes value - an NP-hard problem.
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bidding languages
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In combinatorial auctions, a language that is used by bidders to express their valuation functions - OR and XOR languages are the best known.
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atomic bids
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In combinatorial auctions, a key problem is that of concisely expressing the preferences agents have over bundles of goods: bidding languages are used to express these preferences, and are composed of atomic bids, typically using OR or XOR operators.
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XOR bids
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A type of bidding language for combinatorial auctions, in which a valuation function is defined as the 'exclusive or' of a number of atomic bids.
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OR bids
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A type of bidding language for combinatorial auctions, in which a valuation function is defined as the 'disjunction' of a number of atomic bids.
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dummy goods
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na
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heuristic winner determination
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In combinatorial auctions, finding an optimal allocation (winner determination) is computationally complex - heuristic approaches aim to find a (not necessarily optimal) allocation quickly, using rules of thumb (heuristics).
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approximate winner determination
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In combinatorial auctions, the winner determination problem is a computationally intractable problem, involving finding an optimal allocation of goods to bidders: in approximate winner determination, we aim to find an allocation that may not be optimal, but is within some known bound of the optimal.
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integer linear programming
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A type of optimization problem, in which we want to find integer values for some unknown variables, where constraints on these variables are expressed as linear inequalities over them.
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objective function
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In linear programs, the objective function defines what is to be maximized (or minimized).
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incentive compatible
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A voting protocol (or more generally, social choice mechanism) is incentive compatible if no agent can benefit by misrepresenting their preferences, i.e., if truth-telling is a rational choice.
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VCG mechanism
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Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism: a generalization of Vickrey auctions used in combinatorial auction settings, which has the property that bidding to one's true valuation is a dominant strategy (i.e., it is incentive compatible).
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mechanism design
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The process of designing a game so that, if the participants in the game act rationally, some desirable overall objective will be achieved.
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implementation theory
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The part of game theory concerned with with designing games to satisfy certain properties.
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algorithmic game theory
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A part of theoretical computer science that studies computational aspects of game theory, such as the complexity of computing solution concepts, and the applications of mechanism design in computer science.
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auction bots
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Simple software agents that bid on behalf of their owner in an online auction.
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electronic marketplace
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na
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proxy bidding
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The idea of having a proxy (a program or a person) submit bids on our behalf in an online auction
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sniping
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In an online auction such as eBay, sniping is the behaviour whereby bidders try to submit bids at the last possible moment.
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TAC
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The Trading Agent Competition - a competition intended to test the ability of computer programs to automatically trade goods and services.
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continuous double auction
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An auction in which participants buy and sell simultaneously - used in the Trading Agent Competition.
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