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22 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
monopolistic competition
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market in which firms can enter freely, each producing its own brand or version of a differentiated product
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oligopoly
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market in which only a few firms compete with one another, and entry by new firms is impeded
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cartel
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market in which some or all firms explicitly collude coordinating prices and output levels to maximize joint profits
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How do cartels differ from monopolies?
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a. because cartels rarely control the entire market, they must consider how their pricing decisions willa ffect noncartel production levels
b. because the members of a cartel are not part of one big company, they may be tempted to "cheat" their partners by undercutting prices and grabbing bigger shares of the market. |
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characteristics of a monopolistically competitive market
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1. firms compete by selling differentiated products that are highly substitutable for one another but not perfect substitutes. In other words, the cross-price elasticities of demand are large but not infinite
2. There is free entry and exit: it is relatively easy for new firms to enter the market with their own brands and for existing firms to leave if their products become unprofitable. |
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long-run equilibrium
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long-run equilibrium occurs when no firm has an incentive to enter or exit because firms are earning zero economic profit and the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied
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nash equilibrium
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Set of strategies or actions in which each firm does the best it can given its competitor's actions.
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duopoly
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market in which two firms are competing with each other
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cournot model
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Oligopoly model in which firms produce a homogeneous good, each firm treats the output of its competitors as fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously how much to produce
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reaction curve
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Relationship between a firm's profit-maximizing output and the amount it thinks its competitor will produce.
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Cournot equilibrium
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Equilibrium in the Cournot model, in which each firm correctly assumes how much its competitor will produce and sets its own production accordingly.
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Stackelberg model
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oligopoly model in which one firm sets its output before other firms do
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Bertrand model
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oligopoly model in which firms produce a homogeneous good, each firm treats the price of its competitor as fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously what price to charge.
FIRMS CHOOSE PRICES INSTEAD OF QUANTITIES |
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noncooperative game
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Game in which negotiation and enforcement of binding contracts are not possible.
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payoff matrix
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table showing profit (or payoff) to each firm given its decision and the decision of its competitor
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prisoner's dilemma
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Game theory example in which two prisoners must decide separately whether to confess a crime; if a prisoner confesses, he will receive a lighter sentence and his accomplice will receive a heavier one, but if neither confesses,, sentences will be lighter than if both confess.
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price rigidity
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Characteristic of oligopolistic markets by which firms are reluctant to cchange prices even if costs or demands change.
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kinked demand curve model
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oligopoly model in which each firm faces a demand curve kinkend at the currently prevailing price: at higher prices demand is very elastic, whereas at lower prices it is inelastic.
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price signaling
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Form of implicit collusion in which a firm announces a price increase in the hope that other firms will follow suit.
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price leadership
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pattern of pricing in which one firm regularly announces price changes that other firms then match.
(e.g. General Motors) |
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dominant firm
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Firm with a large share of total sales that sets price to maximize profits, taking into account the supply response of smaller firms.
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cartel
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A combination of independent business organizations formed to regulate production, pricing, and marketing of goods by the members.
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