Aplp Case Cards - Keyed To Rogers/healey (Before Spring Break)

Front 1

ICC v Cincinnati Railway | SCOTUS 1897 | 1

Back 1

(a) Congress expressly said agency regulates rates to ensure their reasonableness
(b) Congress expressly said agency has power to enforce the provisions of the Act
(c) agency does NOT have power to mandate maximums, because Congress did not expressly give it such power

Front 2

Pennsylvania v West Virginia | SCOTUS 1923 |

Back 2

DISSENT!
(a) SCOTUS cannot answer the questions needed to equitably distribute natural gas [issue is too complex]
(b) therefore, SCOTUS must reject the case

Front 3

NBC v US | SCOTUS 1943 | 6

Back 3

(a) Congress expressly gave FCC "expansive (and unenumerated) power" to regulate radio
(b) Congress expressly asked FCC to ensure that radio is put to its "best use"
(c) in order to accomplish (b), FCC must have power to regulate NBC

Front 4

United States v Soutwestern Cable Co | SCOTUS 1968 | 12

Back 4

(a) Congress gave FCC broad authority over all electronic communication before CATV was even invented
(b) Congress asked FCC to ensure that a local station remains available for local expression
(c) national licensing overpoweres the local expression
(d) FCC must have the power to regulate (c) in order to accomplish goal (b)

Front 5

FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco | SCOTUS 2000 | 14

Back 5

(a) FDA does not traditionally regulate tobacco, a huge industry
(b) Congress, thru other legislation and refusal to grant FDA explicit power over tobacco, shows that it does not wish to do so
(c) FCC cannot redefine "drug" and "safety" to grant itself powers that Congress does not wish it to have

Front 6

Londoner v City and County of Denver | SCOTUS 1908 | 17

Back 6

(a) US does not really regulate State's power to assess taxes BUT
(b) 14th amendment requires states to follow due process
(c) Denver cannot allow a SUBSIDIARY AGENCY (public works board) to tax w/o proper hearing because it violates due process

Front 7

Bi-Metallic Investment Co v State Board of Equalization | SOTUS 1915 | 22

Back 7

when a rule affects everyone it is neither practical nor necessary for each person to have a hearing; the notice and opportunity to be heard is done through the machinery of government and the control (remote or direct) that constituents have over their representatives. (the inverse to Londoner- not a few people, but everyone)

Front 8

Bailey v Richardson | DC Circuit 1950 | 2

Back 8

(a) ban on future employment = punishment, but mere dismissal does not
(b) due process does not apply to gov't employees who work at the pleasure of the president, because their job is not an LLP interest
(c) where the government acts w/in its power and hurts an individual, the individual has no right to redress (sorry, sucka!)

Front 9

Goldberg v Kelly | SCOTUS 1970 | 38

Back 9

(a) pre-deprivation hearing is necessary AT LEAST to establish that the welfare recipient will live long enough to get the post-dep "fairness" hearing
(b) in the welfare circumstance, recipient is already destitute and so deprivation affects an LLP interest
(c) recipient IS eligible and so the future benefit IS property (unlike an APPLICANT)

Front 10

Board of Regents v Roth | SCOTUS 1972 | 47

Back 10

(a) the first question is WHETHER DUE PROCESS APPLIES
(b) due process applies ONLY if its an LLP interest
(c) here, the job is NOT an LLP interest because he had no legitimate claim to entitlement after the contract expired

Front 11

Perry v Sindermann | SCOTUS 1972 | 55

Back 11

(a) gov't cannot always dismiss [and free speech is one reason it can't]
(b) "de facto" tenure system means P should get opportunity to prove his legitimate claim to entitlement

Front 12

Bishop v Wood | SCOTUS 1976 | 59

Back 12

Although state law does NOT recognize wife's right to control husband's dead body as "property," the significant interest in the remains is an LLP interest under due process; this is a FEDERAL law determination, regardless of the STATE law label

Front 13

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v Sullivan | SCOTUS 1999 | 59

Back 13

the applicant/recipient distinction MATTERS [see Goldberg]; applicant is not entitled to insurance

Front 14

Wisconsin v Constantineau | SCOTUS 1971 | 60

Back 14

(a) you can't publish someone's face in liquor stores so that they can't buy booze
(b) where a person's good name is at stake because of what the government is doing to him [i.e., publishing his face all over liquor stores and telling them not to sell booze to him], notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential

Front 15

Paul v Davis | SCOTUS 1976 | 61

Back 15

(a) you CAN publish someone's name and face on flyers naming shoplifters
(b) ruling in Constantineau should be understood to mean, due process is required when a right is taken away (the right to buy booze, not the right to not be published in a list of boozers)

Front 16

About This Set

Back 16

-CASElaw from Rogers/Healey Administrative Law Text (used in Prof. Jordan's APLP @ W&L Law)
-"Question Card": case name | court and year of decision | page where case is found in the casebook
-"Answer Card": main holding of the case; facts only included if necessary to narrow the holding, etc.
-Made by 1L Kelley Bodell, no guarantees on accuracy or helpfulness

Front 17

Matthews v Eldridge || SCOTUS 1976 | 69

Back 17

The Matthews Factors for Determining how much process is due (i.e., whether to hold a pre-deprivation hearing and what sort of hearing would be necessary):
(a) private interest in retaining benefit (individual's dependence on the benefit, the extent of the property interest, etc.)
(b) risk of erroneous deprivation (how often benefit will be wrongly taken)
AGAINST
(c) public interest in deprivation (how many resources gov't will save by not holding hearing, etc.)

Front 18

Cleveland Board of Education v Loudermill | SCOTUS 1985 | 79

Back 18

(a) while a statutory entitlement CREATES a property interest, the same statute CANNOT dictate the amount of process due (only the Constitution can do that); in order to do this you must apply the Matthews Factors
(b) private interest: taking someone's job is a big deal, and this weighs heavily in favor of employee
(c) risk of error: in the employment context, facts are often disputed and the risk of error is pretty high; this weighs heavily in employee's favor
(d) public interest: gov't actually has an interest in KEEPING trained employees rather than training new ones; also, a pre-termination hearing would not be an excessive administrative burden (esp. since here, a post-termination hearing would mean that the pre-term. only needs to be a cursory review of the situation to protect against egregious mistakes); this weighs in the employee's favor as well.

A Pre-Terminatino Hearing IS necessary prior to the dismissal of a gov't employee entitled to his job by statute

[NOTE: Rhenquist's dissent emphasizing that Arnett's "bitter with the sweet" analogy should still apply]

Front 19

Arnett v Kennedy | SCOTUS 1974 | 82

Back 19

Statutory entitlements carry the "bitter with the sweet"; that is, the statute can dictate both the property interest and the means by which it may be taken away. [NOTE that this "bitter with the sweet" rationale was explicitly struck in Cleveland Board of Education v Louermill]

Front 20

Castle Rock v Gonzales | SCOTUS 2005 | 89

Back 20

(a) where statute mandating arrest in every case of restraining order violation does NOT constitute a property interest requiring due process
(b) a statutory entitlement cannot "go without saying"; if the legislature meant to do this, they would have said so
(c) the "mandate" probably isn't serious; police officers need to have discretion

Front 21

Ingaham v Wright | SCOTUS 1977 | 92

Back 21

(a) where corporal punishment does NOT require pre-paddling hearing
(b) Statutory entitlement to not being severely beaten via corporal punishment (though minor beatings OK)
(c) private interest: significant... but we decide cases on the general and not specific basis, and most corporal punishments are not as severe as this one
(d) risk of error: usu. corp. punish. is only deployed when the teacher has SEEN what the student has done, so risk is low
(e) public interest: strong interest in not micromanaging schools, in maintaining teacher's authority,etc.

Front 22

Goss v Lopez | SCOTUS 1975 | 98

Back 22

(a) Process is due in the case of a 10-day suspension from school because there is a statutory entitlement to a free public education
(b) private interest: if placed on perm. record, significantly impacts future of students; also, 10 days is a good chunk of school (18 percent of the school year)
(c)risk of error: significant risk of error when the child has no opportunity to present his/her side of the story
(d) public interest: maintaining order in the schools, etc.
(e) an INFORMAL hearing (jsut teacher and student exchanging stories), immed. before suspension decisions, will provide enough due process to satisfy the rights of the student

Front 23

United States v James Daniel Good Real Property | SCOTUS 1993 | 103

Back 23

(whether summary deprivation of property subject only to postdep hearing violates due process). Eldridge factors control:
(1) private interest in keeping house is very strong
(2) risk of erroneous deprivation is high in an ex parte procedure
(3) the public interst is low because there is no urgency (house isnt going to walk away)

Front 24

Hamdi v Rumsfeld | SCOTUS 2004 | 105

Back 24

due process in the enemy cobatant context:
(1) private interest in avoiding the label and not being detained indefinitely is very very high
(2) risk of error is unacceptable high because gov't proposes only a few inadequate safeguards
(3) public interest is high but doesn't outweight the other two factors unless proposed e-c is accorded actual notice and given opportunity to appear before neutral decision-maker.

Front 25

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v Costle | 1st Cir 1978 | 113

Back 25

(a) APA requires that formal adjudicators comply w/ APA itself AND with extra statutory requirements (here, public hearing)
(b) adjudicator has power to decide whether cross-examination would be useful
(c) the words "on the record" are not magic: here, "public hearing" is a substitute (but notice that courts have been inconsistent in the application of this holding and you would want to mention this inconsistency on an exam)

Front 26

Richardson v Perales | SCOTUS 1971 | 127

Back 26

(whether written physician's report is admissible for disability hearing) the inherent characteristics of the disability system make for impartial, reinforceable, and redundant medical reports, as does the very fact that a physician makes them. also, this particular report was well grounded in personal examination of the recipient and has all kinds of objectively verifiable reliability. the written report, albeit hearsay, is admissible.

Front 27

Withrow v Larkin | SCOTUS 1975 | 143

Back 27

simple comination of investigative and adjudicative functions, without more, does NOT equal bias

Front 28

Antoniu v SEC | 8th Cir 1989 | 154

Back 28

An adminsitrator who makes a speech re: the matter at hand and appears to have prejudged it cannot take any part in the adjudication proceedings, even if he recuses himself before decision is announce. The appearance of justice is a value nearly equal to justice itself

Front 29

Vandygriff v First Savings and Loan Assn | TX 1981 | 162

Back 29

(whether the ex parte discussions BETWEEN two separate applications invalidate Comissioner's order) When one application has ended and another has not yet begun, there can be no "ex parte "communication because there are no "partes" to speak of. Commissioner's decisions is therefore not invalidated.

Front 30

Schweiker v Hansen | SCOTUS 1981 | 165

Back 30

(a) AFFIRMATIVE misconduct by gov't employee is required to estop gov't from arguing that recipient should not get benefits
(b) i.e., gov't employee would have to "KEEP" recipient from benefits, not simply fail to instruct them properly on how to gt them

Front 31

EPA v Mink | SCOTUS 1973 | 171

Back 31

FOIA created a presumptino of disclosure and the nine exemptions should be construed narrowly. HOwever, in the case of the Executive classification exemption, it would be inappropriate for judges to compel disclosure or to subject docs to in camera review; classification is the realm of the executive and should not be messed with

Front 32

Nat'l Petroleum Refienrs Assn v FTC | DC Cir 1973 | 179

Back 32

(a) the enabling act discussed adjudication as primary mode of enforement
(b) allowing rule-making does NOT preclude adjudication; it simply narrows the questions for adjudication
(c) virtually all agencies are allowed to adjudicate
(d) the expressio unis est exclusio alterius argument has lost favor lately because lawmakers are not infallible
(e) allowing rule-making is probably even more fair to ppl affected by agency decisions as well as easier for agencies themselves

Front 33

Bowen v Georgetown Univ Hospital | SCOTUS 1988 | 188

Back 33

(a) retroactivity is disfavored in the law and will not be construed without express congressional intent
(b) history and common practice AND the definition in the APA show that rule-making is always PROSPECTIVE

Front 34

Chocolate Manufacturers Assn v Block | 4th Cir 1985 | 196

Back 34

(a) an adopted rule must be a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule coupled with comments given
(b) when an agency specifically rules otu a change, then accepts comments that advocate the change and make that change, it deprives the affected individuals if it does not reopen the comment period regarding that specific change

Front 35

United States v Nova Scotia Food Products Corp | 2d Cir 1977 | 204

Back 35

(a) even in informal rulemaking, it is inappropriate for an agency to base a decisions SOLELY on scientific evidence it collects itself and does not allow public to comment on
(b) it is inappropriate for an agency to squelch comment by not responding to serious questions presented, such as the crushing of commercial viability due to an overly braod regulation standard

Front 36

Mada-luna v Fitzpatrick | 9th Cir 1987 | 218

Back 36

Agency action is a "general policy statement" IF:
1) it is prospective (like a rule)
2) it informs the agency members BUT allows discretion in agency action
NOTE: the "substantial impact" on lots of people has nothing to do with the analysis

Front 37

Warder v Shalala | 1st Cir 1998 | 225

Back 37

The difference between legislative and interpretive rules:
1) legislative: has force of law (is binding on agency and on court), is a mandate, creates something NEW; governed by § 553 of APA
2) interpetive rule: clarifies existing legislative rule (is not binding on court), can turn in a new direction of interpretation, is like a general policy statement

Front 38

Unites States v Florida East Coast Railway co | SCOTUS 1973 | 245

Back 38

1) The presumption is against required formal rule-making
2) the terms "on the record," or similarly intended language must be included in the statute to require formal procedures

Front 39

United States v Allegheny-Ludlum | 248

Back 39

The language "after hearing" in the ICC statute is not equivalent to "on the record" and does not required formal rule-making procedures

Front 40

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NRDC | SCOTUS 1978 | 255

Back 40

Reviewing courts are not allowed to establish procedural requirements for agencies; they can only rule whether they reach the required constitutional floor, and require the agency to follow its own rules

Front 41

SEC v Chenery Corp. (Chenery II) | 332 US 194 | 1947

Back 41

While rule-making is the preferred method of agency action because of its notice capabilities, adjudication is also valid and can be used to decide an issue at hand w/o going through the prospective rule process first

Front 42

NLRB v Bell Aerospace | 416 US 267 | 1974

Back 42

Again, rulemaking may be preferred but the flexible adjudication has its place and is ok