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27 Cards in this Set
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Heckler v Campbell | SCOTUS 1983 | 292
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(whether Secretary may rely on published medical-vocational guidelines to determine availability of work:
(1) enabling act allows Secretary to promulgate reasonable rules in these cases (BROAD (2) it is important that hearings be individualized to each applicant, BUT (3) there is no reason to require the relitigation of the same facts over and over THEREFORE (4) the guidelines, which only deal w/ the presence of types of work in the area and so do not need to be redefined in each case, are APPROPRIATE. |
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Sameena Inc v US Air Force | 9th Cir 1998 | 299
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(whether agency MUST follow FAR requirement of evidentiary hearing for genuine dispute of material fact):
(1) agencies must follow their own rules (2) FAR is applicable rule to ALL federal agency acquisitions (3) FAR requires hearing for dispute of fact, and there is one here (whether Mirza is an officer) (4) Mirza should have gotten an evidentiary hearing |
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Crowell v Benson | SCOTUS 1931 | 312
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(whether it is appropriate for an agency to decide questions of fact w/o de novo review by an article III court):
(1) this is a private rights case, liability of one individual to another. (2) Agencies have always served an advisory nature in these cases and their decisions have generally not been disturbed. (3) Act is limited in application, and the decisiosn to be made are probably best left to the experts chosen to serve in the agency. (4) It IS appropriate for agencies to make decisions of fact not reviewable de novo |
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Northern Pipelien v Marathon Pipe Line | SCOTUS 1982 | 317
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(limiting Crowell by explaining what happens when agencies adjudicate non-congressionally created rights)
(1) judicial determinations in the United States must be made by judicial officers who are protected by Article III from outside influence. (2) Also, congress does NOT have the same authority to prescribe the manner of adjudication for rights that it DOES NOT create (i.e., constitutional rights or state rights). (3) We DISTINGUISH Crowell because this is not a congressionally created right. and because the bankruptcy act is not really of 'limited application,' [because the power given non-article III adjudicators is much broader in this Act than in Crowell.] |
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CFTC v Schor | SCOTUS 1986 | 321
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(whether CEA empowers CFTC to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings and if so whether that grant of authority violates article III)
(1) Commodity Exchange Act empowers the CFTC to entertain state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings, because it has a long tradition of doing so and Congress has amended the statute twice w/o ever seeming concerned w/ this aspect of CFTC authority (2) agency's assumption of jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims does not violate Article III because the counterclaimers effectively waived their article III rights by (a) insisting the reparations court hear their claim instead of the district court and (b) showing up in reparations court in the first place. |
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ALA Shechter Poultry v US | SCOTUS 1935 | 355
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(1) Congress may not delegate essential legislative functions, may use necessary resources of flexibility/practicality which enable it to perform its functions in laying down policies and establishing standards while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which policy as declared by Congress is to apply
(2) National Industrial Recovery Act construed as authorizing President to approve "codes of fair competition," for industrial recovery and not construed as merely authorizing President to deal with unfair competitive practices offending existing law held invalid |
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Industrial Union Dept v American Petroleum Inst | SCOTUS 1979 | 344
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(1) Before Secretary can promulgate any permanent standard, he must make threshold finding that workplace is unsafe (i.e., significant eliminatable risks are present)
(2) Requiring Secretary to make threshold finding of significant risk is consistent w/ scope of regulatory power under § 6(b)(5) to promulgate standards for "toxic materials" (3) This interpretation is supported by § 6(g), which requires Secretary to give due regard to the urgency of the need for mandatory safety standards for particular industries or workplaces, and § 6(b)(8), which requires the Secretary, when he substantially alters an sus standard, to explain how the new rule will "better effectuate" the Act's purposes. |
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Misretta v US | SCOTUS 1989 | 359
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(what exactly the "intelligible principle" standard means) an intelligible principle is pretty much any restriction on the discretion of the delegatee (in one case, the Court ruled that the single word "requisite" was an intelligible principle and enough of a limiting factor to make the power delegable) Generally, the narrower the scope of the delegation, the less restrictions there will be on the use of discretion by the delegatee. The broader the scope of the delegation, the more restrictions on discretion will be necessary.
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Whitman v American Trucking Assn | SCOTUS 2001 | 360
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(whether the delegation of power to regulate air pollution violates the Constitution) The nondelegation doctrine is generally not important and not applicable; the real question is going to be how much power is granted and what the restrictions on the discretion to use that power are, and whether the delegatee conformed to that intelligible principle or not. ALSO, the intelligible principle must be fixed in order to be valid; you can't just decide to apply an unconstitutional power in a reasonable way and save it from unconstitutionality (there IS NO CURE for unconstitutionality)
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INS v Chadha | SCOTUS 1983 | 368 -
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(1) the foundation of checked powers is the requirement that ALL legislative actions be passed by both houses and presented to the President (aside from 4 explicit exceptions found in the constitution)
(2) the rejection of Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation IS a legislative action and IS NOT one of the 4 exceptions, therefore it must be done according to the legislative process described in the constitution. (3) the legislature cannot have it both ways; they wanted to ease the burden on them by delegating this action to the Attorney General, and they cannot now take it back arbitrarily w/o tue legislative process. OVERRULED AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL |
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Buckley v Valeo | SCOTUS 1976 | 392
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(whether members of the Campaign Finance Commission are "Officers of the United Sttes" and whether Congress may appoint "Officers of the United States")
(1) the Framers intended two and only two types of officers, re: appointments: (a) apptd by President/confirmed by Senate and (b) appointed by President alone, Department Heads, or Courts of Law (2) Commission officers fall in the latter category (3) Congress does not fall w/in the latter apptmt authority (4) the current members of the Commission ONLY have the legislative authority that Congress may appt for, the legislative/investigative duties that Congress can give to committee if it likes; all other powers are unconstitutional as the COmmission is now comprised. |
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Freytag v Commissioner | SCOTUS 1991 | 402
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(whether the Tax Chief of the Article I Tax Court is a "head of Department" or a " Court of Law" enabling him to appoint Trial Tax Judges as "inferior officers" via the Appointmnt Clause)
(1) the apptmt clause does not limit "courts of law" to article III courts (2) the Tax Chief is a Court of Law w/in the meaning on the apptmt clause (3) the Tax Chief can therefore appt inferior officers |
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Landry v FDIC | DC Cir 2000 | 403
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(whether an ALJ is an "inferior officer" as opposed to a mere "employee") Since the ALJ has no power to issue a final decision (only a reccomendation), it is not an inferior officer, only an employee
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Myers v United States | SCOTUS 1926 | 404
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(whether President has exclusive power of removing executive officers whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate)
(1) there is no express removal provision in the Constitution, except impeachment (2) however, the power to appoint necessarily and naturally carries w/ it the power to remove (3) the President is in a unique position to know whether or not executive officers are furthering his executive goals, and he has the power to remove w/o consent of Senate |
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Humphreys' Executor v US | SCOTUS 1935 | 411
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(whether the FTCA restricts the power of the President to remove commissioner except upon the causes named; whether such limitation on Presidential removal power is unconstitutional) Congress can restrict the President's power of removal for officers that carry out quasi-judicial/quasi-legislative powers, because if they can't then separation of powers is violated.
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Bowsher v Synar | SCOTUS 1986 | 417
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(whether Balance Budget an Emergency Deficit Control Act gave Congress removal power of Comptroller General; whether Comptroller General exercised executive power under the statutory scheme, making the statute unconstitutional)
(1) to permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would be in effect a congressional veto (2) congressional veto clearly violates separation of powers (3) because Comptroller by statute is removable at initiative of Congress, and because he executes the laws in a significant manner, the statute giving Congress removal power is unconstitutional |
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Morrison v Olson | SCOTUS 1988 | 419
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(whether independent counsel is an "inferior" officer; whether restriction on Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel for good cause unconstitutionally restricts President's power of removal)
(1) independent counsel is an inferior offcer, subordinate to the President via the Attorney General (2) the question is not the TYPE of work the inferior officer is doing, but whether the restriction UNCONSTITUTIONALLY limits the President's power to remove (3) however, the "good cause" removal requirement still gives the President enough wiggle room and does not unconstitutionally restrict the President's removal power |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v Sawyer | SCOTUS 1952 | 455
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(what authority Exec Orders carry)
(1) judicial scrutiny is inversely proportional to weight of authority (2) Congress + Pres = highest (3) Congressional Silence + Pres = still pretty high (4) Congressional Disapproval + Pres = questionable |
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Hamdan v Rumsfeld | SCOTUS 2006 | 457
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(whether Pres has power to order military commissions to try e-cs)
(1) SCOTUS still has jd and still must apply Constitution (2) Commission violates geneva conventions, const, etc; invalid |
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Chevron USA v NRDC | SCOTUS 1984 | 481
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(test for administrative decisions)
(1) The scope of review re: agency statutory interp. is whether the interp is reasonable, not "best" (2) If congress speaks directly to the issue, the controversy ends and courts apply that intent (3) if Congress is silent, the agency is bound only to decide a REASONABLE interpretation and that will be held valid by the courts |
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MCI Telecommunications v AT&T Co | SCOTUS 1994 | 490
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Modify means a narrow, minor change; it does not allow agency to make changes altering the fundamental nature of the act
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Sierra Club v Johnson | 11th Cir 2006 | 495
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Agency must follow ALL notice requirements in enacting statute, not interpret which are most important
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe | SCOTUS 1971 | 549
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Even though agency actions are entitled to presumption of validity, they are still subject to a thorough judicial review based on the FULL administrative record that was before the agency at the time of the decision
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Camp v Pitts | SCOTUS 1973 | 555
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When ct applies APA "arbitrary/capricious" standard, focal point should be admin. record ALREADY EXTANT, not some new record made by the REVIEWING COURT.
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IMS PC v Alvarez | DC Cir 1997 | 555
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(Exceptions to the "no new record rule")
(1) agency failure to examine relevant factors (2) agency failure to explain grounds for decision in order to frustrate judicial review (3) agency bad faith/improper behavior |
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Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC | DC Cir 1970 | 556 AND National Lime Assn v EPA | DC Cir 1980 | 557
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The "hard look" standard applies to court making sure AGENCY took hard look AND to make sure COURT takes hard look in examining
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Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co | SCOTUS 1983 | 559
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(1) Agency changing course by rescinding rule is obligated to supply reasoned analysis for change beyond that required when it takes no action at all
(2) if it cannot do so, the action is arbitrary and capricious; the court cannot supply such an explanation |
