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40 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Non-Human Animals and Ethics
Do non-human animals have rights? Do humans have ethical obligations toward non-human animals? |
Possible Answers
No: Humans have no ethical obligations toward non-human animals. Yes: Humans have (some) ethical obligations toward non-human animals. - Much weaker (Cohen) - Weaker (Warren) - Similar strength Singer: Equal consideration of interests Regan: Equal inherent value |
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An Argument for “Equal Consideration”
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Peter Singer: “All Animals are Equal”
Singer’s Position “[I]f we examine more deeply the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds of race or sex ultimately rests, we will see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans” (SE, p. 483). |
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Why are Racism and Sexism Wrong?
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One answer:
They violate the principle of equality because all humans, no matter what their race or sex, are equal. |
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Are all Humans Equal ?
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Aren’t there countless respects in which humans are unequal ?
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Examples of human inequalities
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Examples of Inequalities
Intelligence Talent and abilities Wealth Health Appearance Strength Virtue |
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Possible response to human inequalities
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A Possible Response
Such inequalities do not correspond to racial and gender differences. Therefore, racism and sexism are wrong because they are based on the false assumption that inequalities in characteristics such as intelligence correspond to racial and gender differences. |
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Singer's Response to human inequalities
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Singer’s Responses
What if it were to turn out that there are differences in intelligence between blacks and whites, men and women? Do we generally give less consideration to the interests of less intelligent people than we do to intelligent people? |
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Singer’s Conclusion With Respect to Humans
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“[T]he claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies a difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings” (SE, p. 485).
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What About Non-Human Animals?
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- The principle of equal consideration applies to all beings with interests, no matter what their intelligence or other capacities.
- Non-human animals have interests insofar as they have the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. An interest in avoiding pain An interest in experiencing pleasure |
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Sexism:
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to give less or no consideration to the interests of persons of another gender
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Racism
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to give less or no consideration to the interests of persons of another race
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Speciesism
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to give less or no consideration to the interests of animals of other species (non-human animals)
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Equal Consideration of Interests, Not Equal Treatment
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What equal consideration requires can vary according to a particular individual's characteristics and capacities.
Children vs. pigs (SE, p. 485): “[C]oncern for the well-being of children... would require that we teach them to read.” “[C]oncern for the well-being of pigs may require no more than that we leave them with other pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room to run freely.” |
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A Weaker Thesis
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Humans are ethically obligated to consider the interests of non-human animals.
Factors to consider: Expected harm to non-human animals (e.g., pain and discomfort) Importance to humans Whether there are alternatives that do not require using non-human animals |
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A Rights-Based Argument
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Tom Regan: “The Case for Animal Rights”
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Inherent or Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
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To say that x has only instrumental value is to say that x has value only in relation to someone else’s goals, purposes, or objectives.
A computer has only instrumental value. If it did not have value to anyone, it would have no value. By contrast, each of us has inherent or intrinsic value. We would have worth or value even if no one valued us. |
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Equality Thesis
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Each of us (and all humans) have equal inherent value.
No differences (e.g., intelligence, race, gender, talents, virtue, etc.) correspond to a difference in inherent value. |
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Inherent Value and The Rights View
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“The genius and the retarded child, the prince and the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Theresa and the most unscrupulous used-car salesman—all have inherent value, all posses it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things, as if they existed as resources for others” (SE, p. 494).
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Do Non-human Animals Have Only Instrumental Value?
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Regan’s answer: No.
Reasons for Regan’s Answer Any characteristic or capacity that non-human animals are said to lack (e.g., a capacity to reason and communicate) is also lacked by some humans (e.g., infants; profoundly retarded, severely demented, and comatose humans). A sufficient condition of inherent value is to be “the experiencing subject of a life” (SE, p. 495). |
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A Comparison of Singer and Regan
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Both attack “speciesism.”
Both criticize current practices with respect to nonhuman animals (e.g., research and commercial meat production). However, there is an important difference in their respective ethical theories. Singer: a utilitarian theory Regan: a (Kantian) respect- or rights-based theory |
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A Defense of “Speciesism”
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Carl Cohen: “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”
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Cohen Critiques two Arguments Against Using Non-human Animals for Research
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A rights argument (e.g., Regan)
Research is ethically wrong insofar as it violates the rights of non-human animals. A utilitarian argument (e.g., Singer) Research is ethically wrong insofar as it causes non-human animals to experience pain, discomfort, etc. |
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Cohen’s Critique of the Rights Argument
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Research cannot violate the rights of non-human animals because they do not have any rights.
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Cohen’s Analysis of Rights
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Rights are moral claims :
Rights are “claims, or potential claims, within a community of moral agents” (SE, p. 504). The capacity to make moral claims is a necessary condition of possessing rights: “Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against one another” (SE, p. 504). |
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Implications for Non-human Animals
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Non-human animals do not have a capacity to make moral claims.
Therefore, non-human animals do not have any rights. Consequently, the treatment of non-human animals (e.g., in connection with research) cannot be criticized on the grounds that their rights are being violated. |
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An Objection to Cohen’s Analysis
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Not all humans have the capacity to make moral claims:
Infants and young children Profoundly retarded adults Severely demented adults Adults with substantial irreversible brain injury Do such humans have rights? If they do, Cohen’s analysis must be mistaken. |
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Cohen’s Response
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His response relies on the notion of “natural kinds.”
Humans comprise a “natural kind” distinct from non-human animals insofar as it is natural for members of the species homo sapiens to have the capacity to make moral claims. Normal adult humans have the capacity. Normal adult members of other species lack the capacity. |
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Problems with Cohen’s Argument
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Is the reliance on “natural kinds” unjustified speciesism?
Is Cohen’s moral claims analysis of rights sound? Implications for human fetuses and infants: If “normal” at that stage of development, then neither has moral rights. If “normal” for an adult member of the species, then both have moral rights. |
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Cohen’s Critique of the Utilitarian Argument
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Cohen’s claim:
Utilitarians such as Singer are mistaken when they condemn research on the grounds that it causes non-human animals to experience pain and distress. |
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Cohen’s Reasons
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He denies that all animals have equal moral standing.
Non-human animals and humans are capable of suffering, and both have an interest in not suffering, but the suffering of humans has more moral weight. No equal consideration of interests. Cohen admits he is a “speciesist.” The benefits of research can outweigh whatever suffering non-human animals experience. The overall good justifies the suffering. |
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Do Humans, According to Cohen, Have any Moral Obligations Toward Non-human Animals?
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Yes:
“In our dealings with animals, few will deny that we are at least obliged to act humanely—that is to treat them with the decency and concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to other sentient creatures. To treat animals humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as the holders of rights” (SE, p. 506). By means of what standard(s) can we determine how to act humanely toward non-human animals? |
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A Possible Standard
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Humans are ethically obligated to consider the interests of non-human animals.
Factors to consider: Expected harm to non-human animals (e.g., pain, distress, and discomfort) Importance to humans Whether there are alternatives that do not require using non-human animals |
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Animal Rights and Human Obligations: A Moderate View
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Mary Anne Warren: “Human and Animal Rights Compared”
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Do Non-human Animals Have Moral Rights?
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Regan: Yes
Cohen: No Warren: Yes, but... There are differences in two important dimensions: The content of their respective rights The strength of their respective rights |
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Differences in Content of Rights
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Even when humans and non-human animals have the same moral right, there can be significant differences in content that correspond to differences in their respective interests and needs.
An example: A right to liberty |
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Differences in the Strength of Rights
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Even when humans and non-human animals have the same moral right, there can be significant differences in the strength of the right.
An example: a right to life Why Are the Moral Rights of Humans Stronger? Warren offers two reasons. First, there are significant differences in the interests of humans and non-human animals. Second, only humans have moral autonomy. Contrary to Cohen, moral autonomy is not a necessary condition of possessing moral rights. However, the moral autonomy of humans is said to be a reason for ascribing stronger moral rights to them. |
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What About “Nonparadigm Humans?”
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Nonparadigm humans (e.g., infants and humans who are profoundly retarded, severely demented, or comatose) lack moral autonomy.
Are their moral rights weaker? Warren’s answer: No |
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Warren’s Reasons for Ascribing Strong Moral Rights to Infants and Young Children
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They possess partial autonomy.
We place a very high value on their lives and well-being. Extending strong moral rights to them is required to enable them to become responsible, morally autonomous adults. |
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Reasons for Ascribing Strong Moral Rights to Other Nonparadigm Humans
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Other people (e.g., family and friends) care about them.
Their cognitive capacities may be greater than it seems. They are more likely to (re-)gain moral autonomy if they are treated as if they had strong moral rights. Since we all might lose our moral autonomy some day, “we would all have reason to be anxious about our own futures” if a loss of moral autonomy were to justify denying strong moral rights. |
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CONCLUSION
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Warren appears to present a plausible basis for distinguishing between the content of the moral rights of human and non-human animals.
The plausibility of Warren’s position on the relative strength of moral rights appears to depend on a successful response to the problem of nonparadigm humans. |
