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124 Cards in this Set

  • Front
  • Back
What is Administrative law?
The body of law that defines and guides the behavior of agencies (their body of rules and regulations and orders and decisions).
This course instroduces agencies and situates them within the framework of our system of governance in terms of their:
Source of authority, the types of activities they undertake, the limits on their actions, and the possibilities they permit.
What's the difference bw substantive and procedural law?
Substantive law is that which governs rights and obligations of those who are subject to it while procedural law deals with the method and means by which substantive law is made and administered.
Administrative law should be distinguished from?
The particular substantive law implemented by each agency.
What is an organic statute?
A statute enacted by Congress that creates an administrative agency and defines its authorities and responsibilities.
What is the APA?
Administrative Procedure Act of 1947 which governs the way in wh ich administrative agencies of the federal govt of the US may propose and establish regulations, it also setsup a process for federal court review of agency decisions.
How do administrative agencies make regulations?
Starts with a decision on the part of the agency to do something to carry out one of its statutory responsbilities.
What are the Londoner and Bimetallic cases about?
Their about determining whether an act is adjudicative or rulemaking in nature.
The Londoner v Denver 1908 tax on a particular street case holding:
Where a state delegates to a subordinate body the duty of taxation, due process of law requires that the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard; the enabliing act was adjudicative in nature and requires due process rights attach to administrative hearings.
The BiMetallic v State Board 1915 city tax case holding:
Due process rights do not attach as the concerned act was rulemaking in nature.
Due process protections only attach to:
Administrative activities in which a small number of people are concerned, who are especially affected by the act, in each case upon individual grounds.
APA 551 rulemaking definition:
An agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule (the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy).
The first 3 articles of the US Constitution:
1) Establishes the powers of and limitation on the Congress, 2) Creates the executive branch, 3) Establishes the judicial branch of the federal government.
Article 1 Section 1:
All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the US (non-delegation doctrine that disallws agencies from making broad legislative-like decisions).
3 cases around the non-delegation doctrine:
1) Field v Clark 1892 that congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president, 2) Hampton v US 1928 that congress shall lay down an intelligible principle behind an act to which those delegated the authority is directed to conform, 3) Schechter Poultry v US 1935 struck down relevant provisions that had set no explicit guidelines.
American Trucking v Whitman 2001 EPA case holding:
Clean Air Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because its construction left the agency free to set standards (NAAQS at any point bw zero and killer fog) without an intelligible principle.
Industrial Union v API 1980 OSHA carcinogens regulation case:
The secretary is required, before issuing any standard, to determine that it was reasonably necessary to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment (the secretary had exceeded his standard-setting authority bc of not showing the justification).
What is Chevron deference?
Courts must defer to administrative agency interpretations of the authority granted to them by Congress where 1) the intent of Congress was ambiguous and 2) the agency's interpretation was reasonable or permissible.
Gonzales v Oregon 2006 assisted suicide drugs case:
The attorney general under the controlled substances act did not have the authority/reason/permissibility to prohibit drugs in a state that specficially authorized them.
The authority of administrative agencies stem from their:
Organic statute and must be consistent with constitutional constraints and legislative intent.
5 contexts in which an agency does not have power to enact a regulation:
1) Regulation is an unonstitutional delegation of power (rare under today's case law), 2) Organic statute denies authority, 3) Regulation is not based on factual findings, 4) Regulation is not pursuant to serving the public, 5) Regulation is outside the purpose as articulated in the organic statute.
2 cases that describe the constitutional limits on the delegation of adjudication:
1) Comodity Futures Trading C v Schor 1985 that Congress may grant reaching jurisdiction over state law counterclaims to administrative agencies and 2) Granfinanciera 1989 right to a jury trial because the suit against them was legal rather than equitable in nature and involved matters of private rather than public rights.
Article 3 is closer to being violanted when congressional delegation of adjudication is:
Overbroad and exhibits the essential attributes of judicial power (previous cases hinged issues on the private-public right dichotomy and the latter being indicative when delegation of adjudication was appropriate).
Cases (2) that outlined how the branches control delegated power or agency officials:
1) Morrison v Olson 1988 that supported congress taking away the appointment power from the executive in regards to inferior officials and even give that power to another branch and 2) Bowsher v Synar 1986 that limited Congress' power to delegate to itself executive-type removal powers (terminating Bowsher the Comptroller).
A case that showed how the branches may influence delegated power or agency policy:
INS v Chadha 1983 deportation case that prohibited Congress from granting itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch (their deportation of Chadha).
Other avenues for deciding INS v Chadha:
1) Unconstitutionality of private bills 2) Unconsitutionality of grants to individuals
Other ways the executive may influence delegated power or agencies:
1) Bully pulpit 2) presidential directives 3) Impoundment.
What is impoundment?
The refusal of the President to spend money that has been appropriated by the US Congress; however, after Nixon, an act in 1974, and Train v NYC the power was essentially taken away.
Londoner (adjudication):
With agencies in adjudicatory functions, due process rights are protected and taxpayers shall have an opportunity to be heard.
Bi-mettalic (rulemaking):
Case that allowed for agencies to choose between rulemaking and adjudication as long as its done with informed discretion:
SEC v Chenery 1947 case that supported SEC and its action (adjudicatory-rulemaking) as it was based on substantial evidence and was consistent with the authority granted by Congress.
Formal adjudication cases:
SeaCoast, Dominion, United Church of Christ, Armstrong.
Seacoast 1978 heated water in estuary case:
Struck agency discretion to not hold hearings in formal adjudication.
Dominion Energy v Johnson 2006 thermal variance case:
Upheld the EPA discretion and reasonable organic statute interpretation in not granting an evidentiary hearing for plaintiff seeking thermal variance.
United Church of Christ v FCC 1966 broadcasting licensing case:
Struck agency discretion for not allowing intervention by the church in the license renewal process of the broadcaster; intervention to vindicate the broad public interest relating to a licensee performance of the public trust inherent in every license.
Armstrong v CFTC 1993 entrepreneur case:
Struck agency authority because the CFTC failed to comply with the APA with an ambiguous affirmance of an ALJ decision and lacked a formal conclusion that the entrepreneur was a controlling person.
Formal adjudication cases in regard to decionmaker control:
Grolier v FTC, Nash v Bown, Morgan, Cement Institute, PATCO.
Grolier v FTC 1980 conflict of interent ALJ case:
The APA guarantees separation of function in ALJ workings and ALJ here had worked for FTC in the past in regard to Grolier.
Nash v Bowen 1989 HHS Secretary promulgating new rules on ALJs case:
Upheld HHS Secretary discretion to adopt reasonable administrative measure in order to improve the decisionmaking process.
Morgan v US 1936 Ag Secretary fixing max rates for livestock case:
Struck Ag Secretary discretion because the granting of a full hearing was a prerequisite to the Secretary making a valid order (rulemaking case and as such has broad need of public participation).
FTC v Cement Institute 1948 antitrust basing point pricing scheme case:
Upheld FTC authority as it was not biased and properly allowed introduction of evidence; the commissioners minds were not irrevocably closed.
PATCO v Federal Labor 1982 striking pilots case:
Upheld the Federal Labor Relation Authority in finding through substantial evidence that PATCO had engaged in illegal striking and having the discretion to revoke PATCO exclusive bargaining status.
Informal adjudication case:
PBGC v LTV 1990 pensions plans case that upheld PBGC authority as it was not required to consider all relevant law but was free to act in its own best interests under the ERISA law.
Administrative Law Due Process cases:
Goldberg v Kelley, Wisconsin v Constantineau, Roth, Sinderman, Meachum v Fano, Manthews v Eldridge, Hamdi v Rumseld, Loudermill.
Goldberg v Kelley 1970 termination of welfare case (a modern watershed):
A pre-termination evidentiary hearing to produce an initial determination of the validity of the termination was necessary to satisfy procedural due process.
What is the question that triggers due process protections?
Does the action deprive life, liberty or property?
Analysis of interests for due process protections in admin law context:
1) Types of interests involved (life, libery, property (welfare as property not gratuity)), 2) Balancing of parties interests (Frankfurter grievous loss argument or cost versus benfit of additional procedures), 3) Seacoast comparison (a party is entitled to present his case); basis in law.
Wisconsin v Constantineau 1971 grievous loss case:
The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the statute (postings in public spaces to not sell to an individual Ms. Constantinueau) was unconstitutional, ruling that the interest (reputation, honor, integrity, property in good name) was such that the requirements of procedural due process had to have been met.
Bd of Regents v Roth 1972 first-year-professor termination case:
The Court held that the professor had no protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted for term, therefore, there could be no Fourteenth Amendment protection.
Perry v Sinderman 1972 four-year-professor with expectancy-tenure termination case:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court that a mere subjective "expectancy" was protected by procedural due process but agreed that the teacher had to be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim and a right to a hearing.
Due process protections analysis:
1) Trigger question: deprivation of life, liberty, or property, 2) balancing of interests, 3) Basis in law.
Meachum v Fano 1976 prisoner transfer case:
The inmates had no liberty interest in remaining in the prison to which they were originally assigned because state law conferred no such right on them; The inmates' expectations were too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger due process protections where the prison officials had discretion to transfer them for any reason or no reason at all.
Has entitlement analsysis taken over libery as well as property?
No but see Vitek v Jones 1980 prisoner transfer to mental hospital case that held that laws entitled the inmate to due process prior to mental disease finding and transfer to mental hospital.
Does it matter whether an entitlement is classified as property or liberty?
Yes see Jago v Van Curen 1981 parole rescission case that held the due process rights were not violated with respect to liberty because inmate's supporting case law (Sinderman) relates to property instead.
Is there a special due process doctrine for prison cases?
No see Sandin v Conner 1995 segregated confinement case that found the state did not create liberty interests requiring due process protections (a hearing prior to segregated confinement).
Do standardless administrative discretion give rise to due process protections?
Yes see Holmes v NYC 1968 public housing applicant case that found the plaintiff having standing because they were immediately affected by the alleged irregularities in the practices of the defendant.
Morton v Ruiz 1974 indian assistance case:
The court found property interests and that congress did not intend to limit assistance to only those native americans directly on reservation land.
The utilitarian calculus of due process protections from (property) interests emergent case:
Mathew v Eldrige 1976 SSA disability benefits case that found procedural due process had been satisfied because respondent was not in a dire position as that of a typical welfare recipient and bc of the myriad procedural safeguards.
The utilitarian calculus of due process protections from (liberty) interests case:
Hamdi v Rumsfeld 2004 enemy combatant case that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial judge.
Analysis formula for receiving due process protections:
Interest of the individual in avoiding interim harm X increased accuracy of additional procedure > govt-societal interest in avoiding more process.
Lassiter v Dept of Social Serices 1981 indigent parents due process case:
Due process did not require the state to appoint counsel to represent the prisoner mother in the proceeding to terminate her parental rights with respect to her infant son.
Brock v Roadway 1987 trucking company employee reinstatement case:
Due process requires the employers receive prereinstatement notice of the employee allegations, notice of the evidence, an opportunity to respond, and an opportunity to provide rebutta witnesses.
Cleveland Bd of Ed v Loudermill 1985 employee termination case:
Employee due process needs to be protected when 1) with a compelling private interest in retaining employment, 2) coupled with the value of presenting evidence prior to termination, 3) outweighed the added admin burden of a pre-termination hearing.
Are post-deprivation judicial remedies relevant?
Yes see North American Cold Storage v Chicago 1908 unfit food case that held a food seizure statute did not violate due process bc the power of the legislature to enact laws relating to public health was within legislative discretion.
Are federal officials who enforce statutes absolutely immune from damages liability?
No see Butz v Economou 1978 employee termination case where federal officials who terminated the employee were entitled only to qualified immunity thereby allowing the suit to move forward; by contrast persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency were entitled to absolute immunity.
What does Rule 553 define?
Rule making a) except if related to military, foreign affairs, or to agency management b) Notice requirement, c) Comment, d) Timeliness, e) Right-to-petition.
What's an interpretation of a hearing requirement in rule making?
See US v Florida 1973 per diem rates on railroad cars case which found that 'after hearing' text in the statute did not necessarily embrace rigoruous traditional proceedings but just informal rule making proceedings.
What's the Seacoast language to trigger formal proceedings in adjudication (556, 557)?
"After opportunity for public hearing".
Is Rule 553 the end-all-be-all for agency rule making?
Yes see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v NRDC 1978 plant licensing case that found the lower court improperly intruded into the commission's decision making process; judges cannot require more layers to procedural stipulations in 553 rule making unless there are constitutional constraints (due process) or other compelling circumstances.
If representing NRDC, how may more rule making be had?
1) Constitutional issues on due process (substantial and procedural) 2) 553 3) Other statutes or histories as per 553a 4) Agency requirements 5) 9706 of the APA as to the right to judicial review.
What's the first requirement of Rule 553?
General Notice of proposed rule making and include time-place, legal authority, and the terms of the proposed rule; see NRDC v US EPA 2002 log transfer debris case where the EPA erred in not affording notice and soliciting further comments in regard to a substantive change in the rules regarding the issue.
What's the second requirement of Rule 553?
Comment, the agency shall give an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation; see US v Nova Scotia 1977 whitefish preparation requirements case that found the agency failed to disclose the basis and purpose of the regulation which rendered the appellants incapable of responding to the evidence.
What's the third requirement of Rule 553?
A statement of basis, either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
A case that seemingly skirts the 3rd requirement of 553:
Rybachek v US 1990 EPA and placer mining case that upheld the EPA's rules despite failure to propose them in advance because the EPA was not required to publish every precise proposal and because they provided adequate notice with regard to another rule's adoption.
The payback rule case:
US Tankers Owners v Dole 1987 case which held Secretary of Transportation failed to fulfill her obligations to set out an adequate statement of basis and purposes for the payback rule and failed to spell out in more detail how her decision could be squared with the statutory objectives set by Congress.
HBO v FCC 1977 case:
In rulemaking, ex parte contacts must be avoided otherwise they are to be exposed on the public record; FCC failed this requirement and HBO won the overturning of FCC rules.
Airtransport v FAA 2002 subinformal rulemaking requiring rest times case:
Like Chevron, an interpretation must be afforded substantial deference and upheld unless plainly errorneous.
GE v EPA 2002 guidance document case:
Document was a legislative rule because it purported to bind both applicants and the EPA with the force of law; so the promulgation was subject to review and vacated because no fair notice was given prior to its promulgation or invocation of sanctions.
APA rules for judicial review:
700 rules; Right of review 702; Reviewable actions 704.
SEC v Chenery 1947 choice of admin action case:
The choice of whether to promulgate rules or proceed with ad hoc adjudicative decisions rests in the informed discretion of agenciesm (Chenery I); and that its action may have a retroactive effect despite not first promulgating a general rule (Chenery II).
Is retrospectivity resulting from choosing adjudication or rulemaking unfair?
Yes see Epilepsy Foundation v NLRB 2001 case where a new rule may not have retrospective application because it ran counter to the settled expectations of the employee when he was first interviewed (no right to having a coworker present at terminatio hearing).
May rules be retroactive if not statutorily authorized?
No see Bowen v Georgetown Univ Hospital 1988 rule may only be retroactive if statutorily authorized; Chenery II allowed for retroactivity in adjudication as it deals with what the law was in the past while rulemaking deals with what the law will be and thus retroactivity is not allowed if not statutorily authorized.
Scope of review of an order requiring employment reinstatement and back pay:
Broad scope of review see Universal Camera v NLRB 1951 case because the appellate court erroneously believed it was limited to reviewing only evidence that justified that decision; the evidence supporting the agency conclusion must be substantial in consideration of the record as a whole including evidence that goes against the decision.
Is the clearly erroneous standard of review grandfathered by the APA?
No see Dickinson v Zuro 1999 computer security patent denial case because the standard was not adopted by the federal circuit when the APA was enacted; APA 706 Scope of Review posits the correct standard of review and APA 559 doesn't allow for the additional requirement as the standard was not recognized in law by the federal circuit.
Allentown Mack Sales v NLRB 1996 union support case:
APA 706 requirement for substantial evidence to support factual determinations was not met to find Allentown lacked doubt over the union's majority support.
Is 706 substantial evidence the standard of review for factual findings in both formal and informal proceedings?
Yes see ADAPSO v Board of Governors 1984 case where the 706 requirement connotes a substantial standard no different from the arbitrary and capricious test.
Should otherwise applicable standards of fact review be superseded by more intense judicial scrutiny when the issue has constitutional implications?
Yes for example the secret service cannot have final say on WH protestors in light of the freedom of speech.
NLRB v Hearst newboys collective bargaining case of 1944:
Reviewing courts have limited review over administrative agencies' interpretation of terms in their organic statutes (banana findings of mixed fact and law); the NLRB's finding that the newsboys were employees as per the act was subject to deference.
The case that examined the deference that was due to the interpretive rules of admin agency:
Skidmore v Swift 1944 firefighters waiting working time case that found as a matter of fact that no principle of law precluded waiting time from also being working time.
Difference between Chevron 1984 and Skidmore 1944 deference?
Where Chevron gives deference when 1) Congressional intent was ambiguous and 2) interpretation was reasonable and permissible; Skidmore gives deference given 1) thoroughness of the agency 2) validity of the reasoning 3) consistency of the agency over time and 4) Other persuasive powers of the agency; Skidmore deference for sub-informal matters (opinion letters) while Chevron for Informal and Formal matters.
2 cases that established the modern law of judicial review of administrative agency actions beyond the determination of facts:
Overton Park v Volpe 1971 and Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assn v State Farm 1983 cases.
Overton Park v Volpe 1971 federal funds for highway construction case:
Though respondent secretary of transportation was not required to make formal findings in informal adjudication, the prior court cannot base judicial review solely on litigation affidavits (Secretary must take in all feasible and prudent alternatives) and court must use the whole record as the basis for review (Secretary must undertake all possible planning to minimize harm).
2 step Overton park test:
1) Did the secretary follow the right procedures in approving, and 2) Substantive challenge as to whether the secretary was right to approve or not; In other words whether the agency's action was subject to arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs v State Farm 1983 informal rulemaking seatbeat requirements case:
Under the a&c standard of review, the NHTSA failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for its action to abandon the seatbelt requirement.
Chevron v NRDC 1984 stationary source of pollutants definition case:
The encasing of polluting devices within the same industrial group is a valid legal construction as 1) the intent of congress over stationary source was abmiguous and 2) the agency construction was reasonable and permissible; therefore the agency action was allowed deference.
May agencies switch rules?
Yes as long as their both reasonable and permissible under the organic statute because change itself does not violate agency discretion see Rust v Sullivan 1991 prohibition of govt funds for adovcating abortion to patients case.
MCI v ATT 1994 detariffing of nondomininant carriers case:
The FCC new detariffing regulation was impermissible under the organic statute and so the rule change was not entitled to deference because it went beyond the meaning the statute could bear.
US v Mead 2001 tariff classification of diaries case (Chevron step 0):
Souter held that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of authority; also known as Chevron Step 0.
Are petitions for not performing rulemaking subject to full judicial review?
Yes see MA v EPA 2007 greenhouse gases case that found the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases from motor vehicles and there was no showing of any congressional intent to bar the EPA from addressing global warming.
How is Heckley v Chaney different from MA v EPA?
Chaney dealt with a petition due to FDA non enforcement that was not subject to judicial review under the APA because unlike MA v EPA it did not deal with non rulemaking (but non enforcement).
Scope of review APA rule number:
APA 706.
May agencies decide informal adjudications that differ from precedential cases?
No see Shaws Supermarkets v NLRB 1989 illegal threat of reprisal during union elections informal adjudication case that found NLRB had failed to adequately explain its departure from prior decisions.
How is Rust v Sullivan different from Shaws Supermarkets?
Rust dealt with rulemaking and allowed for rule changes if alternatives were considered and the interpretation of the law was reasonable.
What is the Accardi doctrine?
An agency's statutory discretion cannot be changed even by the decision maker of the agency because of the need for consistency in agency regulation promulgation.
May the courts set aside sanctions because they do not achieve uniformity of sanctions for similar violations?
No see Butz v Glover 1973 short weighing of livestock case where SCOTUS upheld a suspension because precedents indicated that a Secretary's authority was not invalid due to more severe than normal sanctions imposed in other cases.
Is an agency's decision to bring a particular enforcement proceeding like a DA's decision to prosecute presumptively unreviewable?
Yes see Butz v Glover which is in contrast to a sanction imposed after a proceeding or prosecution of a case which are presumptively reviewable.
May agencies fail to comply with the decisions of the judicial branch?
Yes see Stieberger v Heckler 1985 nonacquiescense policy case where the court enjoined the HHS and SSA policy of not sticking to precedents set by the local federal circuit courts.
Are agency nonenforcement decisions reviewable by the courts?
No see Heckler v Chaney 1985 lethal injection versus FDA regulations case that held that under 701a2 of the APA that such actions are committed to agency discretion by law as the intent of Congress in enacting the APA was to codify the common law and therefore such a presumption of unreviewability should be sustained under the APA; but see Brennan's factors for possible reviewability.
Allen v Wright 1984 IRS standards and white private schools case:
The parents' allegation that they were harmed directly by the mere fact of government financial aid to discriminatory private schools cannot support standing because it did not constitute a judicially cognizable injury.
Why wasn't the response to Allen v Wright the same as in Heckler v Chaney (presumption of nonreviewability of nonenforcement actions)?
Because Allen v Wright dealt with constitutional standing issues (injury, causation, and redressability) while Heckley v Chaney did not.
Adapso v Board of Governors informal rulemaking over banking data processing case:
Despite the statute requiring substantive evidence, the agency action did not require more factual support beyond that demanded by the normal arbitrary or capricious standard of review for informal rulemaking.
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife 1992 case:
Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring suit under the Endangered Species Act, because the threat of a species' extinction alone did not establish an individual and nonspeculative private injury.
FEC v Akins 1998 information request from political committe case:
The Court held that an individual could sue for a violation of a federal law pursuant to a statute enacted by the U.S. Congress which created a general right to access certain information.
Does a party have standing under the APA to seek review of an agency's interpretation of disputed statute when their claim is within the zone of interest of the statute?
Yes see NCUA v First National bank trust because 1) the bankers association had prudential standing in the matter and 2) the agency's interpretation was contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress.
(2) Prudential Standing Requirements (judically created but not C-derived so Congress may overwrite):
1) Prohibition on 3rd-party standing, 2) Prohibition of generalized grievances.
(3) Constitutional Standing Requirements:
1) Injury suffered personally/imminently of P meets Art 3's cases and controversies factor, 2) Causation and traceability of the injury, 3) Redressability such that the court can provide relief in the matter.
(2) Zone of interest test:
1) Zone of injury where the injury is the kind that Congress expected might be addressed under the statute and 2) Zone of interests where the party is within the zone of interest protected by the statute or constitutional provision.
MA v EPA 2007 informal nonrulemaking case over emission of greenhouse gases case:
The EPA's action was arbitrary, capricious, other otherwise not in accordance with law because the EPA had offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases caused or contributed to climate change.
Are drug mfrs entitled to preenforcement judicial review of a regulation that requires specific generic drug labeling?
Yes see Abbott Labs v Gardner 1967 case that held that mfrs were not prohibited by the ripeness doctrine from challenging an FDA regulation.
What is the ripeness doctrine?
A doctrine that prohibits adjudication if it rests upon contigent future events that may not occur as anticipated; Abbott labs required 1) to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and 2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
When is the presumption of reviewability overcome?
When the statutory scheme indicates no congresional intent to create a private right; see Block v Community Nutrition Institute 1984 market orders for milk case.
FTC v Ticor Title Ins 1992 title search ratesetting case:
Supervision by states held not sufficiently active to give title insurance companies state-action immunity from federal antitrust liability.
(3) Doctrines designed to prevent unnecessary or untimely judicial interference in the administrative process:
1) Exhaustion of remedial measures unless there's a clear right exception and irreparable harm 2) Ripeness (fitness of the issues for judicial decision and harship of the parties if court withholds) 3) Finality via clear right or structural right.
Are federal administrator entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in the face of challenges to their conduct of public business?
See Butz v Economou 1978 futures case that held federal administrators that are similarly situated to ALJs decision makers were absolutely immune from suits.