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42 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
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(michelle et al., 2008) Relationships between concepts and basic neural building blocks of meaning
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Search through 1 trillion words of online text to find verbs with co occurring nouns. Celery - (eat, fills, tastes.) Airplane - (Fly, rode, lifted)
Then the study identified brain areas associated with those verbs. The study found that the verbs associated with a certain noun would all register in the same brain area. Therefore, we can predict activation for nouns from where the verbs are activated in the brain. Also Perceptual and motor brain areas involved in representing meaning Concepts are represented by highly distributed patterns of activation across the brain |
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How do we categorize
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Definitions, prototypes, examplars
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How do we represent the relationship
between categories |
Semantic networks
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How are concepts and categories represented
in the brain? |
Overlapping distributed patterns of activity
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What is reasoning? What are the two types?
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Cognitive processes by which people start with
information and come to conclusions that go beyond that information Deductive reasoning • Inductive reasoning |
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Deductive Reasoning?
What are the different components? |
the
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Syllogisms Atmosphere effect Belief bias Conditional syllogisms Falsification principle: Pragmatic reasoning schema |
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Syllogisms
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A way of deductive reasoning that works well for concrete examples, but not abstract problems.
Two statements called premises – Third statement called conclusion |
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Categorical syllogisms
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Describe relation between two categories using
“all”, “no”, or “some” Valid if conclusions follows logically from its two premises, but validity does not necessarily mean that the conclusion is true. |
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Atmosphere effect
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error in evaluation of syllogism
If both premises and the conclusion all use the same descriptor (“all”, “some”, or “no”) then people tend to say the syllogism is valid All professors are faculty. All professors are teachers. Therefore, all teachers are faculty. |
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Belief bias
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Error in evaluation
If syllogism is true or agrees with a person’s beliefs, more likely to be judged valid – If syllogism is false or disagrees with a person’s beliefs, more likely to be judged not valid |
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Conditional syllogisms
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First premise: “If p, then q”
– p = antecedent – q = consequent – Example (denying the consequent): If p then q. Not q. Therefore, not p. |
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Watson Four Card Problem
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) |
Effect of using real‐world items in a
conditional‐reasoning problem. (either using numbers and letters for the problem, or using meaningful everyday terms. Demonstrates the Falsification principle, and the Pragmatic reasoning schema. |
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How is the falsification principle demonstrated in the the Wason Four‐Card Problem
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to test a rule, you must
look for situations that falsify the rule – Most participants fail to do this – When problem is stated in concrete everyday terms, correct responses greatly increase |
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The Wason Four‐Card Problem
Griggs and Cox (1982) |
Compared abstract version
to “beer” version • Concluded that when people can relate the problem to real world regulations, they better understand the critical tests |
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The Wason Four‐Card Problem
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) How is the P]pragmatic reasoning schema demonstrated? |
Every card has “Entering” or “Transient” on one
side, and a list of diseases on the other side: Two conditions: – No permission schema: Make sure that if the form says “Entering” on one side, then cholera is listed on the other side. – Permission schema: This form lists inoculations. If the traveler is entering the country, then cholera must be listed to insure protection against the disease. Conclusions: permission schema conditions resulted in higher accuracy. People are often not good at reasoning abstractly • Context is importan |
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Pragmatic reasoning schema:
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thinking about
cause and effect in the world as part of experiencing everyday life – Permission schema: if A is satisfied, B can be carried out • Used in the concrete versions • People are familiar with rules |
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Misinformation effect
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Misleading or suggestive information presented
after a person witnesses an event can change how that person describes the event later (MPI) |
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What are the three components of the Miss Information Effect? Describe.
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Memory‐trace replacement
– MPI impairs or replaces memories that were formed during original event (reconsolidation?) • Retroactive interference – More recent learning interferes with memory for something in the past – Original memory trace is not replaced • Source monitoring error – Failure to distinguish the source of the information – MPI is misattributed to the original source |
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False Childhood Memories
Hyman et al. (1995) Describe the study and its findings. |
Participants’ parents filled out
questionnaires about childhood experiences • Participants repeatedly interviewed about experiences – Real experiences from questionnaires – False experiences added by experimenter, e.g.: Birthday party at age five with pizza and a clown Results: The more the people were interviewed, the more false memories they remembered. (MPI Effect of memory trace replacement) |
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False Childhood Memories
Hyman et al. (1995) |
Experimental Condition : (view film of make teacher reading to students)
Control Condition: View film of female teacher reading to children. Both groups viewed a film of a female teacher getting robbed by a man, and then later had to pick the robber from a photo spread. Results: make condition participants picked the male teacher as the robber than in the female condition. Source monitoring error |
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Definitional Approach
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Determine category membership based on
whether the object meets the definition of the category Works for abstract, constricted categories |
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Defining features
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Features that any object must have to be a
category member – Necessary and sufficient conditions |
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Prototype
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An average of category members encountered in the past
– An abstract representation of the “typical” member of a category |
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Characteristic features
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Features that objects in the category typically have
– The most salient features of the category – True of most instances of that category |
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Prototype Approach
Rosch (1975) “Prototypicality” |
Do category members vary in typicality
Rate each category member on how well it represents the category title 1 = very good category example high prototypicality 7 = very poor category example low prototypicality Conclusion: Some objects are more prototypical of a category than others, i.e. they more closely resemble the prototype |
Better at handling highly variable categories than prototype approach
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Rosch & Mervis (1975) “Family resemblance”
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What makes an object more or less prototypical?
Task: “For each of the following objects, list as many characteristics and attributes that you feel are common to these objects.” “Dog” Four legs, barks, fur, chases cats, tail… “Deer” Four legs, hooves, fur, eats apples, tail… “Whale” Swims in ocean, baleen, blow hole… Conclusions: – Strong positive relationship between prototypicality and family resemblance – When items share many features with other items in the category, the family resemblance of these items is high, and they are rated more prototypical – They share characteristic features |
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Smith et al. (1974) “Typicality effect”
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Does prototypicality affect (RT) performance?
• Task: Sentence verification technique Conclusion: – Typicality effect: prototypical objects are processed preferentially – Highly prototypical objects judged more rapidly Respond “yes” if the sentence is true, “no” if it is false An apple is a fruit. A pomegranate is a fruit. |
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Mervis et al. (1976) “Naming”
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Does prototypicality affect naming?
• Task: Name as many members of a category as possible. • Result: – More prototypical members of a category are named before less prototypical members Bird: robin, cardinal, raven, sparrow, seagull, ostrich, penguin |
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Rosch (1975b) “Priming”
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Does prototypicality affect priming?
• Task: 1. Hear a color word 2. Make a same/different judgment about two colored discs Conclusion: When participants heard “green” they brought to mind the prototype for the color green. This acted as a better prime for stimuli that matched the prototype well |
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Exemplars
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Exemplars
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Cognitive economy
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Shared properties are only
stored at higher‐level nodes |
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Inheritance
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Lower‐level items share
properties of higher‐level items (e.g. a robin has feathers) |
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Semantic Network
Collins & Quillian (1969) |
Prediction:
The time it takes to retrieve information about a concept should depend on the distance in the network. Shorter = faster. true |
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Semantic Network
Meyer & Schvaneveldt (1971) Spreading activation |
Semantic Network
Meyer & Schvaneveldt (1971) |
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Lexical decision task
spreading activation |
If activation spreads from the first word
to the associated word, then it should be primed, and RT should be faster than for the unassociated word, which won’t be primed. RT for the second word is faster when it is semantically related to the first word. |
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Problems with semantic network model
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links can be longer or shorter depending no how closely related they are.
connects also doe not need to follow a heirarchy |
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Collins & Loftus (1975)
Updated semantic network model: |
1. Links can be shorter or longer
2. No strict hierarchical structure 3. Existence and strength of links depend on individual experience |
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Evidence of categorization by single neurons?
Freedman et al. (2003) Monkey tests |
Trained monkeys to categorize ambiguous
stimuli as “dog” or “cat”: Conclusion: – There are individual neurons that help distinguish between categories – Different neurons involved in representing categories during different stages of processing (e.g. perception versus working memory) |
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How are concepts distributed in the brain?
Martin et al. (1996) |
How are concepts distributed in the brain?
Martin et al. (1996) Objects > nonsense objects Found distributed network across many parts of the brain. Animals > tools More activation in visual processing areas in occipital lobe. Tools > animals More activation in motor planning areas in frontal lobe. Conclusions: – Concepts seem to be represented in part based on salient properties (e.g. uses for tools and appearance for animals). – Similar concepts represented by similar brain areas (e.g. occipital lobe for animals, frontal lobe for tools). |
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Encoding Specificity
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We learn information together with its
environmental context |
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State‐Dependent Learning
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Learning is associated with a particular
internal state Eich & Metcalfe (1989) • Used happy or sad music to induce a mood before studying Better memory if person’s mood at encoding matches mood during retrieval |
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Transfer‐appropriate processing
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Learning is associated with the process used
to encode the information Morris et al. (1977) – Varied the level of processing using different encoding tasks… Memory is enhanced if the encoding process is similar to the retrieval process |
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