Jones’ proposition of both approaches intertwining, she states, can be shown through an ethnographical method. She claims this method can further show how liberal social engineering has been incorporated and used in society, specifically in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where she carried out fifteen months of fieldwork. Jones explains how the UAE is a country of rich rentier state leaders, who would normally have strong incentives not to push citizens to think to think or work very hard, let alone reflect critically (pg 25). Thus, she proposes, why is this not the case? Why are state leaders complying with liberal social engineering? The reason for this, Jones states, is state leaders criticize themselves for not being more liberal, which roots in their own experiences in the West, not in self gain (pg 25). Although liberalizing is commonly associated with liberal democratic regimes, it is possible to imagine it “divorced from that end” (pg 27). Thus, Jones mentions, over the last ten years, UAE leaders have been promoting education to increase open-mindedness, creativity, and individualism (pg 27). For example, the Education Vision 2020 from 1999 is when education reforms began. UAE autocratic officials called for a shift from “memorization to creativity, reflection, imagination and innovation” (pg 28). As a result, Jones has used an interpretive approach in her article. There is no specific cause to her liberal social engineering. Although it is present in the UAE through means of education, this is only one example. It is not a cause-effect relationship for all authoritarian regimes, nor is it generalizable because it is only one specific example – it cannot be applied across a range of cases. It does not mean that all authoritarian regimes will have this type of education, nor does it mean that other liberal components can be applied to all authoritarian regimes. Thus, there
Jones’ proposition of both approaches intertwining, she states, can be shown through an ethnographical method. She claims this method can further show how liberal social engineering has been incorporated and used in society, specifically in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where she carried out fifteen months of fieldwork. Jones explains how the UAE is a country of rich rentier state leaders, who would normally have strong incentives not to push citizens to think to think or work very hard, let alone reflect critically (pg 25). Thus, she proposes, why is this not the case? Why are state leaders complying with liberal social engineering? The reason for this, Jones states, is state leaders criticize themselves for not being more liberal, which roots in their own experiences in the West, not in self gain (pg 25). Although liberalizing is commonly associated with liberal democratic regimes, it is possible to imagine it “divorced from that end” (pg 27). Thus, Jones mentions, over the last ten years, UAE leaders have been promoting education to increase open-mindedness, creativity, and individualism (pg 27). For example, the Education Vision 2020 from 1999 is when education reforms began. UAE autocratic officials called for a shift from “memorization to creativity, reflection, imagination and innovation” (pg 28). As a result, Jones has used an interpretive approach in her article. There is no specific cause to her liberal social engineering. Although it is present in the UAE through means of education, this is only one example. It is not a cause-effect relationship for all authoritarian regimes, nor is it generalizable because it is only one specific example – it cannot be applied across a range of cases. It does not mean that all authoritarian regimes will have this type of education, nor does it mean that other liberal components can be applied to all authoritarian regimes. Thus, there