In examining Rawl’s theory of justice, and the supposed “original-position” which Rawls takes to be the starting point for its conception, the question becomes: “who” amongst all the diversity of human beings in the world exists in that position? Who, in other words, is ever truly at the place to begin a discourse on justice, as applies to all human beings? And in considering the contrary view of Mills to that original position—who gets left out? Who is denied access to the talking circles which enframe a notion of social justice ‘for all’? This brings to light the notion of ‘equality’ in the establishment of a social contract, of which Mills is especially suspicious, and Rawls takes for granted.
If we are to ask how Mills would make sense of the abstract, theoretical ‘equality’ which Rawls espouses, we could perhaps have to first examine the ‘original position’ of the supposed equality that Rawls describes: “…the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair …show more content…
That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions define the principles of just as those which rational person concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies” (Rawls,