In the case of the rose, we label them collectively as “the smell of the rose” though there are two components to this label, the first being the sensation within the perceiver 's mind and the second being the property of the rose perceived as an effect of that sensation. He terms these respectively “the sign” and “the thing signified.” Although the two components are distinct from one another, their simultaneous occurrence leads us to believe they are the same. (Reid 28) This claim further supports Reid 's insistence that perception is direct. If sensation is spontaneous, then its corresponding perception must be immediate rather than the end result of a chain of reasoning. Helmholtz is in obvious disagreement about the relationship between sensation and perception, given his belief that the former term indicates something physical and the latter something psychological. He argues for their separability by appealing to perceptual illusions. When we clearly experience a sensation and are at the same time aware that it has an unusual or unnatural cause, we still are unable force our mind to cease the sensation we initially experienced. (Helmholtz 46) If sensation and perception always correlate, as Reid holds, Helmholtz might argue that the mind should be unable to recognize the illusory nature of the sensation because, or there should be no unusual sensation without the perception of a quality in the object that causes
In the case of the rose, we label them collectively as “the smell of the rose” though there are two components to this label, the first being the sensation within the perceiver 's mind and the second being the property of the rose perceived as an effect of that sensation. He terms these respectively “the sign” and “the thing signified.” Although the two components are distinct from one another, their simultaneous occurrence leads us to believe they are the same. (Reid 28) This claim further supports Reid 's insistence that perception is direct. If sensation is spontaneous, then its corresponding perception must be immediate rather than the end result of a chain of reasoning. Helmholtz is in obvious disagreement about the relationship between sensation and perception, given his belief that the former term indicates something physical and the latter something psychological. He argues for their separability by appealing to perceptual illusions. When we clearly experience a sensation and are at the same time aware that it has an unusual or unnatural cause, we still are unable force our mind to cease the sensation we initially experienced. (Helmholtz 46) If sensation and perception always correlate, as Reid holds, Helmholtz might argue that the mind should be unable to recognize the illusory nature of the sensation because, or there should be no unusual sensation without the perception of a quality in the object that causes