“The Titanic disaster illustrates issues about broadcasting and the limitations of monopolies early in the cycles of technological adaptation. In effect, the Titanic used wireless technology that was rapidly becoming obsolete. Yet American Marconi and its British parent company were notorious for a technological …show more content…
Human eyes and human ears were required to detect the presence of nearby ships, and human eyes and human ears are notoriously limited in their abilities. Which meant that individual vessels were, for the length of their time at sea, effectively isolated from the rest of the world. For the rest of the world, the only way to know whether a vessel had met distress during its journey was its failure to return to shore” (“The Technology That Allowed the Titanic Survivors to Survive”). “Technically, the problem with the Titanic’s radio telegraph system was that Marconi’s “spark” system soaked up virtually all of the frequency bandwidth and created interference for all other ships within signaling distance. As many engineers were realizing at the time, it was far better to use continuous wave radio transmitters (where signals were carried inside the wave) instead of the Marconi intermittent spark transmissions (where wide-spectrum interruptions in the wave were the signal). As Fessenden found, continuous wave radio signal could be “tuned” to allow a variety of frequencies. And it could use shorter wavelength radio transmissions, which carried over long distances by bouncing off the electrically charged outer layer of the atmosphere called the ionosphere—the region where auroras form. This more modern approach uses the …show more content…
The schoolteacher rightly concluded the liner was in serious trouble and its only salvation lay in another ship close by. From the bridge, Quartermaster George Rowe was launching salvos of white distress rockets five minute apart. Rising 300 feet above the masts and rigging, the projectiles burst into showers of bright stars echoing with a thunderous roar. Through his binoculars, Fourth Officer Joseph Boxhall clearly saw the lights of a steamer five miles off the port bow. He asked himself why wouldn't they come? That was the burning question for the two sailors. Even the morse lamp solicited no response from the mysterious vessel. “On the other side of the ice field that the Titanic had sailed into, the S.S. Californian had stopped for the night. Its master, Captain Stanley Lord declined to negotiate the six-mile wide field in the dark. He would wait until sunrise but ordered his radio man, who was soon signing off for the evening, to notify nearby ships of the danger. After 11 p.m., the Californian's bridge officers spotted a ship about five miles distant. An attempt to reach them by morse lamp got no response. At 12:45 a.m., April 15, 1912, Second Officer Herbert Stone saw the flicker of rockets in the far distance. However, the ship he was observing appeared to be in no danger. For decades thereafter, Captain Lord was condemned as the man who failed to rush to the Titanic's aid. While