President Carter negotiated the Accords with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat, which set the framework for the Middle East peace process, set a precedent for two states Palestine and Israel, and ultimately marked the legacy of Carter as the President. A stable and an unwavering Middle East was the focal point of the Carter administration’s main diplomatic mission. With the diminishing influence of the Soviet Union, Carter saw this as an opportunity to hopefully pave a way for democracy in the entire Middle East and spread the words of freedom and free will (Perry 1). Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, met and negotiated with individual Arab leaders and Israeli politicians (Quandt 1). To
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Carter knew the severity to resolve the issue at any cost. This is significant because if the issue was not resolved United States would lose its closest ally in the Middle East and major trading partners. Carter was aware of the response of the OPEC countries ( consisting mostly of Arab nations), which announced an oil embargo that led to drastic upheaval in the economy, due to the American involvement in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Stein 2). Such involvement almost led to a direct confrontation between two of the nuclear superpowers; the United States support for Israel and Soviet Union support for Arab coalition. In the winter of 1977, the then President of Egypt, Anwar al- Sadat, made a dramatic move by publicly considering a visit to Jerusalem to hopefully resolve the longing problem between the Arab world and the Israeli. Sadat would try to overcome the stalemate by engaging with the Israeli openly for a foreseeable Middle East solution. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem steered immediate talks between Egypt and Israel, however, it failed to finalize a concrete solution. Following the events Carter and his administration reappeared on the forefront of the …show more content…
Considering the proposal, Israel agreed about the Sinai Peninsula while expressing different views about the West Bank and the Gaza. Following the disagreement, Sadat grew frustrated and expressed dissatisfaction as well as showing the want to cut all talks with Israel. Sensing a major conflict, Carter “decided to invite both Begin and Sadat to Camp David”, (Carter 45). This is significant because Carter wanted to prove the world that America was able to resolve conflicts through diplomacy rather than war. As he states, “My next act was almost one of desperation”, (Carter 45) Carter saw no other option than bringing the two faces; charismatic Sadat and conservative Begin to the same table. Both leaders accepted the invitation and on September 4th, 1978 the three parties began, “what evolved into a thirteen-day session”, (Carter 46). Carter’s aim was to have “Israelis and Egyptians understand and accept the compatibility of many of their goals and the advantages to both nations in resolving their differences”, (Carter 45). After realizing that Sadat and Begin were personally impossible to work together, Carter decided to work with their representative separately. The talks included over a variety of issues: Israeli withdrawal from the
Carter knew the severity to resolve the issue at any cost. This is significant because if the issue was not resolved United States would lose its closest ally in the Middle East and major trading partners. Carter was aware of the response of the OPEC countries ( consisting mostly of Arab nations), which announced an oil embargo that led to drastic upheaval in the economy, due to the American involvement in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Stein 2). Such involvement almost led to a direct confrontation between two of the nuclear superpowers; the United States support for Israel and Soviet Union support for Arab coalition. In the winter of 1977, the then President of Egypt, Anwar al- Sadat, made a dramatic move by publicly considering a visit to Jerusalem to hopefully resolve the longing problem between the Arab world and the Israeli. Sadat would try to overcome the stalemate by engaging with the Israeli openly for a foreseeable Middle East solution. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem steered immediate talks between Egypt and Israel, however, it failed to finalize a concrete solution. Following the events Carter and his administration reappeared on the forefront of the …show more content…
Considering the proposal, Israel agreed about the Sinai Peninsula while expressing different views about the West Bank and the Gaza. Following the disagreement, Sadat grew frustrated and expressed dissatisfaction as well as showing the want to cut all talks with Israel. Sensing a major conflict, Carter “decided to invite both Begin and Sadat to Camp David”, (Carter 45). This is significant because Carter wanted to prove the world that America was able to resolve conflicts through diplomacy rather than war. As he states, “My next act was almost one of desperation”, (Carter 45) Carter saw no other option than bringing the two faces; charismatic Sadat and conservative Begin to the same table. Both leaders accepted the invitation and on September 4th, 1978 the three parties began, “what evolved into a thirteen-day session”, (Carter 46). Carter’s aim was to have “Israelis and Egyptians understand and accept the compatibility of many of their goals and the advantages to both nations in resolving their differences”, (Carter 45). After realizing that Sadat and Begin were personally impossible to work together, Carter decided to work with their representative separately. The talks included over a variety of issues: Israeli withdrawal from the