As the statue of Saddam Hussein was dragged down by an American armored vehicle, Iraqis cheered “Thank you very much,” holding signs that read “Thank You USA” (Losing Iraq 2014). As Col. R. Alan King recounted in PBS Frontline’s documentary Losing Iraq (2014), he remembers thinking “This might just work.” Unfortunately, these early signs of success towards a stable Iraqi government would not continue. Losing Iraq chronicles the mismanagement of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the instability that was created, and how that ultimately lead to the rise of terrorism in the region. This story of a failed endeavor by a world superpower demonstrates the complications of a lack of social cohesion among religious groups when power is shifting,
…show more content…
found that traditional hard power could be detrimental to their objectives. When the insurgency was initially increasing in Iraq, the U.S. “had absolutely no intelligence” (Losing Iraq 2014). The military commanders didn’t know who there were fighting or what resources they had, and they were under pressure to find out so that they could successfully repel the insurgency. The result was that they used hard power to gather up mostly innocent Iraqis and used interrogation techniques like those at Guantanamo Bay in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq shows how “The biggest single tactical mistake was to stuff Abu Ghraib with tens of thousands of Iraqis, who may have been neutral about the Americans when they went in, but weren’t when they came out” (Losing Iraq 2014). The unintended consequence was that in the search for intelligence, the U.S. increased anti-american sentiment from the Iraqis. Terrorist organizations were able to use the brutality in the prison to gain supporters (Danner 2009). Basically, the terrorists used the hard power actions of the U.S. as soft power propaganda to attract more recruits. This shows that hard power is not always the most effective strategy, suggesting that Joseph Nye’s idea of “smart power” (Nye 2010), which advocates a combination of hard and soft power, would be more …show more content…
set the stage for terrorism. The U.S. wanted to transfer power to the Iraqis, and when the U.S. was able to arrange an election, there was an impressive voter turnout. However, the Sunnis boycotted the election (Eisendrath 2014), an unanticipated consequence of social disunity. From the point of view of the people overseeing the operation, “Everybody understood very quickly that we’d elected a government that divided the country. Beneath this political structure there was a virtual vacuum” (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq traces how the less involved the United States was with the Iraqi government, the more secular it became, further increasing the divides between the Sunnis and Shiites. Once the United States withdrew forces in 2011, the Shiite control of the government “was a catalyst to give the Sunnis a renewed sense that they once again didn’t have seat at the table in their country” (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq shows that this secular divide, in conjunction with the actions by the U.S. that pushed Iraqis towards extremism and terrorism, and further exacerbated by a lack of powerful military or police force after the U.S. withdrew from the region is what allowed the Islamic state to gain a stronghold in the region. This gives important insight into how to approach the eradication of terrorist organizations. In Iraq, a weak, partisan political structure led to increased
found that traditional hard power could be detrimental to their objectives. When the insurgency was initially increasing in Iraq, the U.S. “had absolutely no intelligence” (Losing Iraq 2014). The military commanders didn’t know who there were fighting or what resources they had, and they were under pressure to find out so that they could successfully repel the insurgency. The result was that they used hard power to gather up mostly innocent Iraqis and used interrogation techniques like those at Guantanamo Bay in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq shows how “The biggest single tactical mistake was to stuff Abu Ghraib with tens of thousands of Iraqis, who may have been neutral about the Americans when they went in, but weren’t when they came out” (Losing Iraq 2014). The unintended consequence was that in the search for intelligence, the U.S. increased anti-american sentiment from the Iraqis. Terrorist organizations were able to use the brutality in the prison to gain supporters (Danner 2009). Basically, the terrorists used the hard power actions of the U.S. as soft power propaganda to attract more recruits. This shows that hard power is not always the most effective strategy, suggesting that Joseph Nye’s idea of “smart power” (Nye 2010), which advocates a combination of hard and soft power, would be more …show more content…
set the stage for terrorism. The U.S. wanted to transfer power to the Iraqis, and when the U.S. was able to arrange an election, there was an impressive voter turnout. However, the Sunnis boycotted the election (Eisendrath 2014), an unanticipated consequence of social disunity. From the point of view of the people overseeing the operation, “Everybody understood very quickly that we’d elected a government that divided the country. Beneath this political structure there was a virtual vacuum” (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq traces how the less involved the United States was with the Iraqi government, the more secular it became, further increasing the divides between the Sunnis and Shiites. Once the United States withdrew forces in 2011, the Shiite control of the government “was a catalyst to give the Sunnis a renewed sense that they once again didn’t have seat at the table in their country” (Losing Iraq 2014). Losing Iraq shows that this secular divide, in conjunction with the actions by the U.S. that pushed Iraqis towards extremism and terrorism, and further exacerbated by a lack of powerful military or police force after the U.S. withdrew from the region is what allowed the Islamic state to gain a stronghold in the region. This gives important insight into how to approach the eradication of terrorist organizations. In Iraq, a weak, partisan political structure led to increased