Changes in the company may be hindered by complacency and conformity which can be detrimental to success and in some cases, it can be fatal. The space shuttle Columbia disaster on 2003 may have been caused by complacent leaders who are driven by objectives and disregarded safety. Complacency and conformity are the main factors of the Columbia shuttle disaster. Management was complacent with current processes as evidence of poor leadership, communication, and initiative to change. Complacency is a silent killer without any symptoms and accountability may prevent complacency (Wilson, 2012). Recognizing the need for change as a consequence of varying pressures perhaps is the prerequisite that necessitates organizational modification or transformation.
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NASA addressed their changes as if it was a first order of change with minor adjustments rather than reengineering their processes and perspectives to avoid future failures. The second order of change was imperative where decentralization of safety programs may have been best resolved with centralized execution to circumvent safety miscommunication. Outsourcing the safety program was a costly error. Management’s organizational vision change should have applied to their core values, structure, processes, and communication. The Challenger’s aftermath precipitated an unsuccessful change and manifested in the loss of lives for those in space shuttle …show more content…
The initial investigation that surfaced from the Challenger should have been a learning opportunity which would have avoided Columbia’s fatal crash. Project planning should have included redesign of management roles where new management may link their decisions based on data and eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy particularly in terms of safety. NASA’s change implementation included development of vision and communication; however, it stopped there. Kotter’s eight-step change management models included empowerment of staff, ensure short-term wins, consolidate gains and embedded the change in the culture (Palmer, Dunford, & Akin, 2009) were all nonexistent from NASA’s change implementation. Engineers were pushed hard with smaller staff due to downsizing and while maintaining their launch
NASA addressed their changes as if it was a first order of change with minor adjustments rather than reengineering their processes and perspectives to avoid future failures. The second order of change was imperative where decentralization of safety programs may have been best resolved with centralized execution to circumvent safety miscommunication. Outsourcing the safety program was a costly error. Management’s organizational vision change should have applied to their core values, structure, processes, and communication. The Challenger’s aftermath precipitated an unsuccessful change and manifested in the loss of lives for those in space shuttle …show more content…
The initial investigation that surfaced from the Challenger should have been a learning opportunity which would have avoided Columbia’s fatal crash. Project planning should have included redesign of management roles where new management may link their decisions based on data and eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy particularly in terms of safety. NASA’s change implementation included development of vision and communication; however, it stopped there. Kotter’s eight-step change management models included empowerment of staff, ensure short-term wins, consolidate gains and embedded the change in the culture (Palmer, Dunford, & Akin, 2009) were all nonexistent from NASA’s change implementation. Engineers were pushed hard with smaller staff due to downsizing and while maintaining their launch