Masco writes, “The notions of preemption and emergency response that inform the George W. Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ derive meaning from the promises and institutions built by the Cold War security state” (387), suggesting that Bush’s administration studied and adopted the tactics used by the government in the Cold War era for its own ends during the War on terror. He goes on to argue that while the attacks on September 11 on New York City, which ushered in the newest wave of counter-terrorism, were nonnuclear, the messages released by the government in its aftermath were translated “into the emotional equivalent of the Cold War nuclear crisis” (388). This suggests that while the nature of the threats against the United States has changed since the Cold War era, the government’s message about threats have essentially remained
Masco writes, “The notions of preemption and emergency response that inform the George W. Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ derive meaning from the promises and institutions built by the Cold War security state” (387), suggesting that Bush’s administration studied and adopted the tactics used by the government in the Cold War era for its own ends during the War on terror. He goes on to argue that while the attacks on September 11 on New York City, which ushered in the newest wave of counter-terrorism, were nonnuclear, the messages released by the government in its aftermath were translated “into the emotional equivalent of the Cold War nuclear crisis” (388). This suggests that while the nature of the threats against the United States has changed since the Cold War era, the government’s message about threats have essentially remained