ID: 3031785238
1. In Smart’s paper Sensations and Brain Processes, he introduces the “identity theory” in which he states that mental states are physical states of the brain. This stems from physicalism, the idea that mind is the interior cause of behavior and mental states are biochemical processes in the brain.1 Smart would consider identity statements, such as “pain is the firing of C-fibers” as contingently true. Smart argues that the statement “pain is the firing of C-fibers” is contingently true because it is possible to conceive of worlds where pain is not caused by C-fibers firing; a contingently true statement is one where the statement is true in some worlds but not all. He goes on to say that when dealing with objects A and B, if …show more content…
Kripke coins the phrases of “rigid” and “non-rigid” designators in his attempt to evaluate the structure of identity statements. A rigid designator is one that points out the same possible object in all possible worlds in which the object exists and can never refer to anything else. An example of a non-rigid designator would be a name—Benjamin Franklin refers to the person Benjamin Franklin, whether he achieved any of his accomplishments or not. What this goes on to mean, is that even in possible worlds where Benjamin Franklin was not the inventor of the bifocal glasses, he was still Benjamin
Franklin. The term non-rigid designator is one that picks out different objects based on properties of their own being which are nonessential to what they are. For example, the phrase “the inventor of bifocal glasses” is a non-rigid designator because in our world
Benjamin Franklin fits this role and has this property, but it is possible to conceive of other worlds where someone else, say George Washington, may have fit this property. In Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity he goes on to prove that identity statements must be necessarily …show more content…
A premise in Thomas Nagel’s What Is It Like To Be A Bat is that physicalism is not an effective way to explain the mind. Physicalism is the idea that mind is the interior cause of behavior and mental states are biochemical processes in the brain.4 There is a reductionist kind of argument that goes into physicalism that reduces all behavior to corresponding states of the brain. This view makes sense of what we don’t know—how others minds may work—and puts it into terms that we would understand—in terms of our own thought and processes. However, there is a problem with physicalism as a view.
It does not take into account the subjective account of experiences, or qualia, that one goes through and how they differ from person to person (or even from species to species).
Furthermore, physicalism fails to account for qualia by generalizing the experience as linked to a mental state. Nagel goes on to say that physicalist theory cannot be used as an effective explanation for consciousness and the origin of mental states if the underlying theory did not take into account for qualia. This is because the theory attempts to include the subjective character of experience without having included room for it in theory
1. In Smart’s paper Sensations and Brain Processes, he introduces the “identity theory” in which he states that mental states are physical states of the brain. This stems from physicalism, the idea that mind is the interior cause of behavior and mental states are biochemical processes in the brain.1 Smart would consider identity statements, such as “pain is the firing of C-fibers” as contingently true. Smart argues that the statement “pain is the firing of C-fibers” is contingently true because it is possible to conceive of worlds where pain is not caused by C-fibers firing; a contingently true statement is one where the statement is true in some worlds but not all. He goes on to say that when dealing with objects A and B, if …show more content…
Kripke coins the phrases of “rigid” and “non-rigid” designators in his attempt to evaluate the structure of identity statements. A rigid designator is one that points out the same possible object in all possible worlds in which the object exists and can never refer to anything else. An example of a non-rigid designator would be a name—Benjamin Franklin refers to the person Benjamin Franklin, whether he achieved any of his accomplishments or not. What this goes on to mean, is that even in possible worlds where Benjamin Franklin was not the inventor of the bifocal glasses, he was still Benjamin
Franklin. The term non-rigid designator is one that picks out different objects based on properties of their own being which are nonessential to what they are. For example, the phrase “the inventor of bifocal glasses” is a non-rigid designator because in our world
Benjamin Franklin fits this role and has this property, but it is possible to conceive of other worlds where someone else, say George Washington, may have fit this property. In Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity he goes on to prove that identity statements must be necessarily …show more content…
A premise in Thomas Nagel’s What Is It Like To Be A Bat is that physicalism is not an effective way to explain the mind. Physicalism is the idea that mind is the interior cause of behavior and mental states are biochemical processes in the brain.4 There is a reductionist kind of argument that goes into physicalism that reduces all behavior to corresponding states of the brain. This view makes sense of what we don’t know—how others minds may work—and puts it into terms that we would understand—in terms of our own thought and processes. However, there is a problem with physicalism as a view.
It does not take into account the subjective account of experiences, or qualia, that one goes through and how they differ from person to person (or even from species to species).
Furthermore, physicalism fails to account for qualia by generalizing the experience as linked to a mental state. Nagel goes on to say that physicalist theory cannot be used as an effective explanation for consciousness and the origin of mental states if the underlying theory did not take into account for qualia. This is because the theory attempts to include the subjective character of experience without having included room for it in theory