If not looked at and evaluated within context, such offenders would feel as if any improvement would be fruitless. He then goes on to say that we should thus distribute blame accordingly to incentivize “the worst offenders to get better” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p.298). Arguably, what he is suggesting should perhaps be the case if the effects of climate change (caused by said “offenders”) affected everyone equally, but that is simply not the reality of climate change. Again, impoverished areas (where gas-guzzling joyrides are not usual) are disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change. In other words, these “offenders”—both those that are contributing ‘no’ worse and ‘much’ worse than average—are affected less by the effects of climate change despite their disproportionate contribution compared to those doing absolutely nothing (i.e. contributing zero to minimal emissions) due to their socioeconomic condition. To suggest that we should give these offenders an incentive seems to render the harm brought to those in disportaintaly (and, arguably, unfairly) affected areas as valueless and unimportant—or at least Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument does not seem to consider these harms in the calculus of what offenders contribute to. Because he fails to consider the true nature of how people are …show more content…
This principle states that “[w]e have a moral obligation not to perform an action if this action makes us a member of a group whose actions together cause harm” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005, p.306). Indeed, the collective action of humans emitting carbon emission is causing harm. If I am individually contributing to this collective action, I can thereby be held morally accountable. Put differently, if the group that is pushing the car is collectively responsible for the death of the person trapped inside, I incur some moral liability because I was a part of the collective group. To this, however, Sinnott-Armstrong states that this is only true if the group's intentions are to cause harm. With that in mind, as explained by Robert Audi—a philosopher whose work focuses on epistemology, ethical intuitionism, and the theory of action—intention begins when “desire and belief come together in the way that creates a motivated expectation of behavior” (Audi, 1993, p.29). The desire (want) in this scenario is to go for a Sunday joyride for pleasure; the belief is that this Sunday joyride will create pleasure for myself while simultaneously play a part in the collective action of humans contributing to climate change and causing harm (as I am aware and knowledgeable about the collective harmful effects of carbon emissions). It is important to note that I could very well