Reasons For The Rapid Fall Of France In 1940

For the purpose of this paper I will be explaining the reasons for the rapid fall of France in 1940. Some, if not most, of the attention is given to Hitler’s blitzkrieg style of invasion as a main reason for France’s crushing defeat, but there were many other factors that compounded the devastation that was associated with Hitler’s war on France. As I will highlight, the German advance via the “all new” tank tactics of the time was an extremely devastating driving force that was the tip of the spear but, it should also be noted that France it’s self was a contributor in the downfall that would end up with a German owned Paris. Throughout this paper I will be utilizing many concepts and theories that many in the French ranks had put forth as …show more content…
On one side of the invasion there is the German armed forces, a highly trained and technologically advanced force that was being bolstered by decisive wins before the start of the French invasion. On the other side of the encounter is a bruised and tired French force that was still relying on tactics from World War 1 with the idea that if there is ever going to be a war, it would most certainly be another trench war. While Germany was taking over Europe piece by piece with massively successful tank tactics and an ever changing and improving armored and aerial technology, France decided to dig in and create a line of fortifications known as the Maginot Line to repel a possible attack by a large infantry advance. While the Maginot Line was successful in the areas it was deployed its largest downfall is that it was static with some gaps in places that eventually would be utilized by the Germans in the Battle of France, thus rendering the Maginot Line ineffective. The Maginot Line would become a glaring monument to Frances’ mind set for a defense strategy of the …show more content…
While most of these factors can be argued as being the primary reason for Frances’ failure, nothing did more to hurt the chances of a French defensive than the leadership of the high command. At every turn French leadership was being beaten down, not only did their intelligence fail them to correctly assess Germany’s tank and forces situation but, they made no progress in regards to other deficiencies in their military forces such as their air force. Bloch makes note of the lack of vision the high command showed and referred to this war as a war of intellect, a war the French had clearly