Arguably, adding days to pre-mobilization is not as controversial or even as radical as consolidating training days, given that additional days would only occur in two of the five-year cycle which is a predictable pattern and not a constant requirement. On the other hand, consolidating training to a week or so, every 90 days is a radical approach that challenge the status quo. A bold move such as this one could lead to employers, schools, family, personnel, and perhaps political frictions. Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, RC soldiers voluntarily join for many reasons. Their voluntary status as RC Soldiers indicates they generally do not want the high operational tempo of the AC or taking additional time away from their civilian
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Personnel is the number one driver of readiness and the biggest challenge across the Army. This is a different argument than being away, this is about availability across the board. Enforcement of accountability, standards and discipline are even more paramount in an RC unit because of the major challenges with personnel. More often than not RC units do not reach full collective readiness due to the lack of personnel availability in major collective training events that have cascading effects all the way through mobilization. The RC leadership is challenged to meet 85% or better of their manning requirements during annual training and reaching required manning levels in sufficient time prior to mobilization to achieve 100% certification of pre-deployment training. Under current policy for sustained operations, it takes two or more RC units to provide the same output as one AC unit. Units may have to cross-level people to bring the deploying unit to standard, creating a domino effect that disrupts personnel and unit readiness and the problem could be magnified depending on the length of the deployment. Regardless of force structure/mix efforts and measures to maintain an operational reserve, all are destined to fail if the RC cannot meet the necessary personnel …show more content…
In order to maintain an operational reserve, RC units must have adequate, stabilized, and available manning throughout the SRM cycle. LTG Tucker, First Army Commanding General, suggested as a possible policy change and potential solution to the RC personnel challenges that, “the RC should plan to man units at a minimum of 85% authorized strength from T/R2 through the available year in order to achieve and sustain platoon and staff level proficiency and reduce post-mobilization training time.” This suggestion certainly does not fix all the personnel challenges associated with the RC structure but does address the immediate minimum unit operational readiness requirements. This is a math problem where the assigned personnel will never equal the available pool due to personnel system restrictions and competing requirements. For instance, Soldiers that attend a military school, as part of their professional military education, are not available for training because both requirements compete for the same yearly allocated pre-mobilization training days. However, those Soldiers count against the aggregate numbers assigned in which no backfill can be authorized, potentially resulting in a less than optimal manning numbers during collective training events. The aforementioned example compounded with recruiting and
Personnel is the number one driver of readiness and the biggest challenge across the Army. This is a different argument than being away, this is about availability across the board. Enforcement of accountability, standards and discipline are even more paramount in an RC unit because of the major challenges with personnel. More often than not RC units do not reach full collective readiness due to the lack of personnel availability in major collective training events that have cascading effects all the way through mobilization. The RC leadership is challenged to meet 85% or better of their manning requirements during annual training and reaching required manning levels in sufficient time prior to mobilization to achieve 100% certification of pre-deployment training. Under current policy for sustained operations, it takes two or more RC units to provide the same output as one AC unit. Units may have to cross-level people to bring the deploying unit to standard, creating a domino effect that disrupts personnel and unit readiness and the problem could be magnified depending on the length of the deployment. Regardless of force structure/mix efforts and measures to maintain an operational reserve, all are destined to fail if the RC cannot meet the necessary personnel …show more content…
In order to maintain an operational reserve, RC units must have adequate, stabilized, and available manning throughout the SRM cycle. LTG Tucker, First Army Commanding General, suggested as a possible policy change and potential solution to the RC personnel challenges that, “the RC should plan to man units at a minimum of 85% authorized strength from T/R2 through the available year in order to achieve and sustain platoon and staff level proficiency and reduce post-mobilization training time.” This suggestion certainly does not fix all the personnel challenges associated with the RC structure but does address the immediate minimum unit operational readiness requirements. This is a math problem where the assigned personnel will never equal the available pool due to personnel system restrictions and competing requirements. For instance, Soldiers that attend a military school, as part of their professional military education, are not available for training because both requirements compete for the same yearly allocated pre-mobilization training days. However, those Soldiers count against the aggregate numbers assigned in which no backfill can be authorized, potentially resulting in a less than optimal manning numbers during collective training events. The aforementioned example compounded with recruiting and