Among accounts of what it is that defines a person, two positions stand as rivals. There are arguments that assert that personal identity is purely biological, while other philosophers push that there is something more than the mere body that makes a person who they are. In this paper, I will argue that Eric Olson’s thinking-animal problem does not entail a leap from psychological to biological accounts of personal identity, on the grounds that Lynne Rudder-Baker’s Not-So-Simple Simple view of personal identity evades his objection. In attempting to refute psychological accounts of personal identity, Eric Olson offers “The Thinking-Animal Problem.” Olson begins his argument by asserting that for each human person there would appear to
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He claims that it “does nothing to solve the thinking-animal problem” for its conclusion “would be just as surprising as it would be if they (the body) could not think at all” (34-35). However, though Olson finds her argument as beyond complex consideration within his discussion, I am not convinced that her account should be ignored. Rudder-Baker’s allowance of the human body (or some comparable mechanism that can support the first-person perspective) as a necessary feature of personal identity explains why we see “human animals walking the earth” (149; 29). Furthermore, under her view, it is not the psychological contents that make a person, but the ability to regard one as oneself. This characteristic allows her view to escape the problem because the significant difference between the body and the person is not mental contents but the exemplification of the first person perspective. The body may have the capacity to exemplify this perspective, but it is not the capacity alone that is the essence of a person. Rather, it is thoughts such as “I believe I am hungry” or “I hope I don’t cry” that define a person. Therefore, because Rudder-Baker’s account evades the thinking-animal problem, Olson’s argument leaves open the possibility that the biological account of personal identity may not be the best available
He claims that it “does nothing to solve the thinking-animal problem” for its conclusion “would be just as surprising as it would be if they (the body) could not think at all” (34-35). However, though Olson finds her argument as beyond complex consideration within his discussion, I am not convinced that her account should be ignored. Rudder-Baker’s allowance of the human body (or some comparable mechanism that can support the first-person perspective) as a necessary feature of personal identity explains why we see “human animals walking the earth” (149; 29). Furthermore, under her view, it is not the psychological contents that make a person, but the ability to regard one as oneself. This characteristic allows her view to escape the problem because the significant difference between the body and the person is not mental contents but the exemplification of the first person perspective. The body may have the capacity to exemplify this perspective, but it is not the capacity alone that is the essence of a person. Rather, it is thoughts such as “I believe I am hungry” or “I hope I don’t cry” that define a person. Therefore, because Rudder-Baker’s account evades the thinking-animal problem, Olson’s argument leaves open the possibility that the biological account of personal identity may not be the best available