The intentions of Soviet missiles could have been either offensive or defensive; even modern historians remain unsure of Khrushchev’s intentions with the missiles. By positioning missiles in Cuba, the Soviets could plausibly argue that they were merely a defensive measure to balance the placement of American missiles in Eastern Europe (declared defensive by the Americans). America, however, perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as an offensive maneuver. For the Americans to trust the Soviets’ defensive explanation required the US to accept tremendous risk. Additionally, both nations had reversed promises, leaving pervading attitude of mistrust between the two superpowers. Since neither side trusted the other’s “defensive” intentions by missiles near the other, the crisis necessitated negation and concessions to resolve and reduce
The intentions of Soviet missiles could have been either offensive or defensive; even modern historians remain unsure of Khrushchev’s intentions with the missiles. By positioning missiles in Cuba, the Soviets could plausibly argue that they were merely a defensive measure to balance the placement of American missiles in Eastern Europe (declared defensive by the Americans). America, however, perceived Soviet missiles in Cuba as an offensive maneuver. For the Americans to trust the Soviets’ defensive explanation required the US to accept tremendous risk. Additionally, both nations had reversed promises, leaving pervading attitude of mistrust between the two superpowers. Since neither side trusted the other’s “defensive” intentions by missiles near the other, the crisis necessitated negation and concessions to resolve and reduce