Strategic decisions made on both sides presented Fighter Command with the victory and ensured that they did not come close to defeat. Germany suffered from ‘fog of war ‘and was clearly not prepared for the battle ahead; arrogantly predicting to overcome the RAF in a matter of days with a false sense of superiority after success in France; and misjudging RAF aircraft force. The Luftwaffe started the battle with 2830 aircraft, made up of fighters, bombers and stuka dive bombers. The RAF comprised of 650 operational aircraft with 1434 aircrew spread over 52 squadrons.
Post ‘The Battle of France’ the RAF were tactically well prepared. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding had already sustained heavy casualties at Dunkirk and refused to send further …show more content…
Between July 10 – August 7 the Luftwaffe lost 192 aircraft compared to 70 RAF. The Luftwaffe strategy restricted engagement with RAF fighter aircraft to protect the slow bomber aircraft; a weakness that Fighter Command capitalised on. Dowding’s strategy included orders that enemy aircraft only be engaged to uncover bomber aircraft and that bombers were priority for attack before they could drop their payload. He encouraged head on attacks with larger aircraft escorts to open the vulnerabilities of the German bomber aircraft.
Between August 8- August 15 Germany flew1786 sorties losing 75 aircraft compared to 53 RAF. This was phase 2 of the battle which main objective under preparation for Operation Sealion was to destroy coastal defence, troop reserves and communications. This was an area where German strategy proved to be particularly effective by concentrated attacks on Fighter Command airfields and radar stations using short dive bomb attacks and tactical formations built on experience fighting in the Spanish Civil …show more content…
Dowding knew this and had already began developing a substantial means of communications. He used the Defence Teleprinter Network; a system of teleprinter lines that had been buried underground before the war had begun and distributed vital information between squadrons and command. Dowding built his sector stations along the main routes of these lines for mass effect using miles of telephone cables linking operations rooms to the stations. Radar stations around the coasts of the UK used newly developed short wave radio pulses designed to detect height, range, bearing and strength of the aircraft, up to around 80 miles depending on skill, experience and judgement of the observer. Observation Corps were established to look for enemy aircraft on approach once the enemy aircraft had reached the shore and a Chain Home Low station established to detect low flying
Post ‘The Battle of France’ the RAF were tactically well prepared. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding had already sustained heavy casualties at Dunkirk and refused to send further …show more content…
Between July 10 – August 7 the Luftwaffe lost 192 aircraft compared to 70 RAF. The Luftwaffe strategy restricted engagement with RAF fighter aircraft to protect the slow bomber aircraft; a weakness that Fighter Command capitalised on. Dowding’s strategy included orders that enemy aircraft only be engaged to uncover bomber aircraft and that bombers were priority for attack before they could drop their payload. He encouraged head on attacks with larger aircraft escorts to open the vulnerabilities of the German bomber aircraft.
Between August 8- August 15 Germany flew1786 sorties losing 75 aircraft compared to 53 RAF. This was phase 2 of the battle which main objective under preparation for Operation Sealion was to destroy coastal defence, troop reserves and communications. This was an area where German strategy proved to be particularly effective by concentrated attacks on Fighter Command airfields and radar stations using short dive bomb attacks and tactical formations built on experience fighting in the Spanish Civil …show more content…
Dowding knew this and had already began developing a substantial means of communications. He used the Defence Teleprinter Network; a system of teleprinter lines that had been buried underground before the war had begun and distributed vital information between squadrons and command. Dowding built his sector stations along the main routes of these lines for mass effect using miles of telephone cables linking operations rooms to the stations. Radar stations around the coasts of the UK used newly developed short wave radio pulses designed to detect height, range, bearing and strength of the aircraft, up to around 80 miles depending on skill, experience and judgement of the observer. Observation Corps were established to look for enemy aircraft on approach once the enemy aircraft had reached the shore and a Chain Home Low station established to detect low flying