Communication In Operation Anaconda

COMMUNICATIONS EFFECT ON OPERATION ANACONDA In any team effort communication will always be the most important factor towards success. During Operation Anaconda there were many hurdles faced in regards to communication. Multiple units and allied forces with different methods and command chains had to work in cohesion on short notice and in an extremely stressful situation. Operation Anaconda faced communication difficulties in both the execution and the planning of the mission. The planning of Operation Anaconda faced communication issues from the very beginning. At first the planning was left up to JSOFT DAGGER but due to the growing nature of the mission and the amount forces that were going to be used the planning was eventually differed …show more content…
Even with varying reports the planners assumed the number to be in the low hundreds and never officially confirmed the number or planned for a larger force. The misinterpretation of enemy forces led to many difficulties that could have been accounted for and dealt with. Joint planning problems was also a recurring hurdle that had no easy solution. While some services were heavily involved in the planning and aware of what was to come, some were left out until last minute. The communication between the different services was never clear and no specific guidelines and single chain of command were never properly placed like they should have been. Black SOF was heavily involved in Operation Anaconda and they had a completely different chain of command then the rest of the allied forces. …show more content…
With the OPORD being published mere days before the execution was to begin the varying agencies struggled to prepare for the mission. In the logistics department they were grossly unprepared for the size of the operation. The amount of aircraft fuel and other essential resources should have been requested and planned for way in advance and not days prior to the mission. If the logistics division was unable to provide for the aircraft and keep them maintained then the entire operation would have been doomed from the start. Even with the OPORD published there was still much confusion between the multiple agencies. Many of the agencies didn’t even know when the execution was actually going to begin. The OPORD should have been clearer and dispersion of this basic information should have been handled to the lowest level. Before the first D day multiple reconnaissance teams were inserted around the valley. They were placed in strategic locations so that they could report enemy movement, size, and activity. Even with the reconnaissance teams in place there was still no concise agreement on the number of opposing soldiers in the valley and in the mountains surrounding. Opening up the first day of execution were air strikes. They began only shortly before the insertion of the bulk force because of the belief that the enemy would most likely scatter and flee after the bombs were