SOSC 11300
Professor Kristyn Hara
Prompt 3
Due May 2, 2015
Kant’s Morality, Nietzsche’s Sickness: One and the Same In On the Genealogy of Morality, Friedrich Nietzsche argues against what he calls “bad conscience” (Nietzsche, 56), or the suppression of instinct. He believes that people should act according to their will to power, an aggressive drive which all humans possess. Restraining themselves from exercising this will to power only causes people to turn its violent demands inward and ultimately hurt themselves. In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant describes his concept of morality. The morality of an action, he says, is contingent not on its content, but on whether it was preformed out of our duty …show more content…
Therefore, the only true categorical imperative – a law which can be represented in an action which is good in itself – is an objective principle: that a rational nature exists as an end in itself (Kant 41). The rational nature, as manifest in human beings, should never only be used as a means to reach a goal. Because the inclinations that rational beings carry bestow all worth, these rational beings are necessarily the entities of greatest worth. They must at all times retain primary importance and permanent status as ends. Since every rational being represents its very existence as the most important end within its existence, this can be said to be a universal principle. This categorical imperative is the source of Kant’s moral philosophy. From it, we can derive whether any specific action is moral or immoral. For example, suicide cannot possibly be counted as moral in this model. In self-murder, a person uses human life as a means to the end of escaping trouble or pain. Humanity is an unalterable end, and rationale prevents us from putting other inclinations over the preservation of our life. In every situation, we must protect the rational nature before taking our other desires into …show more content…
This transition from the domain of nature to the domain of society takes us from a state of freedom to a state in which we live with the constant fear of punishment. Some of our appetites are judged to be intolerable; the actions they suggest are deemed impermissible in society. Laws are made wherein punishments are assigned to these supposedly criminal deeds. The purpose of these punishments is debatable – perhaps it is compensation for the crime, perhaps it is meant to prevent further crimes, perhaps it is a form of festival – but whatever the intention was in the advent of punishment, its effect is always the same: it instills fear. This fear “tames” us, making it less likely that we will exact our violent will to power on others, but it in no way negates this will to power. And so, Nietzsche says, we turn these aggressive impulses inward, and mutilate our own souls (Nietzsche, 57). This is the only way we are able to express our will without fear of punishment, but in the end it becomes the cause of our own sickness. We make ourselves ill because we prioritize escaping punishment over following our