The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) is designed to provide officials such as our senior civilian and military policymakers with more in-depth information on some international topic of interest and likely course of future events (Johnson, p. 333). The NIE is designed to provide understanding in support of making tough decisions regarding complex international situations for policymakers. The NIE is produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) …show more content…
From there the TOR is then circulated through the IC for comments. Then a set of IC analysts from different agencies product the initial draft which is then reviewed by the NIC before being sent up for wider dissemination. Once reviewed the material must be vetted to discuss the quality and reliability of the sources for possible removal which is typically done through the National Clandestine Service within the CIA. IC experts from various agencies review the material to identify any errors and then it is forwarded to the National Intelligence Board which consists of senior representatives and is headed by the DNI. Once the final version is approved by the board it is then sent to the requestor along with the president and senior policymakers.
So why is the NIE an imperfect process that produces an imperfect product? First the entire process involves too many interests which can slow the process and result in a finalized product that does not meet the agenda. The IC consists of 16 different agencies all with dissenting opinions on what should be included or should not be which could lead to a myriad of problems to include an issue called groupthink. Groupthink …show more content…
Historically, an NIE on average has taken 215 days to produce (Johnson, p.342). But this seems to all depend on the situation at hand and whether a crisis is happening. During the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 we saw an NIE that only took a few hours to the most recent biggest NIE error was the three week product on the Iraqi WMD NIE. Many critics felt it was hastily prepared and some even referred to it as the `worst body of work in the CIA’s long history’ (Johnson, p. 343). This rushed product resulted in a myriad of problems to including dissenting opinions on the true threat of Iraqi WMD never reaching the light of day to incomplete and inaccurate product that did not reflect the views of the entire IC. If a cohesive and complete NIE is to be produced our analysts must be afforded the time to provide key predictive analysis. The NIE is designed to drive our national policy and we can ill-afford to make hasty analysis for the sake of appeasing higher