Milgram’s (1974) empirical study of obedience is of paramount influence within experimental social psychology. Milgram (1974) was notorious for his fascination with the perils of group behaviour and blind obedience to authority, and aspired to facilitate understanding surrounding human ability to act inhumanely, without boundaries or any apparent conscience, with specific interest surrounding the horrendous acts committed during the Holocaust (Mastrioanni, 2002). Milgram’s (1974) experiment is today considered somewhat controversial and unethical and has been significant in prompting ethical considerations in future studies. However it is still considered highly relevant to contemporary social psychology, with findings demonstrating a commonality that implies a universal obedience for authority (Miller et al, 1995). Despite Milgram’s (1974) undisputed influence, the research itself is not without dispute. Gibson (2011) takes a unique perspective, challenging Milgram’s (1974) work and the validity of the results, informed by rhetorical psychology, drawing specific attention to the interactions between experimenter and participant, including the way in which participants appeared to lure the experimenter into negotiation surrounding the protraction of the experiment. Within this paper, the findings will be critically examined and the implications for social psychology methods will be explored in consideration of discursive and cognitive social psychology. Gibson’s (2011) analysis denuded several alleged flaws to Milgram’s (1974) experiment which consisted of Milgram (1974) electing male participants after advertising in the newspaper. The procedure fundamentally entailed the participant being paired with another person where one was the ‘learner’ and the other the ‘teacher’. The experiment was set up so that the participant was the teacher, and the learner was one of Milgram’s (1974) alias (Dickinson, 2012). The learner was taken into a separate room where electrodes (which were, in fact, fake despite the participant being led to believe they were functional) affixed to him, and the teacher who was in the same room as the experimenter was asked to administer an electric shock from the faux generator, which consisted of a row of switches marked remote shock up to severe, with the severity of the shocks increasing as the learner gave increasingly incorrect answers in a memory task. The ‘learner cried out in alleged pain in correspondence with the shocks, although stopped crying out after the 330v shock was administered, despite protesting for the experiment to cease after the 150v shock (Gibson, 2011). Moreover, the experiment involved the utilisation of four standardised prompts with a further two integrated if the antecedent four were unsuccessful. This process was carried out until the participant ceased the experiment (Gibson 2011). The findings of Milgram’s (1974) experiment pointed specifically to what is termed as an ‘agentic state’ a power related dualism of agency – structure, which identifies people as operating on two levels, autonomous and as an agent (Holloway, 2005) .
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Milgram (1974) used this perspective to explain the behaviour expelled by the participants when continuing to administer increasingly severe shocks, even after the ‘learners’ protesting and once the experimenter had exclaimed that they would take responsibility, allowing the ‘teacher’ to take an agentic shift from autonomy (Reicher & Haslam, 2012). Nissani (1990), suggests that the human cognitive system is not fully reliable to recognise potentially malevolent authority despite them being supposedly benevolent, subsequently indicating that the participant’s behaviour may be conceptual, rather than as a result of forsaking their morals. Russell (2009) argues however, that this theory of agentic state should be replaced with the term ‘autonomous denial’, implying that the participants did, in fact, understand the implications of their actions, however, chose to deny them in hope of both avoiding confrontation with the experimenter, whilst adjacently dismissing blame for any wrongdoings, thus leaving argument open for whether or not the participants knowingly contributed to any immoral behaviour. Additionally, Milgram’s (1974) account of obedience implies links to the proximity of authority figures, determining that participants were more likely to obey when close to the experimenter. Holloway (2005), identifies, suggesting that when the ‘victims’ are within close proximity, then obedience drops. Reicher & Haslam (2012) discuss this, suggesting that when the participant is together with the ‘authority figure’ then they are far more inclined to classify themselves as the same.
Milgram (1974) used this perspective to explain the behaviour expelled by the participants when continuing to administer increasingly severe shocks, even after the ‘learners’ protesting and once the experimenter had exclaimed that they would take responsibility, allowing the ‘teacher’ to take an agentic shift from autonomy (Reicher & Haslam, 2012). Nissani (1990), suggests that the human cognitive system is not fully reliable to recognise potentially malevolent authority despite them being supposedly benevolent, subsequently indicating that the participant’s behaviour may be conceptual, rather than as a result of forsaking their morals. Russell (2009) argues however, that this theory of agentic state should be replaced with the term ‘autonomous denial’, implying that the participants did, in fact, understand the implications of their actions, however, chose to deny them in hope of both avoiding confrontation with the experimenter, whilst adjacently dismissing blame for any wrongdoings, thus leaving argument open for whether or not the participants knowingly contributed to any immoral behaviour. Additionally, Milgram’s (1974) account of obedience implies links to the proximity of authority figures, determining that participants were more likely to obey when close to the experimenter. Holloway (2005), identifies, suggesting that when the ‘victims’ are within close proximity, then obedience drops. Reicher & Haslam (2012) discuss this, suggesting that when the participant is together with the ‘authority figure’ then they are far more inclined to classify themselves as the same.