In United Brands case, mentioned earlier the CJEU stated that “charging a price which is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied would be an abuse” . Moreover, in the Microsoft case General Court stated that “reasonable remuneration charged should only reflect the “intrinsic” value of the technologies rather than the “strategic” value stemming from the IPR holder’s market power” . As the result, an approach in United Brands to determine “excessive” prices was based on two steps: analysis if the difference for costs and price charged is excessive and, further, the comparison of such difference with the competing products. As for the Microsoft, no exact rate for royalty calculation was found and established. Still, as the General Court mentioned: “the use of imprecise legal concepts within a provision does not prevent liability being established” .
To make more precision into the vagueness in the determination of value and unreasonable …show more content…
In particular, Judge James Robart in Microsoft v. Motorola case had to determine reasonable royalties for Motorola’s patents . To do so, firstly the hypothetical negotiation model from Georgia-Pacific for calculation of reasonable royalty damages was used. Secondly, the assumption that “from an economic perspective, a RAND commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a reasonable royalty on the economic value of its patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard” was taken. Finally, to express the specifics of RAND-related negotiation the court modified 12 factors of Georgia-Pacific in the way of their applicability regards following
To make more precision into the vagueness in the determination of value and unreasonable …show more content…
In particular, Judge James Robart in Microsoft v. Motorola case had to determine reasonable royalties for Motorola’s patents . To do so, firstly the hypothetical negotiation model from Georgia-Pacific for calculation of reasonable royalty damages was used. Secondly, the assumption that “from an economic perspective, a RAND commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a reasonable royalty on the economic value of its patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard” was taken. Finally, to express the specifics of RAND-related negotiation the court modified 12 factors of Georgia-Pacific in the way of their applicability regards following