Question 2: Jack v Cheryl
C wants to know what she needs to establish to bring a claim against J under the Act and the likelihood that she would be granted a share of Jack’s assets. Are there any custody issues, would C still help with childcare arrangements?
De Facto Relationship Defined
Jack (J) and Cheryl’s (C) 2 year and 11 month DFR:
• Is not a qualifying relationship under s 1C(2)(b) as it is shorter than 3 years by about 1 month. Thus, the provisions of s 14A would apply.
• If s 14A applies, then the Courts cannot make an order unless the court is satisfied that: o That there is a child of the DFR, or o That the applicant has made a substantial contribution to the DFR, and o The Court is satisfied that failure to make the order would …show more content…
Therefore, when they ceased living together on 30 September 2016, under s 11(1)(a)-(c) J and C are entitled to equal division of all their RP. The equal division principle in s 1N(c), is based on the presumption that in a qualifying relationship both partners acquire property by joint effort and all forms of their contributions are treated as equal. Parliament adopted this presumption based norm into the Act to minimise the emotional and financial costs of working out individual contributions as outlined in s 1N(d). rebutting this presumption can therefore present some significant challenges.
If the Court applies s 14A it would appear, that C has made a significant contribution to the relationship. In the first 9 months of the relationship C could not find suitable work, so J paid for all the household expenses, however C did all the domestic work, and cared for J’s two children from a previous relationship when they were home for the weekends. C also helped J with administration work in his drain-lying business. C also used some of her redundancy money to pay for an extra bedroom to be added to the FH so that the two boys could have their own rooms. She found a 30 hour per week job after 9 months, and she contributed to the household expenses, as well as continuing to do the domestic work, and assisting J with office work, and looking after the children. She also took the family for a holiday to America last Christmas …show more content…
This was demonstrated by the Court in P v H FC North Shore FAM-2008-044-1236, 11 February 2009, where it made a vesting order in the children to enable one party to buy out the other party’s share of the FH. In Walker at 565 and 245 Justice Cooke states this is not a power that should be exercised lightly as RP belongs to the parties and in Coxhead v Coxhead [1993] 2 NZLR 397 (CA), at 408 and 58, observed that the parties’ interests should not be displaced to reduce the proper entitlement of one partner and increase that of the other. Therefore, even though there is nothing in s 26(1) to support this restricted approach, J is unlikely to get a court order of this kind as the courts apply this section only in exceptional or special circumstances that are not present in J’s
C wants to know what she needs to establish to bring a claim against J under the Act and the likelihood that she would be granted a share of Jack’s assets. Are there any custody issues, would C still help with childcare arrangements?
De Facto Relationship Defined
Jack (J) and Cheryl’s (C) 2 year and 11 month DFR:
• Is not a qualifying relationship under s 1C(2)(b) as it is shorter than 3 years by about 1 month. Thus, the provisions of s 14A would apply.
• If s 14A applies, then the Courts cannot make an order unless the court is satisfied that: o That there is a child of the DFR, or o That the applicant has made a substantial contribution to the DFR, and o The Court is satisfied that failure to make the order would …show more content…
Therefore, when they ceased living together on 30 September 2016, under s 11(1)(a)-(c) J and C are entitled to equal division of all their RP. The equal division principle in s 1N(c), is based on the presumption that in a qualifying relationship both partners acquire property by joint effort and all forms of their contributions are treated as equal. Parliament adopted this presumption based norm into the Act to minimise the emotional and financial costs of working out individual contributions as outlined in s 1N(d). rebutting this presumption can therefore present some significant challenges.
If the Court applies s 14A it would appear, that C has made a significant contribution to the relationship. In the first 9 months of the relationship C could not find suitable work, so J paid for all the household expenses, however C did all the domestic work, and cared for J’s two children from a previous relationship when they were home for the weekends. C also helped J with administration work in his drain-lying business. C also used some of her redundancy money to pay for an extra bedroom to be added to the FH so that the two boys could have their own rooms. She found a 30 hour per week job after 9 months, and she contributed to the household expenses, as well as continuing to do the domestic work, and assisting J with office work, and looking after the children. She also took the family for a holiday to America last Christmas …show more content…
This was demonstrated by the Court in P v H FC North Shore FAM-2008-044-1236, 11 February 2009, where it made a vesting order in the children to enable one party to buy out the other party’s share of the FH. In Walker at 565 and 245 Justice Cooke states this is not a power that should be exercised lightly as RP belongs to the parties and in Coxhead v Coxhead [1993] 2 NZLR 397 (CA), at 408 and 58, observed that the parties’ interests should not be displaced to reduce the proper entitlement of one partner and increase that of the other. Therefore, even though there is nothing in s 26(1) to support this restricted approach, J is unlikely to get a court order of this kind as the courts apply this section only in exceptional or special circumstances that are not present in J’s