This means that identities can be relinquished by individuals, which in turn means that an identity can stop being normative for us if we stop accepting the reasons and duties it ascribes as compelling. However, Korsgaard asserts, it is necessary that one has a notion of one 's practical identity (120). According to her argument, there is reason to adopt a practical identity because, without it, one completely lack reasons for acting in any way. This reason is derived from one 's identity as a human, not from any specific practical identities one possesses. As such, she thinks that so long as we value our human identity, which she claims is the same as a moral identity, we have a reason to act in accordance with our particular identities. Our human identity simply is our moral identity because “valuing humanity in your own person rationally requires valuing it in the persons of others”
This means that identities can be relinquished by individuals, which in turn means that an identity can stop being normative for us if we stop accepting the reasons and duties it ascribes as compelling. However, Korsgaard asserts, it is necessary that one has a notion of one 's practical identity (120). According to her argument, there is reason to adopt a practical identity because, without it, one completely lack reasons for acting in any way. This reason is derived from one 's identity as a human, not from any specific practical identities one possesses. As such, she thinks that so long as we value our human identity, which she claims is the same as a moral identity, we have a reason to act in accordance with our particular identities. Our human identity simply is our moral identity because “valuing humanity in your own person rationally requires valuing it in the persons of others”