There are numerous speculations as to the origins of the self. However, what was once a common perception has been challenged and built upon from the work of philosophers. His observations distance themselves from many others, while omitting important facets as well. “Simplified” by Henrich, the procedure of Fichte’s thought can still be harrowing to follow, although it allows for more streamlined understanding. This is both a benchmark in history and a valid form of reasoning as an explanation.
Rather than assume self-consciousness as the beginning point for branching outwards with thought, Fichte adopts the role of discerning how self-consciousness is derived in its own right and questions how its own nature …show more content…
Explained differently, supporters of Fichte will assert that having human knowing as a dependency on supposedly independent and unknowable things-in-themselves could possibly be explained on the basis of necessary conditions of the self’s own activity of self-positing. Through this understanding, it is claimed that the not-self, without which the very self could not be a self, must ultimately be understood as another free self, thereby arguing for the necessity of belief in other selves as a condition of the possibility of the self’s own self-positing. Distinction between subject and object is one which can be made only within and by subjectivity …show more content…
It may also be contended that this absolute identity cannot be discursively demonstrated or conceptually articulated (because demonstration and conceptualization already presuppose a subject-object split) but can only be apprehended immediately in an intellectual intuition. Comparing these against one another with their thought processes and presuppositions in mind, my personal assessment leans towards that of Fichte’s conclusion and position. My reasoning behind this is heavily influenced by Heinrich, who enabled me to be more able to discern the process of logic that Fichte employed which brought his insights to fruition. Firstly, it should be again stated that Fichte has this belief of the original act of self-positing being an inalienable feature of our mode of being as subjects. As