In this paper, I will explain the Justified True Belief (JTB) analysis of propositional knowledge and provide a counterexample to it. I will then verify that the Casual Theory (developed by Alvin Goldman) is to a certain extent the correct analysis of propositional knowledge. The motivation behind my thesis is to prove that JTB, first established by Plato completely fails to analyse propositional knowledge, and the essay will highlight the facts how it fails to do so when answering the question.
The JTB analysis of knowledge states how propositional knowledge is analysed. Propositions are true or false and are things we believe and assert, such as ‘1+1=2’ or ‘the time is 11:04 AM’, and the JTB analysis defines how propositions are gained and …show more content…
Goldman states that perception and memory are the ‘appropriate’ casual connections for causing S’s belief that P; therefore with the lost dog case – the Gettier objection can be averted. This is because through perception, as in the lost-dog case when you saw the rock (which you thought was the dog) in the field, you believe the dog is in the field and the fact that there is a dog in the field causes the belief in the ‘appropriate’ way. Instead of the justification belief then, which is certainly susceptible to Gettier counter-examples, the casual theory replaces it and thus becomes immune to Gettier cases. This is because propositional knowledge, according to the casual theory requires no justification, and the knowledge is explained by what caused the belief instead. Hence, this is why the casual theory dislodges the traditional assumption ‘that epistemological questions are questions of logic or justification, not casual or generic questions’ (Goldman, 1967 …show more content…
Because the casual-theory rejects justification as a condition in the analysis of knowledge, the casual-theory nicely handles the standard Gettier cases. This is because the casual theory does not require that one be able to state one’s justification for believing that P. This makes it easy to account for one’s knowledge of propositional facts whose justification one has forgotten. Moreover, the Gettier cases like the lost-dog case I established before, were the result of some inference that was made from a premise that was considered a justified belief, but not about something true (that being in the lost-dog case, seeing the rock and thinking it was the dog). The massive advantage of the casual theory is its ability to eliminate inferences (a conclusion reached on the base of evidence and reasoning) that begin with a false proposition, such as in the lost-dog case seeing the rock and thinking it was the dog because there is a casual connection which causes the justification of the belief and links it with the truth of the
The JTB analysis of knowledge states how propositional knowledge is analysed. Propositions are true or false and are things we believe and assert, such as ‘1+1=2’ or ‘the time is 11:04 AM’, and the JTB analysis defines how propositions are gained and …show more content…
Goldman states that perception and memory are the ‘appropriate’ casual connections for causing S’s belief that P; therefore with the lost dog case – the Gettier objection can be averted. This is because through perception, as in the lost-dog case when you saw the rock (which you thought was the dog) in the field, you believe the dog is in the field and the fact that there is a dog in the field causes the belief in the ‘appropriate’ way. Instead of the justification belief then, which is certainly susceptible to Gettier counter-examples, the casual theory replaces it and thus becomes immune to Gettier cases. This is because propositional knowledge, according to the casual theory requires no justification, and the knowledge is explained by what caused the belief instead. Hence, this is why the casual theory dislodges the traditional assumption ‘that epistemological questions are questions of logic or justification, not casual or generic questions’ (Goldman, 1967 …show more content…
Because the casual-theory rejects justification as a condition in the analysis of knowledge, the casual-theory nicely handles the standard Gettier cases. This is because the casual theory does not require that one be able to state one’s justification for believing that P. This makes it easy to account for one’s knowledge of propositional facts whose justification one has forgotten. Moreover, the Gettier cases like the lost-dog case I established before, were the result of some inference that was made from a premise that was considered a justified belief, but not about something true (that being in the lost-dog case, seeing the rock and thinking it was the dog). The massive advantage of the casual theory is its ability to eliminate inferences (a conclusion reached on the base of evidence and reasoning) that begin with a false proposition, such as in the lost-dog case seeing the rock and thinking it was the dog because there is a casual connection which causes the justification of the belief and links it with the truth of the